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This research aims at examining Malaysia’s participation in the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations. Participation has many aspects. First, Malaysia had to decide if 
active participation was in its best interest. Second, the government had to determine 
priorities and specific negotiating positions. 
It was then necessary to provide Malaysian negotiators with reliable information, 
human and financial resources and the flexibility to adjust to the challenges arising from 
the negotiating process. Finally, Malaysia had to choose its partners and allies in order to 
achieve at least some of its negotiating goals. 
This research has shown that the outcome of the Uruguay Round was reasonably 
positive for Malaysia. The final act by and large reflected Malaysian negotiating 
positions. In the majority of the models used to predict or measure the impact of the 
round on world economies, Malaysia figures among the countries which benefited the 
most. This study argues that this favorable outcome was not the product of some ‘luck’ or 
benevolence on the part of other participants.  
The Malaysian government took a clear decision to participate in the talks in 
order to create a more stable, predictable and rule-based international trading system. It 
supported the launch of the Round, and entered coalitions of like-minded nations to get 
the negotiations started and to have a say on the agenda. At home, the government 
enhanced cooperation between the public and private sectors in order to gather reliable 
information and to reassure the domestic business community about its intentions. 
 vi
Malaysia used significant resources during the round to elaborate proposals and to make 
concessions, and determined to implement the agreements as swiftly as possible. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem and the outcome of the study. The 
negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round is considered in Chapter 2. First, market access 
problems such as trade in agriculture and textiles and clothing, and safeguards as well as 
systemic issues such as Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries and 
dispute settlement procedures are examined. Second, the ‘new issues’ of services, 
intellectual property rights and investment measures are described.  
In Chapter 3, the final agreements are analyzed. The Malaysian perspective on the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round is the subject of the third section of the chapter. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the description of the international environment before 
and during the trade negotiations. In Chapter 5 Malaysian foreign policy strategy adopted 
during the Round is presented. The Malaysian government and its ASEAN partners 
joined several coalitions during the negotiations.  
The Malaysian trade-policy making system is the object of Chapter 6. The 
Conclusion introduces some of the criticisms leveled at the outcome of the round by 
some Malaysian observers. It also presents some of the new issues that industrial 
countries wished to include in the WTO work program. The attempts to link trade policy 
to non-trade objectives is one of the factors that caused a change in Malaysia’s stance 
towards the WTO, shifting from a position of ‘friend of the negotiations to one of 
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1) THE ISSUE 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in December 1993 was hailed by most trade negotiators in 
Geneva as a ‘milestone’ in the history of the international trading system. The 
GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland called it a “monumental trade 
agreement” and declared that the final deal was “significantly larger in size 
and scope than anything done before.”1  
The delegates and the observers applauded the results that had been 
reached after eight years of negotiations: reductions in tariff barriers to trade; 
the start of a liberalization of world trade in agricultural products and textiles 
and clothing; the changes in many rules regarding trade in commodities and 
manufactured goods; the creation of new agreements for trade in services and 
intellectual property and the establishment of a new institution to govern the 
world trading system, the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Asian nations believed the agreements would help create a more 
predictable global trading environment; a Japanese negotiator noted that 
“there [was] finally recognition of the fact that the world economy is really 
global” and Haron Siraj, the Malaysian negotiator said that his country 
                                                 
1 FEER, 23 December 1993: 54. The agreements consisted of 26,000 pages. Croome (1999): 
xiii. 
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“looked at [the successful conclusion of the round] as a victory for 
international trade.”2
The declaration of the Malaysian negotiator was particularly 
significant because developing countries, including Malaysia, had not fully 
participated in the previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
The Uruguay Round saw the active participation of many developing 
countries and, more importantly, their governments accepted to engage in 
reciprocal exchanges of concessions with the other GATT contracting parties. 
In 1986, when the Uruguay Round was launched, it was agreed that 
the outcome was to be a single undertaking, i.e. all the agreements were to 
apply to all signatories, and all members were to submit schedules of 
concessions and commitments.3 The acceptance of the agreement as a single 
undertaking also meant that negotiations had to be successful on each and 
every issue tabled (nothing was agreed until all was agreed, as the European 
Union negotiators liked to remind other participants) and the history of the 
Round shows that it was an extremely complicated and long endeavor. 
Participation to the Round presented many challenges and difficulties 
for developing nations. First, the GATT had long been a ‘club’ for OECD 
countries. This meant that newcomers had to familiarize themselves with 
long-standing practices and many non written rules.4 Second, trade 
negotiations are very complex. A very important requirement is reliable 
                                                 
2 FEER 30 December 1993: 79. 
3 In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, contracting parties could opt out from specific 
agreements. 
4 See, for instance, the account by Ambassador Rubens Recupero, former trade negotiator for 
Brazil, of his first meeting in Geneva. Recupero, Rubens. (1998) “Integration of Developing 
Countries into the Multilateral Trading System.” In Bhagwati J. and Hirsh M. (eds.) (1998) 
The Uruguay Round and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Arthur Dunkel, Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
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information on all the issues in order to determine negotiating priorities. The 
agenda of the Uruguay Round was as ‘monumental’ as its outcome, and 
negotiators had to represent their countries’ positions on issues as varied as 
sanitary and phytosanitary rules and telecommunications. Third, an efficient 
bureaucratic support at home was absolutely necessary as well as the 
availability of officials capable of managing the impressive amount of data, 
dossiers, proposals together with the subtleties of the negotiating process. 
Finally, small trading nations have a very limited influence on trade 
negotiations if they stand alone. It is of paramount importance to participate 
in coalitions of like-minded countries in order to maximize leverage at the 
negotiating table. In fact, the Uruguay Round was launched because of the 
efforts of an alliance of smaller trading nations, the Cafe’ au Lait coalition. 
The influence of such coalitions was greater in the pre-launch phase 
and during the first years of the negotiations. The inclusion of the agricultural 
sector in the agenda of the round was made possible by the pressure exerted 
by the Cairns Group. It is, therefore, strategically important for a country to 
understand which international alliance will be more effective in promoting 
national interests at the negotiating table. 
This research aims at examining Malaysia’s participation to the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Participation has many aspects. First, 
Malaysia had to decide if active participation was in its best interest. Second, 
the government had to determine priorities and specific negotiating positions. 
It was then necessary to provide Malaysian negotiators with reliable 
information, human and financial resources and the flexibility to adjust to the 
challenges arising from the negotiating process. Finally, Malaysia had to 
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choose its partners and allies in order to achieve at least some of its 
negotiating goals. 
The following chapters will examine and explain how the Malaysian 
government succeeded in overcoming those challenges; the introduction will 
present an overview of the international trading environment during the pre-
negotiation phase on the Uruguay Round. 
 
2) THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTIES 
The Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986 at the Punta del 
Este Ministerial Meeting of the GATT contracting parties. The agreement to 
initiate a new round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) was reached 
after many years of discussions among major trading nations on the problems 
affecting global trade. 
In 1984, only five years after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, 
Arthur Dunkel, the then Director-General of the GATT, affirmed that 
“international trade relations [were] passing through their most troubled and 
divisive phase in the post-war period.”5 He was convinced that the trend 
towards ‘managed trade’ was so powerful as to “cast doubts on the 
commitment of governments … to the principle of comparative advantage 
and to the rule of law in international trade.”6  
The recession that had hit the world economy after the second oil 
shock of 1979 had prompted many industries in industrialized countries to 
demand protection from foreign competition. The worsening economic 
situation, especially the growing unemployment rates, convinced many 
                                                 
5 Dunkel, Arthur (1984) Address by the Director-General of the GATT to the International 
Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm, June 18, 1984. Reprinted in Forum (1984): 70. 
6 Dunkel (1984): 70. 
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governments to adopt sectoral policies that involved subsidies and ‘informal’ 
discriminatory trade restrictions, affecting especially exports from Japan7 and 
the newly industrializing countries.8
These policies were generally represented as exceptional and 
temporary.9 However, these practices were spreading, undermining the 
integrity of the open trading system. In addition to distorting competition and 
hindering the efficient allocation of resources, subsidies and ‘informal’ trade 
measures were also provoking a surge in trade disputes among nations.  
Sectoral systems of protection, “plotted in an extensive process of 
negotiations between domestic producers and the bureaucracy”10 - and often 
the most influential among the exporters – caused the ‘cartelization’ of whole 
industrial sectors, creating oligopolistic markets. Foremost examples of 
managed trade were the textiles and steel sectors. 
A second aspect of this protectionist trend was the return to 
bilateralism in trade relations. Industrialized countries negotiated bilateral 
trade restricting agreements with the aim of reducing both domestic pressures 
from industry lobbies and international frictions caused by their own 
protectionist policies. Governments opted for non-transparent forms of trade 
regulations, negotiated bilaterally with supplier countries, often “escaping the 
attention of … other trading partners.”11 In fact, both sectoralism and 
bilateralism in trade relations were also the answer of the ‘older’ 
                                                 
7 It is noteworthy that the first government to publicly ask for the start of preparations for a 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations was the Japanese government at the end of 1983. 
8 For a review of the trade policies of the industrialized countries in the 1970s and early 
1980s, see Lydia Dunn et al., (1983), In the Kingdom of the Blind: A Report on Protectionism 
and the Asian-Pacific Region, Trade Policy Research Center, London, UK. 
9 Dunkel would rather call those “policies’ ‘actions’ “because policy implies a settled intent 
and these actions were usually ad hoc responses to short-term pressures.” Dunkel Arthur 
(1984): 70. 
10 Dunn et al (1983): 66. 
11 Dunn et al (1983): 69. 
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industrialized nations to new and aggressive competition by newly 
industrializing countries.  
The protectionist wave was having a real effect on the economies of 
developing countries trying to industrialize their economies. As Dunkel 
stressed “potential investors in developing countries [needed] assurance that 
access to markets, particularly in the industrialized world, will not be 
restricted or cut off as soon as production achieves internationally 
competitive levels.”12
The global trading system was therefore becoming discriminatory, 
non-transparent, and based on bilateral (and short-term) agreements and not 
on multilaterally agreed rules. 
 
3) THE GATT PRINCIPLES 
The rules and disciplines of the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade13 were based on five fundamental principles: nondiscrimination, 
reciprocity, enforceable commitments, transparency, and safety valves.14
The nondiscrimination principle has two elements, the most favored 
nation and the national treatment rules. 
The most favored nation (MFN) rule requires that “a product made in 
one member country be treated no less favorably than a ‘like’ (very similar) 
good that originates in any other country.”15 It means that if a product from 
                                                 
12 Dunkel (1984): 71. 
13 The GATT was established in 1947. It had the responsibility of “setting and keeping the 
rules of international trade and promoting the removal of barriers to trade on a worldwide 
scale. It has pursued the task of trade liberalization by successive rounds of multilateral 
negotiations among its members.” Bayne, Nicholas. (1993) “In the Balance: The Uruguay 
Round of Trade Negotiations.” In Government and Opposition. Vol. 26 No. 3: 302-315: 303. 
14 The same principles apply to the rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization. 
15 Hoeckman, Bernard M. and Michel M. Kostecki. (2001) The Political Economy of the 
World Trading System. London and New York: Oxford University Press: 29. 
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one trading partner is subject to a tariff of 10 percent, similar products 
imported from any other GATT members have to be charged the same tariff 
rate of 10 percent. The MFN rule applies unconditionally, i.e. “it cannot be 
made conditional on considerations of reciprocity.”16
National treatment, the second component of the nondiscrimination 
principle, requires that imported goods must be subject to the same taxes and 
regulations that apply to similar goods domestically produced. 17
Because it has to be applied unconditionally, the MFN opens spaces 
for the free-riding of concessions. The reciprocity principle minimizes the 
opportunities for free-riding. Reciprocity can be realized in many ways: in 
bilateral negotiations it is achieved through the selection of products on which 
concessions are offered and sought; in multilateral negotiations, it is pursued 
through the selection of products that are to be exempted from 
liberalization.18
It is, however, important to remember, that “reciprocity is always a 
subjective notion. … It cannot be determined exactly; it can only be agreed 
upon and such agreement is possible only among countries sharing a 
commitment to some higher principle which, in the case of GATT, is, quite 
simply, the rule of law.”19
Agreements and commitments have to be enforced if they are to be 
credible. The commitments on tariffs made by GATT members upon 
accession or during a MTN are listed in the national schedules of concessions. 
                                                 
16 Hoeckman. and Kostecki (2001):30. “However, exceptions are made for the formation of 
free trade areas or custom unions and preferential treatment of developing countries.” 
17 “Once they have satisfied whatever border measures are applied.” Hoeckman and Kostecki 
(2001): 30. 
18 See Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 31. 
19 Dunkel Arthur (1982) Speech at Hamburg, on October 5 1982. Quoted in Dunn et al 
(1983): 72. 
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These lists establish the ‘ceiling bindings’, i.e. members cannot raise their 
tariffs above the ceiling level. That level is ‘bound’ and cannot be increased 
without offering compensation to the principal suppliers of the product 
subjected to the tariff. The MFN principle “ensures that such compensation – 
usually a reduction in other tariffs – extends to all … members.”20
If a government takes actions that might nullify or impair bound 
commitments or other multilateral trade disciplines, it may be asked by the 
damaged countries to change or rectify its policies. If the trading partners do 
not obtain satisfaction, the interested parties can have recourse to the dispute 
settlement procedures. 
The principle of transparency requires that members do share accurate 
information about their trade policies, laws and regulations. 
A very important role for the functioning of the international trading 
system is performed by the safety valves: governments have the faculty of 
restricting trade in some situations. The GATT provisions for safety valves 
included “articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain non-
economic objectives; articles aimed at ensuring ‘fair competition’ and 
[articles] allowing for intervention for economic reasons.”21
Non-economic objectives comprise public health, national security 
and protection for industries that are seriously injured by competition from 
imports (Article XIX). The second category covers the right of governments 
to charge countervailing duties (CVD) on imports that have benefited of 
subsidies and antidumping duties on imports that have been dumped in the 
home market. Interventions for economic reasons are allowed in the event of 
                                                 
20 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 34. 
21 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 36. 
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serious balance-of-payments difficulties, or to support ‘infant industries’ in 
developing countries. 
These fundamental principles had helped international trade flows to 
grow for almost five decades. Seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
had “resulted in a general lowering of the average tariff on manufactured 
goods among major countries from 40% when the GATT came into 
existence, to 5%” in 1986.22
The GATT system was under pressure from protectionist tendencies 
in industrialized countries; as Hoeckman and Kostecki noted “trade 
restrictions formed part of an inappropriate policy response to structural 
adjustment pressures, which were augmented by the emergence of East Asian 
countries as competitive suppliers of labor-intensive manufactures.”23
 
4) ASEAN AND THE LAUNCHING OF A NEW ROUND 
Developing countries had a strong interest in preserving an open 
global trading system. In August 1984, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia 
affirmed that “International trade as a means of achieving economic and 
social advancement should be allowed to flourish and can only do so within 
an environment of security, stability and predictability. There must be a return 
to internationally agreed rules and procedures for the better conduct of 
trade.”24
Developing nations, including Malaysia and its ASEAN partners, had 
not actively participated in the previous rounds of multilateral trade 
                                                 
22 Asmat bin Kamaruddin. (1986) “The New MTN Round – Protectionism or Freer Trade.” 
In Forum 1986: 37. 
23 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 43. 
24 Speech by the Prime Minister at the ASEAN-Australia Business Council (AABC) dinner in 
Sydney on August 13, 1984. Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 17 No.3 (September) 1984: 267. 
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negotiations. In the mid-80s, however, as the then Australian Ambassador to 
GATT commented, the “Pacific Rim countries moved decisively to actively 
support the convening of a new trade round. … The ASEAN group played a 
critical role in this shift.”25
Prime Minister Mahathir, a few years later, stressed the importance 
for a country like Malaysia to take part to trade negotiations. He thought that 
“Small though we maybe we must strive to influence the course of 
international trade. To grow we have to export. Our domestic market is far 
too small. It is important to us that free trade is maintained.”26  
In the early summer 1985, at the 18th ASEAN ministerial meeting, the 
foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand expressed their strong support for a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.27
Their support came at a critical time. A few months earlier, at the 
Bonn Economic Summit, the seven most industrialized nations had failed to 
find an agreement about a date for the start of a new round of trade 
negotiations. France had openly opposed the setting of a date and this setback 
had put the American administration under growing pressure from the 
protectionist-oriented Congress. Although there was still some optimism 
about the possibility of launching of the round in 1986, the pessimists would 
point to the difficulties that France could cause to its EEC partners, and to the 
                                                 
25 Oxley, Alan (1990) [Australian Ambassador to GATT 1985-1989]. The Challenge of Free 
Trade. Hemel Hemstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf: 97. 
26 Mahathir Mohamed (1991), Malaysia: The Way Forward, Working Paper presented at the 
inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council, February 28, 1991, Kuala Lumpur: 20. 
27 “The Foreign Ministers stated that ASEAN welcomed the launching of the new round of 
Multilateral Trade negotiations. Towards this end, they stressed the need to initiate 
preparations expeditiously”. Joint Communiqué of the 18th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
July 9, 1985. Foreign Affairs – Malaysia. (1985): 275. 
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mounting American trade deficit that was prompting vigorous protectionist 
reactions both in Congress and in the public opinion. 28
The US administration was adamant in his intention to launch trade 
negotiations and the possibility of a “Pacific Rim Trade Round” was 
circulated. Together with Japan and South Korea, the ASEAN countries had 
already signaled their interest in a new GATT round of multilateral 
negotiations.29
In the Joint Communiqué of the 18th ASEAN ministerial meeting, the 
foreign ministers recalled that “following deliberations by the Seventeenth 
ASEAN Economic Ministers held in February, 1985 in Kuala Lumpur, 
ASEAN conveyed its positions on major international economic issues to the 
Bonn Economic Summit.”30 The ASEAN communiqué did not hide the 
disappointment of its members with the outcome of the Bonn Summit, and 
stated that the foreign ministers “felt that the concern of ASEAN and the 
other developing countries had not been adequately dealt with.”31
The support of the Southeast Asian nations for the new round was 
motivated by a common concern for the state of international trade relations. 
Protectionist pressures in industrialized nations had created a situation where 
“more and more exceptions to GATT’s general trading rules and disciplines 
are extending beyond agriculture, textiles and clothing …, as policies on 
                                                 
28 “A Japanese official told the Review that he believed the new GATT round would be 
started in 1986 anyway” FEER, 16 May 1985: 66. 
29 “US Treasury Secretary James Baker said after the French veto that “if we don’t get there 
[a new trade round in 1986], I think it’s the position of the US [that] we need trade 
liberalisation, we need to resist protectionism. And I think that we would sit down with those 
countries that would sit with us …” FEER, 16 May 1985: 66. According to the FEER “A 
“Pacific Trade Round” [was] not yet a probability, but it emerged at the summit as a distinct 
possibility.” FEER, 16 May 1985: 69. 
30 Joint Communiqué of the 18th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 9, 1985. Foreign 
Affairs – Malaysia Vol.18 No. 3 (September 1985): 287. 
31 Joint Communiqué of the 18th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 9, 1985. Foreign 
Affairs – Malaysia Vol.18 No. 3 (September 1985): 287.  
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subsidies and discriminatory quantitative restrictions spread to other sectors. 
… The current trends have ominous portends of open trade warfare.”32
The early agreement among ASEAN nations about the need for a new 
GATT round was not only instrumental for the actual launching of the 
negotiations, but also enabled them to submit a common agenda at the 
ministerial meeting in Punta del Este in 1986, when the Uruguay Round was 
eventually launched.  
In the statement by the Malaysian Minister of Trade and Industry, 
presented on behalf of ASEAN at Punta del Este, the Southeast Asian nations 
asked for the establishment of a special negotiating group for tropical 
products; they wanted serious changes in trade rules applied to agricultural 
products, in particular in export subsidies on farm products which affected 
their exports and their export earnings. They stressed the importance of the 
preservation of the special and differential treatment for all developing 
countries. And ASEAN was not ready to link concessions on old issues with 
new issues. The traditional issues focused on trade in goods, while the new 
included trade in services, intellectual property rights, and trade-related 
investment measures.33
The decision to present a united front, in spite of sizeable differences 
in national priorities, came from the recognition that the new round, in the 
words of the Malaysian Trade and Industry Minister, was important for 
ASEAN.  
                                                 
32 Workshop on ASEAN Trade Policy Options: Multilateral Trade Negotiations; held on May 
8 1987 in Singapore by the Economic Society of Singapore. Working Paper 1: 6. 
33 See the “Statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry, on behalf of ASEAN, in Punta 
del Este, Uruguay, on September 16, 1986” at the Meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties 
at Ministerial Level. Foreign Affairs –Malaysia. September 1986, Vol.19 No.3: 83-85. 
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The external sector played a very important role in those economies: 
they were all relatively open and exports contributed around a third of the 
total ASEAN GDP and imports represented the same proportion of their 
combined expenditure. ASEAN exports of primary commodities, semi-
manufactured and manufactured goods had as their main destination the 
markets of industrialized nations. Therefore, “the [export] earnings and 
economic well-being of the ASEAN countries [were] highly dependent on 
free market access to these industrialised countries.”34
ASEAN countries had embraced industrial policies and investment 
incentives aimed at supporting manufactured exports. Although primary 
commodities remained significant export earners, manufactures constituted 
the fastest growing segment of ASEAN exports. Fiscal incentives, from tax 
holidays to accelerated depreciation allowances, and export incentives, in the 
form of export allowances, import duties exemptions, had been planned to 
foster export-oriented industrial activities. 35
 
4) MALAYSIA 
Malaysia had been at the forefront of this export drive.36 During the 
1970s Malaysia’s economy enjoyed an average real growth of 8 percent a 
year, thanks to favorable commodities prices. The economic growth was by 
and large spurred by the exports earnings from the mineral and plantations 
sectors. However, by the early 1980s, a severe commodities price slump 
                                                 
34 Statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry, on behalf of ASEAN, in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, on September 16, 1986. Foreign Affairs –Malaysia. Vol.19 No. 3 (September): 83. 
35 For a discussion of ASEAN economic sdevelopment at the beginning of the Round, see 
Ariff, Mohamed and Joseph Tan Loong-Hoe. (eds.) (1988) ASEAN Trade Policy Options, 
Singapore: ISEAS.  
36 This section draws on Piei Mohamed Haflah and Kamal Salih (1988) Malaysia and the 
Uruguay Round of Negotiations. Kuala Lumpur: MIER Discussion Paper n.112, March. 
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forced a reduction in government spending. The fall in public investment 
coincided with a dramatic decline in private investment and in 1985, for the 
first time since independence, the economy experienced negative growth (-1 
percent). 37
While the Government struggled to reduce both the budget deficit and 
the balance of payment deficit, it started to implement measures aimed at 
relaxing government control over economic activities and therefore 
stimulating private (mainly foreign) investments. 
The reduction in export earnings coincided with a significant increase 
of protectionist measures in the industrialized world. Trade protectionism in 
the largest export markets, particularly the European Economic Community 
and the US, was clearly a very serious obstacle to a sustained recovery, at a 
time when the Malaysian economy needed to expand export earnings and 
foreign investments 
The urgency of the situation prompted the Malaysian government to 
accept, for the first time, to play an active role in the multilateral trade 
negotiations. This meant to enter negotiations on domestically sensitive 
issues, and to be ready to make sizeable concessions in order to achieve 
greater access to industrialized countries markets. It involved taking grave 
risks. 
In particular, the outcome of the negotiations on the new issues, trade 
in services, intellectual property rights, and trade-related investment 
measures, would clearly impinge on behind-the border policies. In fact, the 
                                                 
37 Piei Mohamed Haflah and Kamal Salih (1988): 5. See also, Economic Planning Unit. 
Prime Minister’s Department Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990. Malaysia, 1986.:40 and 
Economic Planning Unit. Prime Minister’s Department. Mid-Term Review of the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan 1986-1990. Malaysia, 1989:13 and Table 1.1: 30. 
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Ministry of Finance in its Economic Report in 1986 pointed out as the most 
significant feature in the round “the inclusion of trade in services in the 
agenda for negotiations.”38 The report stressed that it would have paved “the 
way for bringing the area of trade in services under GATT regulations”, 
adding that it constituted a significant “departure from the previous GATT 
talks which concentrated only on commodities and manufactured goods.”39 A 
list of the new issues (that included foreign investments, copyrights 
protection, service industries and agricultural subsidies) followed and the 
author of the Report correctly concluded that “in view of the comprehensive 
agenda and the sensitivities of each agenda item to all contracting parties, the 
negotiation is expected to be extremely long and protracted.”40
Malaysia’s primary interest was to discuss market access for all its 
exports, both primary commodities and manufactures, and to revise other old 
and unsolved issues of special and differential treatment, safeguards and 
selectivity. In order to start negotiations the Malaysian government had to 
make a first, fundamental concession: to allow trade in services to be included 
in the talks.41 In 1986 Malaysia approached the new round with pragmatism: 
results could not be expected in all areas; the aim was to be able to get desired 
outcomes in agricultural trade, trade in tropical products, and substantial 
strengthening of the GATT system. 
 
                                                 
38Ministry of Finance/Malaysia, Economic Report 1986/1987, Kuala Lumpur, 24 October 
1986: 32. 
39 Ministry of Finance (1986): 32. 
40 Ministry of Finance (1986): 33. 
41 For a history of the Uruguay Round and the negotiations that paved the way to its 
launching see Croome John (1999), Reshaping the World Trading System. The Hague: 
Kluver Law International. Chapter 5 examines the role of Malaysia and ASEAN played in the 
negotiations to include the new issues in the Uruguay Round agenda. 
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6) SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE RESEARCH AND MAIN FINDINGS 
This research has shown that the outcome of the Uruguay Round was 
reasonably positive for Malaysia. The final act by and large reflected 
Malaysian negotiating positions. In the majority of the models used to predict 
or measure the impact of the round on world economies, Malaysia figures 
among the countries which benefited the most. This study argues that this 
favorable outcome was not the product of some ‘luck’ or benevolence on the 
part of other participants.  
The Malaysian government took a clear decision to participate in the 
talks in order to create a more stable, predictable and rule-based international 
trading system. It supported the launch of the Round, and entered coalitions 
of like-minded nations to get the negotiations started and to have a say on the 
agenda. At home, the government enhanced cooperation between the public 
and private sectors in order to gather reliable information and to reassure the 
domestic business community about its intentions. Malaysia used significant 
resources during the round to elaborate proposals and to make concessions, 
and determined to implement the agreements as swiftly as possible. 
According to this study, there were three main elements that defined 
Malaysia’s ability to confront such a complex challenge. First, the strength of 
ASEAN as a regional grouping: even if economic integration was rather 
limited, the group had a long experience of political cooperation at the 
multilateral level. The fact that the Southeast Asian economies had similar 
characteristics was not an obstacle, but instead turned out to be a conspicuous 
advantage. Sharing the same problems in the global trading system, the 
ASEAN countries were able to pool scarce resources, such as knowledge and 
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reliable data, and to define together which were their most urgent negotiating 
priorities. It is important to note that ASEAN had established a Geneva 
Committee in 1973: the foundations for a cooperative effort were already in 
place. 
Second, a tradition of strong executives in Malaysia allowed a small 
number of people to participate in trade policy debates. Trade policy was a 
very important component of the development strategy of Malaysia. Prime 
Minister Mahathir exerted a very strong control on economic policy-making, 
and he was convinced that the country’s best interest was served by a stable, 
predictable, rule-based international trading system.42 Lastly, the country had 
a relatively efficient and competent bureaucracy. Malaysia sent teams of 
skilled negotiators to Geneva. The bureaucracy was also capable of 
implementing a policy of ‘new partnership’ with the private sector. Although 
private sector involvement in trade policy discussions was mainly at the level 
of the gathering of the information necessary for the ongoing negotiations, it 
nevertheless entailed a significant effort to organize and monitor the 
numerous initiatives started during the Round. 
 
7) LITERATURE REVIEW 
Malaysia is a small open developing economy and, therefore, highly 
vulnerable to the pressures of world markets on its –relatively- fragile 
domestic structures.  
It could be possible to understand Malaysia’s participation in the 
Uruguay Round even leaving aside the fact that it is a developing country, 
                                                 
42 See, next section Literature Review and Chapter Six. 
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and focusing only on Malaysia’s position as a small state in the international 
political economy. As Katzenstein explained, the position of small states is 
“intrinsically weak” and therefore “this group of states has a strong interest in 
lowering tariffs, in preventing the formation of economic blocs, and in 
strengthening the principle of multilateralism.”43 When Katzenstein wrote 
Small States in World Market, at the beginning of the 1980s, he noted that 
there were similarities between the position of the European small states and 
many developing countries. He maintained, however, that developing 
countries’ attitudes towards the international economy could not be similar to 
those expressed by the small European states. LDCs found themselves at the 
periphery of the world capitalist system and could not be satisfied with the 
status quo.44
When examining Malaysia’s economy, it possible to notice many of 
the similarities mentioned by Katzenstein in his book, in particular, the 
country’s dependence on foreign capital, on imports of goods and technology 
and the need to export. Interestingly, he stated that “the small European states 
… tend to develop two different economic sectors, one externally oriented 
and competitive, the other internally oriented and protected.”45 The 
Malaysian economy presents the very same dualistic structure. 
However, developing countries were also confronted with their 
limited ability to compensate domestically for international instability. Small 
European states tried to compensate fluctuations in the global economic 
cycles by a comprehensive range of domestic policies aimed at shielding their 
                                                 
43 Katzenstein, Peter J. (1985) Small States in World Markets. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press: 39-40. He referred to small European states. 
44 Katzenstein (1985): 202-203. 
45 Katzenstein (1985): 84. 
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citizens from the worst effects of economic openness.46 The fragility of LDCs 
institutions and societies would preclude this option. 
It was therefore expected that developing nations would prefer 
“international regimes embodying authoritative rather than market allocation 
of resources.”47 In Structural Conflict, Krasner explained that the attitude of 
developing countries toward international regimes stemmed from their 
inability either to influence or adapt to the pressures of global markets.48
In fact, in the postwar period, and particularly in the 1970s, 
developing countries had supported the adoption at the global level of 
“principles and norms that would legitimate more authoritative as opposed to 
more market-oriented modes of allocation [of resources].”49 The attempt to 
establish a New Economic International Order (NIEO), and the Integrated 
Program for Commodities (IPC) were testimony of the LDCs dislike for the 
liberal trade regime represented by the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade.50 However, Krasner noted that there were probable exceptions: the 
newly industrialized countries of Asia that had adopted export-oriented 
strategies and had successfully adapted to the challenges of the international 
economic environment. Krasner concluded that “the contemporary NICs and 
other developing countries that become more capable of adjustment may 
eventually find attractive to throw their lot with the North” and “may come to 
                                                 
46 Katzenstein (1985): 46-47. 
47 Krasner, Stephen D. (1985) Structural Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press: 
11. 
48 Krasner (1985): 11 He defined regimes as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors expectations converge.” Krasner (1985): 4. 
49 Krasner (1985): 4-5. 
50 For an account of the NIEO negotiations and their failure, see Rothstein, Robert L. (1984) 
“Regime Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated 
Program for Commodities.” In International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 28 No. 3 (September): 
307-328. For a comprehensive history and analysis of the IPC, see Finlayson, Jock A. and 
Mark W. Zacher. (1988) Managing International Markets: Developing Countries and the 
Commodity Trade Regime. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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resemble the smaller industrialized states … in their positive attitudes towards 
liberal international regimes.”51 It could be then envisaged that a growing 
number of developing states would come to prefer a ‘fix-rule’ system (the 
GATT) to a ‘fix-quantity’ regime. 52
Malaysia had participated actively in the long and painstaking 
negotiations for the IPC. Actually, the International Natural Rubber 
Agreement (INRA) was the only new International Commodity Agreement 
(ICA) to emerge from the UNCTAD negotiations of the 1970s. 
Notwithstanding this –limited-success for his country, by 1983, Mahathir had 
reached the conclusion that the NIEO negotiations had been useless and 
Malaysia’s development needed a more effective international economic 
strategy. 
The literature on Malaysia’s development policies is rich. The history 
of the country’s industrialization and its different phases is brilliantly 
presented by Jomo and Edwards in Malaysian Industrialization in Historical 
Perspective.53 The authors describe how the tariffs and incentives/subsidies 
regimes varied according to the policy goals and how the policies towards 
export-oriented foreign direct investments (FDI) became gradually more 
liberal. In fact, Malaysian development strategy became progressively more 
dependent on foreign investments. As Ariff noted in The Malaysian 
Economy: Pacific Connections, “Malaysian trade policy is heavily influenced 
                                                 
51 Krasner (1985): 51. 
52 Bhagwati, Jadish. (1988) Protectionism, Cambridge: MIT Press: 47. 
53 Jomo K. S. and Chris Edwards (1993) “Malaysian Industrialisation in Historical 
Perspective” in Jomo K. S. (ed) (1993) Industrialising Malaysia: Policy, Performance, 
Prospects, Routledge: London and New York. For an account of the most recent trends in 
tariff and incentive policies, see Gustafsson Fredrik (2007), “Malaysian Industrial Policy, 
1986-2002” in Jomo K.S. (ed.) (2007), Malaysian Industrial Policy, Singapore: NUS Press. 
John H Drabble (2000) in An Economic History of Malaysia, London: Macmillan provides a 
good overview of the economic history of Malaysia. 
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or dependent on, its foreign investment policy and not the other way 
around.”54 Successive governments had actively promoted the country as a 
destination for foreign investments for an array of reasons: modernization of 
the economic system, employment generation, technology transfer, export 
promotion and regional development. In the mid-1980s, the Malaysian 
government was aiming at integrating the manufacturing sector into the 
emerging regional division of labor.  
The government concluded that the economic slowdown of the mid-
1980s signaled not only a cyclical slowdown of commodity prices, but also 
serious structural deficiencies in the domestic industrial base. Prime Minister 
Mahathir was convinced that there were no economic opportunities for 
commodity exporters, and embraced a strategy of export-oriented 
industrialization centered on the promotion of foreign investments, possibly 
in high technology sectors. The policies adopted are examined in detail by 
Jomo and Felker in Technology, Competitiveness and the State: Malaysia’s 
Industrial Technology Policies.55
Malaysian development policies linked economic growth to rapid 
modernization of the industrial/export sector to be realized through sizeable 
foreign investments. Clearly, these goals could not be achieved in the absence 
of a liberal economic system, where multilateral norms and institutions 
“facilitate policy coordination between states.”56  
                                                 
54 Ariff, Mohamed (1991), The Malaysian Economy: Pacific Connections, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press. 
55 Jomo K.S. and Greg Felker (eds.) (1999) Technology, Competitiveness and the State: 
Malaysia’s Industrial Technology Policies, London: Routledge. See also Jomo K.S., Greg 
Felker and Rajah Rasiah (eds.) (1999) Industrial Technology Development in Malaysia. 
London: Routledge. 
56 Katzenstein (1985): 45. 
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Malaysia and its ASEAN partners took the historical decision to 
support the launch of new GATT talks. It is important to understand that there 
was a very strong tradition of unanimity in the G-77 Group. As Finlayson 
stressed “[the G-77] leaders put very effective pressure on dissidents” in order 
not to weaken the developing countries’ front in multilateral fora. It is 
plausible to argue that the Malaysian government took the decision to break 
LDCs solidarity only because it was considered absolutely necessary for the 
success of its economic plans. Malaysia and its Southeast Asian allies showed 
they had more in common with small European states than previously 
thought: the tendency to favor a “pragmatic over an ideological 
orientation.”57
As noted earlier, the Malaysian government had ambitious plans for 
the economic transformation of the country. It was also politically necessary 
to maintain a rate of growth that could allow for the continuation of the New 
Economic Policy. The recession of the early 1980s had put into question its 
sustainability. 
In Ethnicity and the State, Jesudason described the role of the NEP 
and its goals of ethnic redistribution of economic opportunities as the 
principal reason for the preference accorded to foreign investors by the Malay 
ruling elite.58 The difficult relations between the state and the Chinese 
business community are the subject of many studies; Sieh-Lee Mei Ling in 
“The Transformation of Malaysian Business Groups” gave a critical account 
of the marginalization of the Chinese business in Malaysia and the retreat into 
                                                 
57 Katzenstein (1985): 46. 
58 Jesudason, James V. (1989), Ethnicity and the Economy, Singapore: Oxford University 
Press. 
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low risk activities of many Chinese entrepreneurs. 59 Searle in The Riddle of 
Malay Capitalism argued that Chinese businesses have suffered relatively 
little from the NEP and a real Malay capitalist class has emerged.60 The 
ruling coalition in Malaysia was able to contain protectionist pressures 
coming from domestic capital because, as Jesudason stresses, domestic 
capitalist were predominantly Chinese, and therefore, politically 
marginalized. The autonomy from Chinese capital did not mean that there 
were no distortions in the allocation of resources.61 But it meant that the 
government had the political opportunity to grant protection to some import-
substituting national ‘champion’ ventures and to the service sector, while at 
the same time offering a more liberal business environment to chosen foreign 
investors. 
The NEP had clear racial connotations. However, it also meant the 
creation of what Jesudason called the ‘enlarged state.’ An interesting parallel 
can be drawn between that increased role of the state in the Malaysian 
economy and the expansion of state control “over the domestic economy 
through the nationalization of a large portion of the national income” in the 
small European states.62 Mutatis mutandis, it can be argued that the 
Malaysian government adopted an outward-oriented development strategy 
                                                 
59 Sieh-Lee Mei Ling. (1992) “The Transformation of Malaysian Business Groups” in 
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because it had established a considerable degree of control over the 
distribution of domestic resources. 
The role of Mahathir in the economic policy-making and his political 
views are examined in great detail by Khoo Boo Teik in The Paradoxes of 
Mahathirism.63 The PM’s vision of Malaysia as a developed, modern state 
carried undoubtedly a great deal of weight in trade policy debates. His 
preoccupation of facing a real threat to national prosperity and therefore 
security did not disappear even when the Malaysian economic situation began 
to improve significantly. In 1989, Mahathir expressed his views about the 
trends in international relations. The general perception was that the Cold 
War was ending; however, the new situation was not without risks for smaller 
trading nations. According to Mahathir, “We will see in the years ahead 
increasing examples of economic expansionism … we can expect much of 
our future to be determined by the trading state rather than by the garrison 
and the military state.”64 As Khoo Boo Teik noted, Mahathir was worried 
about the tendency of the West to change the rules of free trade for fear that 
[developing countries] “might …invade and compete with them in their own 
markets.”65  
Khoo Khay Jin argued that Mahathir’s vision of an industrialized, 
technologically advanced Malaysia where the private sector, led by the Malay 
business elite, would play a fundamental role, was not shared by many in the 
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64 Speech of the Prime Minister at the 1999 Third Asia-Pacific Roundtable, organized by the 
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ruling party.66 However, for the aim of this study, it is important to note that 
the internationalization of the Malaysian economy and its integration in world 
wide networks of production was not uniquely a Mahathirist vision. In April 
1986, a few months earlier than the launch of the Uruguay Round, the then 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Razaleigh Hamzah, announced that 
“Malaysia [had] embarked on a programme of increasing internationalization 
of its economy for its future survival.”67 In 1985, it had been Razaleigh 
himself to announce that Malaysia was endorsing the new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.68 Razaleigh, although a member of Mahathir’s 
cabinet, was the PM’s main rival inside the UMNO. He was to lead the 
opposition against Mahathir inside UMNO. After a controversial defeat at the 
party’s elections, Razaleigh would fight against the government as founder 
and leader of a new political party. Opinions vary about the depth of 
ideological diversity between the two protagonists of the ‘Battle Royal.’69 
Crouch believed that “ideological and policy differences [seemed] to have 
played almost no part [in the party split].”70 On the other hand, Khoo 
contended that “underlying the conflict [was] a real difference in policy.”71 
Razaleigh appeared to support both export-orientation and foreign 
investments. Differences most probably existed on the distributive aspects of 
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economic policy, for instance about which groups were to benefit the most 
from the nation’s economic growth. However, it is reasonable to argue that, in 
1985, the decision to participate in the Uruguay Round was shared by a very 
large majority of the ruling UMNO party.  
 
8) SOURCES 
The research work has relied on the very extensive literature on the 
Uruguay Round negotiations; GATT and WTO Trade Policy Reviews of 
Malaysia have provided detailed data and also allowed for a comparison 
between the positions of the Malaysian government and GATT and WTO 
officials on various issues. The primary sources for the study are interviews 
with government officials and business representatives. About twenty 
interviews were conducted in July and September 2003. 
Interviews with representatives of business associations were very 
useful to understand the level of cooperation between the business 
community and state officials about WTO questions, commitments and 
implementation issues. 
Interviews with government officials provided important information 
about the negotiating positions of Malaysia and its working relationship with 
ASEAN countries and other coalitions’ partners. 
A very important source of information about the stance of the 
Malaysian government during the negotiations was Foreign Affairs- 
Malaysia: statements, speeches and declarations by the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and other relevant political personalities were 
 26
significant in order to assess the positions that Malaysia was supporting at the 
round on the many different issues. 
A conscious attempt was made on my part to avoid giving Malaysian 
negotiators the benefit of hindsight. I have used sources that were available to 
Malaysian policy-makers and negotiators at the time they were preparing for 
the round. Immediately after the conclusion of the negotiations, a large body 
of literature about the UR has been published. Much of these data and 
information were not available in 1986, or earlier. During the pre-negotiation 
phase and the round itself, one of the most difficult tasks for a policy-maker 
or a negotiator was to find and choose the right piece of information, and to 
make an educated guess on what could be relevant in ten years time, i.e. when 
the agreements reached at the Round would come into full effect. 
 
9) OUTLINE OF THE WORK 
The negotiating agenda of the Uruguay Round is introduced in 
Chapter 2. First, the ‘old issues’ are examined. They included traditional 
market access problems such as trade in agriculture and textiles and clothing, 
and safeguards as well as systemic issues such as Special and Differential 
Treatment for developing countries and dispute settlement procedures. 
Second, the ‘new issues’ of services, intellectual property rights and 
investment measures are described. Malaysia’s negotiating positions are 
presented at the end of each section. 
In Chapter 3, the final agreements are analyzed. As in the previous 
chapter, ‘old issues’ are examined first, followed by the new agreements on 
Services, trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related 
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investment measures (TRIMs). The main results of the Round are presented 
and Special and Differential treatment provisions are highlighted in every 
sub-section. The Malaysian perspective on the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round is the subject of the third section of the chapter. 
The following Chapter is devoted to the description of the 
international environment before and during the trade negotiations. A number 
of factors were exerting powerful pressures on smaller exporting economies, 
pushing countries like Malaysia to seek protection for their trade interests in a 
renewed GATT system. The recession that struck the world economy at the 
beginning of the eighties made only more apparent that the Tokyo Round had 
failed to resolve some of the most pressing trade issues, such as trade in 
agriculture. New problems caused by the success NIEs exports were enjoying 
in Western markets were feeding threats of trade wars. The call for selectivity 
and the rise of anti-dumping actions constituted serious concerns for 
developing countries trying to modernize their industrial structure. Moreover, 
there was a trend to adopt regionalism as defense against unwanted imports. 
Confronted with these factors, Malaysia developed a strong interest in 
strengthening the multilateral trading system, even as at the cost of accepting 
the principle of reciprocity of concessions. 
In Chapter 5, Malaysian foreign policy strategy adopted during the 
Round is presented. The Malaysian government and its ASEAN partners 
joined several coalitions during the negotiations. The objective was to 
maximize the potential benefits of participation in the talks, given the limited 
resources at their disposal. First, it is important to consider that ASEAN 
countries presented a united front, both in the pre-launch phase and during the 
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Uruguay Round itself. This strategy allowed ASEAN nations to deploy 
efficiently their resources and to elaborate common negotiating proposals and 
positions. 
Malaysia and its ASEAN partners joined the Café au Lait coalition. 
This group was able to mobilize enough support to make the launching of the 
round possible. In fact, the draft for the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del 
Este was a product of the Coalition. Malaysia was also a member of the 
Cairns Group. Although liberalization of trade in agriculture was limited, 
having brought it on the negotiating table was already a considerable success, 
given the strenuous resistance opposed by some members of the European 
Economic Community. Malaysia’s membership of APEC (and the East Asia 
Economic Grouping proposal) has to be considered part of the reaction to the 
very real risk of collapse of the Uruguay Round. The specter of regional 
trading blocs from which Malaysia and other outsiders would be excluded 
provoked an intense diplomatic activity that brought about APEC. 
The Malaysian trade-policy making system is the object of Chapter 6. 
The first section is devoted to the issues of political control and direction of 
the process of trade-policy making. The chapter then examines how the 
government was organized to lead trade policy and how governmental 
agencies approached the Uruguay Round. The last section focuses on the 
inclusion of the private sector into the discussion of trade policy. The need to 
gather indispensable information was central to the decision of involving 
segments of the private sector in a consultation process. This strategy of 
consultation and cooperation was also adopted in view of the inevitable 
problems in the implementation of the final agreements. 
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A short Conclusion summarizes the argument and the results of the 
research. It introduces some of the criticisms leveled at the outcome of the 
round by some Malaysian observers. It also presents some of the new issues 
that industrial countries wished to include in the WTO work program. The 
addition of these issues, labor standards and environmental protection among 
others, faced fierce opposition by developing countries’ governments. The 
attempts to link trade policy to non-trade objectives is certainly one of the 
factors that caused a change in Malaysia’s stance towards the WTO, shifting 
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 CHAPTER 2 




In this chapter the agenda of the negotiations is examined. First, the 
‘old issues’, those that remained unresolved at the end of the Tokyo Round, 
are presented; these included trade in agriculture, textiles and clothing and 
safeguards and Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries. 
Trade in agriculture was the most contentious subject for negotiations. 
Domestic agricultural policies in the United States, Japan and the European 
Economic Community were seriously damaging agricultural exporters around 
the world. Trade in tropical products was also affected by tariff escalation in 
developed countries’ markets. Another ‘old issue’ under scrutiny was 
international trade in textiles and clothing; as for agriculture, years of highly 
protectionist trade policies in industrial countries had worked to the 
disadvantage of the most competitive producers, which, for the most part, 
were developing nations. Special and Differential Treatment for developing 
countries had become inextricably linked with the issue of graduation. The 
Generalized System of Preferences was still considered by a majority of 
developing nations to be a valuable tool to access industrial countries’ 
markets. A related question was the request by developing countries for 
longer implementation periods for the agreements and less stringent 
requirements in many fields, for instance tariff bindings and tariff reductions. 
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Negotiations on new and improved rules for safeguards were of 
particular importance for countries that had embarked in an export-oriented 
industrialization drive. Anti-dumping actions and the imposition of 
countervailing duties by the United States and the European Economic 
Community had intensified in the 1980s. The introduction of selectivity in 
safeguard actions and anti-circumvention laws advocated by the EEC 
represented serious concerns for Asian exporters. A reform of the GATT 
dispute settlement procedures had been advocated for quite sometime. It was 
in the interest of smaller trading nations to have at their disposal a functioning 
and respected dispute settlement system, especially since the bigger players 
appeared to prefer unilateral actions to solve trade contentions. 
New issues had been brought to the table by the insistence of the 
United States. The US was determined to use the multilateral negotiations to 
open foreign markets for their service industries, to create a better world-wide 
protection for intellectual property rights, and to liberalize investment 
regimes. Developing countries had opposed the inclusion of those new issues; 
they accepted to enter negotiations on those subjects only when it became 
clear that it was the only way to preserve a rule-based international trading 
system and to improve market access for their exports. 
The chapter introduces the various issues and presents Malaysia’s 




While successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations had greatly 
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reduced tariffs and other barriers to international trade in manufactured 
goods, trade in agricultural products was administered by exceptions to the 
GATT rules. Since governments tended to consider agriculture as an activity 
deserving special treatment, trade in agriculture was severely distorted by 
intricate systems of import restrictions and export subsidies adopted by most 
of the industrialized countries. One major consequence of those systems was 
surplus production. The combination of import barriers and subsidized 
exports reduced export earnings and trading opportunities for those 
developing countries that relied on agricultural exports for economic 
growth.72 Trade disputes over agriculture were on the increase: while only 
comprising 10 percent of world trade (down from 50 percent in 1948), 
agricultural commerce accounted for about half of all trade disputes brought 
to GATT. 
The agricultural negotiations of the Uruguay Round were preceded by 
extensive and careful preparations. The parties involved often differed 
dramatically about the object and the aim of the negotiations. Strong 
disagreements over agriculture at the ministerial meetings in 1982 and 1984, 
and in the final discussions for Punta del Este, had come close to derailing the 
entire round. 
At the 1982 ministerial meeting, the ministers agreed to set up a 
Committee on Trade in Agriculture. During the following two years, the 
Committee examined “all matters affecting trade, market access and 
competition and supply in agricultural products” and in 1984, the Committee 
                                                 
72 See for instance, “Sugar Sours Friendship.” FEER 2 October 1986:106 “Trade relations 
between Washington and Bangkok … have taken a beating following a US-subsidized sugar 
sale to China, which Bangkok alleges, has further depressed the price of this key Thai export 
commodity.” 
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presented its recommendations on how to liberalize trade in agriculture.73 
These recommendations, accepted by the annual session of GATT members, 
“aimed at establishing conditions under which substantially all measures 
affecting agriculture will be brought under more operationally effective 
GATT rules and disciplines.”74 They included proposals on market access, 
export competition, quantitative restrictions and subsidies.  
The outcome of this preparatory work was that the Punta del Este 
Declaration was especially detailed on agriculture: three paragraphs – more 
than any other issue – defined the scope and the objectives of the 
negotiations. The Declaration stated that the negotiations should aim at 
liberalizing trade in agriculture and reinforcing the multilateral rules and 
disciplines governing the sector “by: (i) improving market access through, 
inter alia, the reduction of import barriers; (ii) improving the competitive 
environment by increasing disciplines on the use of all direct and indirect 
subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, 
including the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their 
causes; (iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture.”75
The main achievement of the Punta del Este Declaration was that for 
the first time in the history of GATT, there would be effective negotiations on 
trade in agriculture. However, the parties continued to have different 
positions on the various issues as well as different final objectives. The 
United States supported a wide liberalization effort; the EEC held the view 
                                                 
73 Croome (1999): 92. 
74 Croome (1999): 92. 
75 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, D. Subjects for Negotiations, in Croome 
(1999): 343 Annex. 
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that the negotiations should aim at bringing stability to the world agricultural 
market and not to establish free trade. The Cairns Group, an alliance of 
fourteen agricultural exporters, proposed gradual but progressive 
liberalization and was an ally of the United States. The difficulties 
encountered in the preparatory phases of the agricultural negotiations were to 
remain, posing serious risks to the success of the Round. 
 
TROPICAL PRODUCTS AND RESOURCE-BASED PRODUCTS 
Among the fifteen negotiating groups that started their work in 
Geneva in February 1987, two were established to deal with tariff and non-
tariff barriers relating to two sectors of trade: tropical products and products 
based on natural resources. 
The Tokyo Round had provided little liberalization in trade in the two 
sectors. It had proved contentious even to reach a generally agreed upon 
definition of tropical products. Some countries sought to include all natural 
products, raw or processed; most developed countries preferred a more 
limited definition of agricultural products from the Tropics.  
At the Punta del Este meeting it was agreed that the negotiations 
should aim “at the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical products, including 
in their processed and semi-processed forms.”76 The parties also recognized 
developing countries’ special interest in trade in tropical products and agreed 
that negotiations in that area should receive special attention. It was also 
agreed that positive outcomes of the negotiations could be implemented as 
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soon as possible, without waiting for the conclusion of the Round. 77
Although tropical products had been declared “special and priority” in 
the Tokyo Round, the outcome of the negotiations was disappointing for the 
developing countries. Industrial nations had agreed on a combination of most-
favored nation and GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) concessions and 
some reduction in barriers facing tropical products exports was eventually 
achieved by the conclusion of the Round. However, the gains for developing 
countries were limited. The United States was unwilling to accept that 
developing countries would not make offers on their own in return for 
concessions; the EEC saw the issue as critically linked with trade in 
agriculture and was even more reluctant to make significant concessions.  
At the Uruguay Round, as in earlier negotiations, tropical products 
were divided into seven groups: tropical beverages (coffee, cocoa, and tea), 
spices, cut flowers, tropical plants and plant products, oilseeds, vegetable oil 
and oilcake, tobacco, rice, and tropical roots (e.g. manioc), tropical fruits and 
nuts; tropical wood and rubber, and jute and other hard fibers. 
The chairman of the negotiating group was Paul Leong Kee Seong, 
former Minister for Primary Industry of Malaysia. The first proposal for 
negotiations came from the ASEAN countries, who suggested the 
harmonization of tariffs applied by industrial countries to the lowest tariff 
rates. Developed countries, on the other hand, were unwilling to apply an 
automatic formula approach, proposing instead a bid-offer process for 
specific products. The ASEAN proposal would actually have made it more 
                                                 
77 “The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of the negotiations 
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difficult to discriminate among product groups; industrial countries were 
unwilling to accept significant tariff and non-tariff liberalization to trade in 
tropical products that would compete directly with temperate products.  
There was also the issue of previous concessions made bilaterally by 
developed countries to some developing nations: the value of those 
preferences would have diminished dramatically if ASEAN’s approach had 
been accepted. 
According to the Punta del Este Declaration, negotiations on natural 
resource-based products had to aim at achieving “the fullest liberalization of 
trade in natural resource-based products, including in their processed and 
semi-processed forms” by reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff 
measures, including tariff escalation. 78
During the Tokyo Round, a negotiating group for these products had 
been working on these issues. The products had been divided into sub-groups 
and negotiators had examined the possibility of removing tariffs and non-
tariff barriers on the single group of raw materials and their processed and 
semi-finished forms. Despite considerable efforts by Canada and other 
producing countries, no tangible results were reached. However, exporters of 
natural resource-based products insisted on having a dedicated negotiating 
group at the Uruguay Round.  
The difficulties faced by negotiators at the Tokyo Round continued at 
the new round: according to participants, at the first meeting of the 
negotiating group in February 1987, “it became obvious that there was no 
agreement on what the role of the group should be, or what the negotiations 
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should cover.”79 Producing countries wanted to start negotiations, while other 
parties argued that the group should only examine what was being achieved 
by other negotiating groups, such as those working on tariffs, non-tariff 
measures, and agriculture. There was little agreement even on which sectors 
should be covered, and even on those considered to be covered by the group 
(non-ferrous metals, forestry products and fish), it proved hard to reach a 
decision about what could be negotiated. In fact, the important decisions for 
trade in natural resource-based products were taken by other negotiating 




Malaysia attached great importance to the negotiations on agriculture, 
tropical products and natural resource-based products.80 Although 
commodities were facing low prices and world wide surplus production, the 
non-oil primary sector was still contributing significantly to the economy: in 
1984, export earnings amounted to M$15.8 billion (US$6.2 billion), 
according to the Primary Industry Ministry Report.81 Malaysia produced 65% 
of the world’s palm oil, 45% of natural rubber, 27% of tin, and 17% of 
pepper, together with significant quantities of timber, coconut oil, tobacco 
and pineapples. 
Malaysia was the world’s largest palm oil producer. In 1984, palm oil 
was the country’s second biggest contributor to export earnings after 
                                                 
79 Croome (1999): 44. 
80 See Table 2.1 and 2.2 for relative importance of agriculture as export-sector and GDP 
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81 Quoted in FEER, 11 April 1985:78-79.  
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petroleum and gas. However, in 1986, the government was confronted with a 
major fall in prices. They had expected prices to be about US$400 a ton, but 
palm oil was fetching only US$280 in international markets. A few years 
earlier, prices were on average US$550 a ton. This downswing was partly due 
to increases in local production,82 and partly to US agricultural policy that 
encouraged soybean producers who were basically competing for the same 
markets.83
According to the 1984 Primary Industry Report, notwithstanding the 
diversification in crops that had taken place in Malaysia, the rubber industry 
still employed a third of agricultural labor, occupied more than 45% of total 
cultivated area and represented a substantial fixed investment of M$16 
billion.84 Although the commodity still provided sizeable export earnings, the 
prices for rubber were on a downhill path, while production was growing 
worldwide. In 1984, the International Rubber Organization held 275 000 tons 
of rubber; by 1986, the buffer stock reached 400 000 tons, making it 
impossible for the cash strapped organization to exert any influence on prices. 
Prospects looked brighter for other commodities like cocoa, 
pineapple, tobacco and pepper. Cocoa production, in particular, was on the 
increase: according to the Report, cocoa cultivation had expanded 10 times 
since 1974 and world prices were relatively more stable. 
Malaysia was not a rice exporter. However, rice production and the 
                                                 
82 According to commentators, “the smaller Malaysian mills and refineries [were] short of 
tank capacity. To make room they [had been] clearing at any price.” INSIGHT. March 1986: 
24-25. 
83 It is important to remember that some countries were accepting to liberalize the import of 
US soybean products in the attempt to reduce trade frictions originating from other sectors, as 
Thailand in 1986, when the government was facing the threat of being denied by the US GSP 
preferences for Thai exports. FEER, 2 October 1986: 106. 
84 Quoted in FEER, 11 April 1985: 78-79. 
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international price of rice were of great political and economic importance to 
the country. Rice was cultivated mostly by Malay smallholders; assistance in 
terms of loans, credit, subsidized input and a price support scheme had 
always been granted primarily for political reasons. 
Until 1983, the government policy for the sector had three main 
objectives: increasing production through efficiency gains and land 
development in order to achieve the highest possible level of self-sufficiency; 
increasing farmers’ income; and ensuring that consumers paid a reasonable 
price for rice. However, world prices had fallen by over fifty percent from 
1974 to 1986.85 It had become increasingly difficult for the government to 
finance the price support and other subsidies to farmers.  
In 1984, the New Agricultural Policy was introduced. Rice production 
was discouraged outside specifically designated areas, while the farmers in 
the rest of the country were persuaded to shift to other crops such as coffee, 
maize and groundnuts. The government successfully reduced subsidies to rice 
producers. It is worth remembering that “price subsidies alone represented 69 
percent of farmers’ annual net income in 1984.”86  
During the 1980s, Malaysia imported about 20 percent of its rice 
consumption. Subsidies encouraged production and limited imports; in the 
years 1986 and 87, notwithstanding the changes introduced in 1984 and 
despite the fact that rice was cultivated only on 11.3 percent of Peninsular 
Malaysia agricultural land, production and price subsidies targeted at paddy 
farmers amounted to more than 80 percent of total agricultural subsidies.87
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The rice subsidies were created to help Bumiputra farmers out of 
poverty.88 The very large majority of the paddy farmers were Malays and the 
Malay-majority constituencies were basically rural. Therefore, since 
independence, the UMNO-dominated Malaysian government had invested in 
agricultural development and income support for farmers in order to maintain 
electoral support among its rural constituencies.89  
Besides reducing its own expenditure, there was little else the 
government could do. The international price for rice was heavily influenced 
by the agricultural policies of developed countries.  
Timber was another important export commodity for Malaysia. In 
1984, the sector produced export earnings amounting to M$4.2 billion, or 
10.4 percent of the country’s total exports. However, Malaysian production 
was declining because of both a slowdown of deforestation due to 
conservation reasons, and more importantly, because of falling prices and “a 
general decline in demand for timber and timber products in Malaysia’s 
traditional as well as new markets”90 according to the Primary Industry 
Report of 1984. Although production continued to decline the following 
years, in 1986 Malaysia was still exporting 30 million cubic meters of logs 
and fewer than 6 million cubic meters of sawn timber. 
Malaysia is the world’s largest producer of tin. By the beginning of 
                                                                                                                              
1986 to 1988 … subsidies amounted to 298 Ringgits or about 56 percent of the import price 
in 1987.” It is also worth noting that the government was also sustaining considerable 
expenditures on drainage and irrigation works for rice production. 
88 “In 1970, over 88 percent of paddy farming households fell below the poverty line. 
Moreover, the main concentration of rive production is in the comparatively poor [and with a 
strong Malay ethnic majority] northern states.” Lucas and Verry (1999): 155. 
89 See, for instance, Crouch, Harold. (1996) “Malaysia: Do Elections Make a Difference?” 
and Jomo K.S. (1996) “Elections’ Janus Face: Limitations and Potential in Malaysia”. Both 
in Taylor R. H. (1996) The Politics Of Elections in Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
90 Quoted in FEER, 11 April 1985:78-79. 
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the 1980s, however, the price of tin had fallen precipitously. Technological 
developments, such as new packaging materials (mainly aluminum and 
plastic) had drastically reduced world demand for tin. In October 1985, the 
International Tin Council (ITC) in London announced that it had no resources 
left to support prices. At the time, there was US$ 900 million worth of unsold 
tin in the world market, or the equivalent of nine months of consumption.91
The issues of greater interest for Malaysia were market access (tariff 
and non-tariff barriers), and the inclusion in the negotiations of the 
agricultural policies of the industrial countries, in particular production 
subsidies and farm support programs. The Malaysian position was that 
agricultural trade liberalization should not be limited to a reduction in tariffs, 
but should extend to non-tariff barriers and include reform of domestic 
policies with potentially trade distorting effects. 
Protection would come in the shape of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(including quantitative restrictions), and unfair trade practices. Although 
tariffs on Malaysia’s agricultural products imposed by developed countries 
had declined, tariff escalation remained a problem.92 The EEC applied a 
MFN tariff rate for crude palm oil of 4 percent, while on processed palm oil 
the rate was 15 percent.93 Cocoa products also faced serious tariff escalation 
in the markets of developed countries.  
According to the World Development Report of 1986, tariffs on cocoa 
beans were around 2.6 percent on average, while processed cocoa and 
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chocolate products faced tariffs around 4.3 percent and 11.8 percent 
respectively. Timber and wood products were also subject to escalating tariffs 
in major importing countries. The effective rate of protection (ERP)94 for 
semi-processed or final goods could, therefore, reach high levels; it was not 
unusual for the ERP to exceed 100 percent on the value added component in 
processing.95 Hence, protection in developed countries’ markets not only 
depressed export levels, but also discouraged the development of agro- and 
resource-based industries at a time when Malaysia was actively seeking to 
promote their growth. In 1985, the Medium and Long Term Industrial Master 
Plan indicated that resource-based industries were among those selected to be 
modernized and expected to positively contribute to national economic 
development. 
A second major issue was the widespread use of non-tariff barriers. 
Quantitative restrictions, voluntary export restrictions (VERs), orderly 
marketing arrangements (OMAs), import inspection procedures, and standard 
health and sanitary regulations (including labeling requirements) were used 
by many countries to deter exporters.96 For instance, Malaysia had a duty-free 
quota for plywood in the EEC of 86 000 cubic meters; in 1986 Malaysia 
exported 168,685 cubic meters: the plywood exports above the quota limit 
                                                 
94 “The Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) can be defined as the proportional increase in 
valued added per unit of a good produced in a country relative to value added under free trade 
(no protection). The magnitude of ERP depends not only on the tariffs applied on the final 
product concerned, but also on the tariffs applied to the inputs used, and the importance of 
those inputs in the value of the final product.” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001):131. 
95 Ariff Mohamed and Joseph Tan Loong-Hoe (eds.), (1988), ASEAN Trade Policy Options, 
Singapore: ISEAS: 3. 
96 Managed trade had become a major issue for ASEAN countries: “In 1988, managed trade 
affected around one-third of Thailand’s exports to three major trading partners, namely the 
United States, Japan, and the European Community, Compared to Thailand ‘s overall 
exports, managed trade accounts for 18.1 percent. … In general, primary commodities are 
more affected by managed trade.” Suthiphand Chirathivat. “Managing Thai Trade Policy to 
Better Access Developed Countries Markets.” In ASEAN Economic Bulletin. Vol. 8, No. 1 
(July 1991): 72. 
 43
were faced with a tariff of 11 percent. In Japan, when the quotas for plywood 
were filled, the tariff went from zero to 20 percent. 
Discriminatory trading arrangements represented another obstacle for 
Malaysian exporters. Duty-free market access was given by the EEC to palm 
oil imports from ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and imports 
on other oil seed (e.g. soy beans) faced no tariffs. Canned pineapples from 
Malaysia were subject to a tariff of 24 percent in the EEC, while the same 
product was imported duty-free from ACP countries.97  
The agricultural policies of industrialized countries, characterized by 
heavy subsidies to their agricultural sectors, were causing severe distress to 
producers in developing countries. The EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy 
had contributed to the creation of a disproportionate supply of high cost 
vegetable oils and fats; the American policies of grain price support and other 
measures had promoted the over-production of soy beans. A depressed world 
price for palm oil and a decrease in export earnings for Malaysia were very 
direct consequences of the excess supply of vegetable oils and fats, sponsored 
by industrialized countries. The same policies were responsible for the 
depressed price of rice.  
The Malaysian government was determined to play a more active role 
in bringing the agricultural trade issues into the negotiations; its participation 
in the Cairns Group has to be appreciated in this context. In a 1988 paper 
based on the submission of the position papers of the Philippines and 
Malaysia to the Committee preparing for the ASEAN Summit of 1987, 
Narongchai Akrasanee argued that “ASEAN should continue to support the 
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Cairns Group for a coordinated preparation in the agricultural trade 
negotiations. ASEAN should also press for the adoption of basic principles 
that should govern world trade in agriculture. These principles should address 
the problems of market distortions.”98  
Malaysian palm oil exporters had also to confront a new kind of 
protectionist threat: “the dissemination of discriminatory and distorted 
information” by the American Soybean Association.99 The Association 
launched a campaign in 1986 to label palm oil, palm kernel oil and coconut 
oil as saturated fats. In fact, imports of palm oil in United States had 
increased and soybean producers reacted to competitive threat from palm oil 
and coconut oil advertising the health risks posed to the American consumer 
by the so-called “tropical oils.” The campaign maintained that palm oil and 
coconut oil were to be labeled saturated fats and that consumption of such 
products might cause heart-attacks, atherosclerosis, and heightened 
cholesterol levels. The Malaysian government reacted to the campaign at 
different levels. On the one hand, together with Indonesia and the Philippines, 
lobbied the US Congress to stop labeling laws; on the other hand, it promoted 
scientific research aimed at studying palm oil’s effects on human health. 
Early results showed that cholesterol levels do not seem to raise with palm oil 
consumption. 
Malaysia’s expectations from the negotiations on agriculture were 
moderate. As Asmat bin Kamaruddin, Director of the International Trade 
Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and negotiator for the 
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Malaysian government wrote in 1986, “one has to be extremely optimistic to 
expect that the new round would result in a substantial reduction in the 
average levels of protection in agriculture. But for the new round to succeed, 
it must attempt to resolve the question of how to protect agriculture in less 
disruptive and less inefficient ways.”100
 
3) TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
Since the late 1950s, international trade in textiles and clothing had 
been increasingly exempted from many GATT rules. The sector is typically 
labor-intensive and needs relatively limited technology inputs. These 
characteristics allow developing countries to have an inherent comparative 
advantage over industrialized nations in the production of textiles and 
clothing. As the industry in developed countries started to face strong 
competition from low cost Asian producers, it asked for and obtained 
protection. As a result, bilateral and discriminatory trade restrictions 
progressively spread both in terms of product and country coverage. 
The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was negotiated in 1973.101 The 
MFA was initially supposed to run for four years, but in fact it was renewed 
four times. The MFA allowed “arrangements that, in the words of an India 
statement transgressed the basic principles and rules of the GATT in letter 
and spirit.”102
The MFA was a multilateral arrangement that permitted governments 
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to negotiate bilateral agreements in order to limit imports of textiles and 
clothing. The rules of GATT would only allow safeguard actions to be 
applied against all imports independently of their sources and prescribed that 
the exporting countries had to be compensated for the damage caused by the 
restrictions. On the contrary, the MFA allowed governments to restrict 
imports from selected exporting nations, without having to provide any 
compensation. The agreements worked through “the imposition of individual 
quotas, which set precise limits on the quantity of textile and garment 
products to be exported from one country to the other. For every single 
product a quota was specified.”103 The MFA became more restrictive each 
time it was renegotiated: initially it applied only to cotton fabrics, but later on 
wool, man-made fibers, vegetable fibers and silk blends were included.  
In 1994, the MFA involved 45 countries, eight importers (Austria, 
Canada, the EU, Finland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States) 
and 31 developing country exporters. At the beginning of the 1980s, textiles 
and clothing constituted 45 percent of the total imports of OECD countries 
from developing nations. Therefore, “it was the MFA and not MFN that was 
the cornerstone of the institutional framework for North-South trade.”104
The exporters had different characteristics. There was a group of very 
efficient producers from East Asia, who could try to compensate for the 
quantitative restrictions by higher prices charged because of the artificial 
scarcity created by the MFA. A second group of suppliers – Brazil, India, 
Pakistan and others - were initially helped to develop the sector by limited, 
but guaranteed market access. As these exporters became more competitive, 
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they started to resent the Arrangement and asked for its liberalization. Finally, 
there was a third group of countries which were smaller and less efficient 
suppliers. These nations were able to exploit the MFA to gain access to 
markets in developed countries. Malaysia belonged to the third group of 
textiles and clothing producers. 
Trade in textiles and clothing became a subject for serious MTN 
negotiations for the first time at the Uruguay Round. The decision to discuss a 
possible liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing originated from 
interests of two very different groups of contracting parties. On one side, 
there was considerable pressure from the exporters; on the other, the US and 
the EEC established an implicit link between their demands for the round to 
address new issues such as services and intellectual property rights, and the 
developing countries’ demands for better market access for their 
manufactured goods, including textiles and clothing. 
At the meeting in Punta del Este, it was agreed that the negotiating 
group on textiles and clothing had the mandate to “formulate modalities that 
would permit the eventual integration of this sector into GATT on the basis of 
strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.”105
 
MALAYSIA’S POSITION 
By the early 1980s, the textiles and clothing industry was providing a 
crucial contribution to the Malaysian manufacturing sector, second only to 
electronics. Its development directly correlated to the export industrialization 
phases of the economy. The first modern textile factory in Malaysia started 
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operating in 1957 and was foreign-owned.106 The adoption of the Pioneer 
Industry Ordinance in 1958 was followed by an influx of foreign investments 
in Malaysia. This first wave of investments was due to imposition of high 
tariff – and the granting of sizeable fiscal incentives – and was predominantly 
oriented to the domestic market. In 1968 Malaysia introduced the Investment 
Incentive Act in order to stimulate export-oriented industrialization, and in 
1972 opened the first Free Trade Zones (FTZs). The tax holidays and other 
incentives of the Investment Incentive Act together with the duty-free 
regimes of the FTZs spurred a massive influx of foreign investments, 
including in the textiles and clothing sector. In fact, firms from East Asia 
opened production facilities in Malaysia to take advantage of the quota 
allocations under the MFA. Although Malaysia’s quotas were small – given 
its status of latecomer and small producer – the country was known for 
having a “policy of not discriminating against foreign companies in its quota 
allocation.”107
The economic reforms of the mid-1980s, especially the relaxation of 
the Investment Coordination Act and the enactment of the Promotion of 
Investment Act (1986) inaugurated a third wave of foreign investments. 108 
As a result, in 1988 foreign firms owned more than 50 percent of the 
country’s fixed assets.109 The Malaysian government successfully managed to 
incorporate the industry into global production networks at a time when the 
sector in the industrialized countries was going through a process of 
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restructuring and a new regional division of labor was emerging in Asia. 
Firms from Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore opened production 
facilities in Malaysian FTZs, effectively connecting the country to the triangle 
manufacturing arrangements that developed within Asia.”110 On the other 
hand, a growing number of Malaysian apparel firms successfully acquired the 
competencies and capabilities needed to supply firms from the developed 
countries directly.  
When the preparatory work for the Uruguay Round started, the 
industry employed 18 percent of the Malaysian manufacturing workforce.111 
Textiles and clothing exports represented about 20 percent of the country’s 
exports of manufactured goods.112 Exports to MFA countries ranged between 
55 and 65 percent of total industry exports while 82 percent of apparel 
exports were destined to MFA nations.113 The main destinations were the 
United States and Europe, especially the EEC countries. Malaysia had been a 
net importer of textiles and clothing products until 1982, when it registered a 
positive balance of M$91.7 million. The surplus came from the apparel sub-
sector, while the textile sub-sector remained in deficit.114
As mentioned earlier, Malaysia was one of the developing countries 
that had in fact benefited from the Multifibre Arrangement. Without the 
guaranteed market access offered by the quota system, a local industry would 
have faced insurmountable obstacles to develop and foreign investors would 
                                                 
110 See Smakman (2003) for a discussion on the internationalization and globalization of the 
industry. 
111 Business Times , 3 November 1983. Quoted in Jesudason (1989): 179. 
112 Mohamed Haflah Piei and Kamal Salih. (1988): 19. 
113 Mohamed Haflah Piei and Kamal Salih. (1988): 18. 
114 A problem for the development of the textile and apparel industry in Malaysia was 
undoubtedly that “foreign firms bought nearly all their intermediate products … abroad, 
particularly from their parent companies. In 1982, for example, only 6.5 percent of raw 
material procurement … was purchased from the principal custom area (Industrial Master 
Plan. Textiles. 1985:38).” Jesudason (1989): 179. 
 50
probably have not moved to the country.115  
The quota allocation system was under the direct responsibility of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) that managed the quotas in 
cooperation with the biggest industry association, the Malaysian Textile 
Manufacturers Association (MTMA). There were several criteria for the 
annual quota allocation. In short, quotas were generally granted to well 
established manufacturers with a robust track record of export performance, 
and priority was given to MTMA members.116 There was a lot of controversy 
about the allocation system as non-quota holders found it extremely difficult 
to become quota holders. As Ariff and Tan noted, inevitably, “bilateral quotas 
[had] given rise to rent-seeking activities. Trade cartelization … tended to 
prevent new entry.”117
This was one of the arguments in favor of the liberalization of trade in 
textiles and clothing. Moreover, the MFAs were getting ever more stringent 
both in terms of products covered (the MFA V identified exports down to the 
7-digit SITC categories) and in terms of quotas expansions.118 This made 
diversification increasingly difficult, and the annual quota increase of 1-2 
percent granted to Malaysian exporters would soon prove insufficient to 
accommodate the industry growth. There were provisions that would have 
allowed for Malaysia to ‘borrow’ unused quotas from other ASEAN 
members; however, procedures were too complicated for the limited domestic 
                                                 
115 Rasiah Rajah found in his study on Malaysia’s textile and garment industry that a very 
large majority of foreign firms “considered quotas as the most important reason for relocating 
abroad.” Rasiah (1993): 5. 
116 See Smakman (2003) for an accurate description of the quota allocation system in 
Malaysia. Box 5.1: 171-172. 
117 Ariff and Tan, (1988): 22. 
118 The SITC is a standard numerical code system developed by the United Nations to 
classify commodities used in international trade. 
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managerial and marketing resources.  
On the other hand, Malaysian authorities were aware of the lack of 
competitiveness of the domestic textile sector compared to both traditional 
East Asian producers and new low cost exporters such as Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the local industrialists were supporting a 
renegotiation with limited liberalization of the Arrangement.  
However, the multilateral negotiations offered the Malaysian 
government an ideal forum to oppose the spreading of selective import 
restrictions. The MFA had in effect been the precursor to a growing number 
of bilateral trade agreements, covering products as varied as steel and 
footwear that were threatening one of the fundamental principles of the 
GATT: non-discrimination among trading partners. In addition, the most 
important objective of the Malaysian negotiators was to ensure better market 
access for all the country’s manufactured goods. As already mentioned, the 
liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing was part of a complicated 
negotiating deal between the industrial countries on one side and developing 
countries such as India and Brazil on the other. Malaysia, and the ASEAN 
countries, could only try to smooth the path to a successful conclusion of the 
multilateral negotiations, in order to achieve its basic goals. 
 
4) SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
In 1947, the GATT rules and disciplines assumed parity of obligations 
for all contracting parties: no distinction was made between rich and poor 
countries. In the following decade, however, with numerous colonies gaining 
independence, the idea of granting preferential treatment to developing 
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nations gathered momentum. In 1965, a new Part IV on Trade and 
Development was added to the GATT, officially introducing the notion of 
special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries.  
Special and differential treatment was granted in two ways: better than 
MFN access to developed country markets through tariffs and other 
preferences, and exemptions from most of GATT rules and disciplines. S&D 
meant that developing countries were not supposed to grant tariff concessions 
and to bind tariffs. 
At the Tokyo Round (1973-79), the Enabling Clause was adopted. 
Included in the Framework Agreement and formally called Differential and 
More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, the Enabling Clause “sanctioned … preferences 
granted to developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP)119 by most developed countries, [allowed developing countries to] 
resort to non-tariff measures on infant-industry and balance of payments 
grounds, [consented to] tariff and non-tariff preferences granted by 
developing countries to one another (the so-called South-South Trade), 
[introduced] certain kinds of special treatment for “least developed” 
countries, and most importantly, a commitment by developed countries not to 
expect reciprocity of tariff and other concessions from developing 
countries.”120
In return for the adoption of the Enabling Clause, industrial nations 
obtained the inclusion of the principle of graduation: developing countries 
would lose the privileges granted by the S&D once they had reached a 
                                                 
119 The Generalized System of Preferences is examined in the next pages. 
120 Arndt Hans W.(1987) “GATT and the Developing World: Agenda for a New Trade 
Round.” In Weltwirtshaftliches Archiv, band 123, heft 4 (1987):707. 
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satisfactory level of economic welfare. Hoeckman and Kostecki argue that 
“the basic objective of OECD countries [in introducing the principle of 
graduation] was to progressively integrate into the GATT system developing 
countries with large markets or substantial trade levels and growth.”121
Some of the most successful developing countries, such as Korea, in 
addition to having become sizeable markets, were running large trade 
surpluses with industrial nations. The graduation principle was therefore 
increasingly invoked by developed countries. It is important to note that there 
was not an agreed upon definition of developing country. Each country had to 
declare its chosen status.122 Therefore, graduation was left to the parties to 
decide, sometimes bilaterally, more often, as in the case of GSP preferences, 
unilaterally by the preference-giving country. 
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was the most important 
form of S&D accorded to developing countries. 123 In Resolution 21 adopted 
at the UNCTAD II Conference in New Delhi in 1968 is stated: “the objectives 
of the generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences 
in favour of the developing countries … should be (a) to increase their export 
earnings; (b) to promote their industrialization; and (c) to accelerate their 
rates of economic growth.” 124
By the end of the Uruguay Round, there were 16 GSP schemes with 
                                                 
121 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 388. 
122 “This continues to be the case under the WTO. An exception concerns the group of 48 
least-developed countries, when the UN definition is used.” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 
389. 
123 In this section the past tense is used because we refer to the 1983-1994. However, the 
characteristics of the GSP system have not changed. 
124 The GSP was adopted at UNCTAD II in 1968. In 1971, the GATT contracting parties 
approved a waiver to Article 1 of the General Agreement for 10 years in order to authorize 
the GSP scheme. As mentioned before, the Enabling Clause of 1979 created a permanent 
waiver to the MFN clause to allow preference-giving countries to grant preferential tariff 
treatment under their respective GSP schemes. 
 54
27 participating countries.125 The system was complicated: each of the 
schemes had its own characteristics. Some were reviewed annually, others 
only occasionally. The preferences were usually directed at manufactured 
goods; only a few agricultural products received limited coverage. Under 
these schemes, manufactured exports generally had duty-free access to the 
preference-giving country market, while agricultural goods benefited from 
tariff cuts.  
To be eligible for GSP treatment, goods had to be shipped directly 
from the preference-receiving country to the preference-giving country and 
strict rules of origin were applied.126
The European Community and Japan limited the volumes of GSP 
imports by the adoption of safeguards mechanisms, such as tariff quotas, 
ceilings and a maximum country amount. The United States applied to its 
GSP imports the so-called Competitive Need Limit (CNL): “the CNL is 
reached when the GSP imports of a single product from a particular country 
constitute more than 50 percent of market share in the United States, or 
exceed a certain dollar value which is adjusted annually in proportion to the 
change in the nominal US GDP.”127 In short, GSP schemes were unilaterally 
managed by the preference-giving countries. As the schemes were 
periodically reviewed, the preferences might be withdrawn either in total – 
the preference-receiving country being graduated out of the scheme - or 
partially – by the removal of products from the list of GSP eligible goods.  
 
                                                 
125Malaysia was beneficiary of all schemes, except that of Bulgaria and Poland. MITI (1993) 
International Trade and Industry Report: 93. 
126 Goods “must be either wholly obtained or have undergone substantial transformation in 
the country of origin” MITI. (1993): 94. 
127 MITI (1993): 96. 
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MALAYSIA’S POSITION 
Malaysian exports under GSP schemes had been on the increase 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s. While they represented only 1.5 percent 
of total exports in 1973, by 1984 they were 9.19 percent.128 According to the 
1993 International Trade and Industry Report,129 by the end of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, GSP exports had reached 14 percent of total Malaysian 
exports. 
In 1984, the EEC, Japan and the United States received more than 90 
percent of GSP Malaysian exports; agricultural products represented 60 
percent of the total. Palm oil and palm oil products, including palm kernel oil 
were the most exported products, with a share of 30 percent of the total 
value.130 Electrical and electronics goods had a share of 19 percent. 
In 1992, the European Union the United States and Japan were still 
the largest importers of Malaysian goods under GSP schemes at 47.7%, 
32.1% and 7.5% respectively. Electric and electronics goods were the biggest 
exports, with a 31.28 percent share of the total value, while palm oil 
represented 10.6 percent of GSP exports.131
The Generalized System of Preferences had been beneficial to 
Malaysia in terms of enabling easier access to developed country markets, 
although the gains in terms of tariffs saved on its GSP exports were 
marginal.132 Another positive consequence of the GSP was that it increased 
the country’s attractiveness for foreign investors, as in the case of East Asian 
                                                 
128 MITI, quoted in Mohamed Haflah Piei and Kamal Salih. (1988): 22. Table 3. The 
percentage fell to 5.44 in 1985 because of the severe slump in commodity prices. 
129 MITI (1993): 93. 
130 Mohamed Haflah Piei and Kamal Salih (1988): 23. 
131 MITI (1993): 96-97. 
132 Mohamed Haflah Piei and Kamal Salih(1988): 25. 
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firms establishing export-oriented production facilities.133
At the Uruguay Round, Malaysia and the ASEAN countries sided 
with the Group of 77 in the defense of the Special and Differential Treatment. 
The GSP system was based on principles of non-reciprocity and non-
discrimination. However, increasing numbers of conditions that were attached 
to every renewal by preference-giving countries, and the growing threat of 
graduation was undermining both the principles and the scope of the 
preferences. Developing countries felt they were exposed to undue pressures 
to make trade concessions under the threat of withdrawal of GSP 
preferences.134
The Punta del Este Declaration openly supported the principle of 
S&D. It stated that “developed countries do not expect the developing 
counties, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are 
inconsistent with their individual development, financial, and trade needs.”135 
However, it also declared that “Less-developed contracting parties expect that 
their capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions … would 
improve with the progressive development of their economies … and they 
would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights 
and obligations under the General Agreement.”136
Malaysia was among the developing countries which were inclined to 
“participate more fully” in the negotiations. Notwithstanding a vigorous 
defense of the S&D principle, Malaysian negotiators were ready to make 
                                                 
133 Ariff (1990): 61. 
134 See for instance Thailand, as mentioned in footnote 11. 
135 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986) B (v). General Principles 
Governing Negotiations, reprinted in Croome(1999): Annex: 345. 
136 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986), B (vi). General Principles 
Governing Negotiations, reprinted in Croome (1999) Annex: 345. 
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offers (i.e. concessions) if they saw them as indispensable to reach their 
fundamental goal of improved market access for the country’s products.  
During the negotiations on Tropical Products in 1990, for instance, an 
impasse was reached when the developed countries declared that the offers 
made by the developing countries were unattractive. “As the major 
beneficiaries of any agreed concessions, the developing countries, especially 
ASEAN, [were] expected to improve on the quality and quantity of proposals 
made, to reflect their trade, development and financial standing. In this 
context, Malaysia’s offer [comprised] 128 items and it … indicated that it 
[would] improve on it if some of our specific interests, such as the narrowing 
of “exclusion lists” [were] met.”137  
It is extremely important to remember that, prior to the Uruguay 
Round, it was almost unconceivable for a developing country to make offers. 
Even though its negotiators would always insist on non-reciprocity of 
concessions, Malaysia was ready to consider undertaking more obligations as 
contracting party of the GATT. 
 
5) SAFEGUARDS AND EXCEPTIONS 
By the time the launching of the Uruguay Round was negotiated, the 
trade-enhancing effects of the tariff cuts introduced by the previous rounds of 
MTN were in danger of being nullified by the widespread use of Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs).  
Quantitative restrictions, subsidies, government procurement practices 
and technical barriers were common obstacles confronted by exporters. 
                                                 
137 Ministry of Finance. (1990) Economic Report. Feature Article 1: 26. 
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Export restraint agreements were also on the increase and these arrangements 
were applied against ‘selected’ trading partners in open contradiction to the 
MFN principle.138 According the Malaysian Ministry of Finance, “in 1988, 
there were more than 250 export restraint arrangements in force with over 25 
percent of the trade in non-fuel imports being subjected to NTMs.”139  
The GATT system offered safeguards and rules on subsidies, anti-
dumping and countervailing duties; however, at the Punta del Este Meeting, it 
was decided that those rules and disciplines needed urgent clarification and 
reform. 
Safeguard provisions are generally considered essential parts of any 
agreement aimed at liberalizing trade, since they allow governments to 
suspend or withdraw from certain commitments under specific 
circumstances.140 GATT safeguard provisions include: 
(a) Emergency Protection (Article XIX) temporary protection when imports 
of a product cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers; 
(b) Antidumping (Article VI) measures to offset dumping, i.e. pricing of 
exports below what is charged in the home market – that cause injury to 
domestic producers;  
(c) Countervailing Duties (Article VI) measures to offset the effect of 
subsidization that causes injury to domestic producers;  
(d) Balance of payments (Articles XII and XVIII:b) restriction on imports to 
safeguard a country’s external financial position; 
                                                 
138 Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs). 
139 Ministry of Finance. (1989) Economic Report. Feature Article 2: 36. 
140 Safeguards “function as both insurance mechanism and safety valves. They provide 
governments with the means to renege on specific liberalization commitments – subject to 
certain conditions – should the need for this arise. … Without them, governments may refrain 
to sign an agreement that reduces protection.” Hoekman and Kostecki (2001): 303. 
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(e) Infant Industry (Articles XVIII:a and XVIII:c) Developing countries could 
invoke these articles which allow restrictions to protect infant industries.141
During the first two decades of the GATT, contracting parties mainly 
used renegotiations to modify concessions and Article XIX when dealing 
with sudden increases in imports of a product. 142
In the seventies, industrial countries started to use Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERs). VERs were bilateral agreements on restrictions on the 
volume of exports of a product between the industry in the importing country 
and the competing industry in the exporting country.143 These were typical 
‘grey area’ measures, namely measures that were not permitted by the GATT 
rules but not banned outright. VERs provided some compensation to 
exporters, because they guaranteed market shares, and possibly higher 
prices.144  
Starting from the mid-1980s, lobbies seeking protection from their 
governments consistently asked for Anti-Dumping action (AD) to be taken 
against selected exporters. Between 1980 and 1986, the European Union 
imposed 213 AD actions, and only 10 Article XIX measures. During the same 
years the United States adopted 5 Article XIX measures and initiated 195 AD 
actions.145
 
                                                 
141 This list draws from Hoekman and Kostecki (2001): 303. There are also provisions that 
allow for permanent exceptions. They are the general exceptions (granted  to safeguard 
public morals, health, laws and natural resources (Article XX GATT), national security 
exceptions (Article XXI), and the renegotiations or modification of schedules are permitted 
under (Article XXVIII if compensation is offered. Hoekman and Kostecki (2001): 304. 
142 “The GATT allows governments to renegotiated tariff concessions and schedules of 
commitments. Renegotiation centers on the compensation that must be offered as a quid pro 
quo for raising a bound rate” Hoekman and Kostecki (2001): 308. 
143 OMAs “refers to VERs that are arranged on a Government to Government basis” Ministry 
of Finance (1989):36. 
144 A prominent example of VERs was the Multifibre Arrangement. 
145 See Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 306. 
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Article XIX and the ‘Grey-Area’ Measures 
Article XIX allowed governments to raise bound tariffs or introduce 
quantitative restrictions to protect domestic producers if and when domestic 
producers were seriously injured by imports of a specific product. However, a 
government could invoke Article XIX only if certain conditions were met.146 
Once invoked, a government had to offer compensation to the affected 
exporters and, most importantly, apply it on a MFN basis, i.e. they could not 
discriminate among suppliers.  
Industrialized countries considered Article XIX to be too strict and 
therefore burdensome to administer; as a result, surveys by the GATT 
Secretariat found that in the years preceding the Uruguay Round, grey-area 
measures were ten times more frequent than Article XIX actions. Besides the 
textile and apparel sector, they were widely used to reduce imports of 
automobiles, steel, footwear, and electronics.147
The Punta del Este Declaration asked the negotiating group on 
safeguards to reach a comprehensive agreement that should include the issues 
of transparency, coverage, objective criteria for action including the very 
controversial concept of ‘serious injury’, temporary nature of the measure,148 
degressivity (the progressive removal of the measure), compensation and 
retaliation.149
In addition to the definition of the concept of ‘serious injury’, the most 
                                                 
146 “Necessary conditions for the invocation of Article XIX under GATT 1947 were: (1) the 
existence of increased imports; which (2) resulted from unforeseen developments; (3) were 
the consequence of trade liberalization negotiated in a MTN; and (4) caused or threatened 
serious injury to domestic producers.” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 311. 
147 See Croome (1999): 53. 
148 Although “Article XIX actions were to be temporary in principle, no formal time limits 
were imposed. As a result, some actions taken by contracting parties lasted for many years” 
Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 305. 
149 See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986) D. Subjects For Negotiations, 
Safeguards. Reprinted in Croome (1999): 348 Annex. 
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divisive issue confronting the negotiators was ‘selectivity’: should safeguards 
respect in every instance the MFN principle or could they be directed at 
‘selected’ suppliers. The EEC supported the argument that restrictions should 
apply only to those exporters that were causing damages to the local 
industries. Many governments, however, considered that MFN was the 
fundamental principle of the GATT; developing countries, in particular, 
believed that the MFN principle was the strongest protection given by the 
GATT system to the smaller trading nations.  
 
Subsidies, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties. 
During the Uruguay Round a negotiating group on subsidies and 
countervailing measures was established to review the Articles VI and XVI of 
the GATT. 
Article XVI dealt with subsidies. The article declared that countries 
had to notify the GATT if they were providing subsidies that might have 
direct or indirect effects on trade. Export subsidies were to be avoided, 
although there was no formal prohibition.150 The Article did not clearly 
define the concept of subsidy.  
Article VI of the GATT covered anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties.151 In the first decades of the GATT, AD actions were rare; however, 
they proliferated in the 1980s.152 Australia, Canada, the EU and the United 
                                                 
150 “A tougher requirement, brought into effect in 1962, forbids exports subsidies which are 
to reduce the sale price of a non-primary product below its domestic sale price. However, this 
requirement was accepted only by developed countries.” Croome (1999): 58. 
151 “Dumping occurs when a firm sells products on an export market for less than what is 
charged on its home market for the same product. Dumping is also said to occur if the export 
price of a product is below the cost of production”. Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 315. 
152 Over 2000 AD investigations were initiated in the 1970- 1995 period. Source: WTO 
Antidumping Committee, Annual Report (2000). Quoted in Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 
315. 
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States used these measures most frequently. AD investigations could lead to 
the imposition of AD duties that were generally higher than the average tariff 
rate. AD duties were considered necessary to protect national producers 
against unfair business practices of foreign companies. AD investigations and 
subsequent imposition of duties created a lot of controversy between 
contracting parties; as a result, dispute settlement in this area became a major 
issue in the Uruguay Round. 
Contracting parties were visibly divided into two distinct groups: on 
one side there were the countries whose exports were targeted by AD 
investigations, on the other, the nations that were adopting AD measures. The 
first group called for more stringent and explicit rules that would restrict 
administrative discretion in the investigations, while ensuring a greater degree 
of transparency. The second group sought to maintain if not increase their 
discretionary powers to confront what they considered new and unfair 
business practices that were used by exporters to nullify the rules of the anti-
dumping code.  
A 1987 Japanese proposal clearly shows the difference between the 
two groups. According to the Japanese negotiators, there was a trend 
“towards imposing anti-dumping duty on parts and components of products 
subject to anti-dumping duty under the assumption that those parts or 
components [were] imported in such forms to circumvent the duty.”153 Three 
months earlier the EEC had adopted new anti-dumping rules which included 
‘anti-circumvention’ provisions. The introduction of the concept of ‘input 
dumping’ was a second matter of concern for the Japanese delegation: the 
                                                 
153 Quoted in Croome (1999): 68. 
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idea was that AD duties could be imposed on products which, were not 
‘dumped’ themselves, but contained dumped parts and components.  
The European Community, on the other hand, wanted the new 
agreement to endorse the principles of its own anti-circumvention laws. The 
EEC was concerned that companies were getting around anti-dumping 
regulations either by importing component parts of the product and then by 
assembling it in ‘screw-driver’ plants set up inside the EEC, or by assembling 
it in a third country before exporting it to the Community. 
Many countries, including most developing countries and the East 
Asian nations, vigorously opposed the inclusion in the new code of rules 
covering screw-driver plants, third-country assembly and input dumping. 
Governments might impose Countervailing Duties (CVD) when they 
found their industries were materially injured by imports benefiting of 
subsidies. Investigation preceding the imposition of CVD duties had to prove 
that imports had been subsidized and were causing material injury to the 
national industry.154
The main user of CVD investigations was the United States. A large 
number of these actions were not followed by the imposition of duties, but led 
to the introduction of trade restricting bilateral agreements.155 As in the case 
of AD, there were essentially two opposing views on the issue. On one side, 
there were those nations whose aim was to limit the ability of governments to 
grant trade-distorting subsidies to domestic industries; and on the other side, 
the countries that judged that the threat of CVD investigations and duties was 
unjustly exploited to harass more efficient producers. 
                                                 
154 The provisions are similar to those of AD and were described in the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies Code. 
155 See Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 331. 
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MALAYSIA’S POSITION 
Malaysian exports had been targeted by several anti-dumping 
investigations initiated by the United States.156 Most of the investigations had 
failed to prove dumping activities by Malaysian producers;157 they, however, 
had imposed heavy legal and administrative burdens on the accused 
exporters. Moreover, Malaysia was caught in the trade disputes between the 
United States and Japan; in a typical case of ‘third country dumping’ the US 
had accused Japan of using production facilities in Malaysia to assemble 
goods destined to be ‘dumped’ in the US market.158
In 1987, the EEC accused Malaysian urea exporters of dumping their 
product in the European Community market, and, as a result, the Malaysian 
producers had to accept an export restraint agreement. In 1987, New Zealand 
charged refined sugar exports from Malaysia with anti-dumping duties.159
As for CVD, the United States had started numerous investigations 
involving Malaysian producers. In 1988, four of such investigations had been 
initiated. In the same year, the US imposed a countervailing duty of 17.7 
percent on Malaysian exports of wire rods, because these products had 
benefited from government subsidies. 
In 1985, CVD investigations on textiles and apparel exports from 
Malaysia by US authorities were launched on the grounds that subsidies had 
been granted to Malaysian producers. CVD duties on textiles and apparel 
                                                 
156 See Table 2.1. Manufactured exports were rapidly increasing their contribution to foreign 
exchange earnings. 
157 "For instance, the US International Trade Commission (USTC) in … 1989 cleared 
Malaysia of allegations of dumping its thermostatically controlled appliance plugs , after 
investigating the complaint filed by Triplex Inter Control (USA) Inc.” Ariff (1990): 60. 
158 “The verdict of the Independent International Trade Commission was that the Japanese 
suppliers were guilty.” Ariff (1990): 60. 
159 Ministry of Finance (1989): 37.  
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products were automatically applied whenever the “exporting country’s 
subsidy … [exceeded] the trigger point of 0.5 percent. … Investigations by 
the US Department of Commerce showed that Malaysia’s export subsidy was 
only of the order of 0.22 percent for textile, and 0.27 percent for apparel.”160
Even if the main targets of AD and CVD actions were the North East 
Asian newly-industrialized countries, Malaysia was starting to appreciate the 
extent of the risks of being singled out for punitive action. 
The most serious systemic concern for Malaysia was the issue of 
selectivity. The international situation was such that the GATT’s principle of 
non-discrimination was upheld only in theory. In practice, even though 
safeguard measures were formally directed at products, not countries, the 
provisions were drafted with such accuracy to make safeguard actions 
discriminatory.”161 Selectivity was spreading out of the ‘traditional’ sensitive 
sectors, i.e. textiles and clothing, and had begun to represent a threat to 
Malaysian manufactured exports 
Malaysia was among the developing countries that supported a careful 
reconsideration of Article XIX of the GATT and wished to put severe limits 
on the use of VERs, AD and CVDs. It also urged an agreement on a more 
stringent definition of ‘serious injury’ and a time limit for emergency actions. 
The official position of the ASEAN countries was that the practice of 
both AD and CVD investigations had to be put under more stringent 
discipline. The ASEAN governments wanted to reduce the attractiveness of 
those measures in general and to discourage frivolous investigations in 
particular. As mentioned earlier, developing countries and East Asian nations 
                                                 
160 Ariff (1990): 60. 
161 Ariff and Tan (1988): 20. 
 66
believed that such actions were initiated mostly to scare the counterpart into 
bilateral agreements, notwithstanding the accuracy of the initial accusation. 
In the 1985/86 Economic Report, the Malaysian Ministry of Finance 
explicitly pointed out the crisis in the international trade system, highlighted 
by the unprecedented preference by the bigger players for grey area measures, 
as a major obstacle for national economic growth.162 Therefore, the request 
by ASEAN and Malaysian negotiators for a decisive strengthening of the 
dispute settlement procedures took on tremendous importance.  
 
6) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 
The efficient functioning of the international trading system requires 
effective resolutions of trade disputes. Multilaterally agreed upon dispute 
settlement procedures are of great importance for smaller trading nations 
since they are unable both to enforce rules by themselves and to oppose 
unilateral actions by larger states. 
Up until the beginning of the Uruguay Round, about 120 trade 
disputes had been taken to the GATT, and around 70 had led to the 
establishment of panels.163
Under the GATT, dispute settlement worked on the consensus 
principle. Ensuring that the parties agreed on the outcome of a dispute, the 
principle enhanced the probability of implementation of the shared decision. 
However, it also made it easier for disputants to block the procedures. A party 
could prevent the initiation and/or completion of the process.164 During the 
                                                 
162 Ministry of Finance (1986). See, for instance, p.86. 
163 See Croome (1999): 121. 
164 “This could be achieved through refusal of one of the parties to a dispute to agree to the 
formation of a panel, delay the appointment of a panel, or refuse to adopt the panel report.” 
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1980s and the early 1990s, numerous contentious trade disputes were left 
unresolved by the dispute settlement procedures.  
This inability to find a resolution for controversial trade disputes – 
often involving major trading nations – was not the only difficulty 
encountered by the system. The consensus principles implicitly frees parties 
to “decide how rules agreed on and accepted by many countries are to be 
interpreted” without any “guarantee that their interpretation [would] respond 
to the interests of other members.”165 Naturally, the existence of differing 
interpretations of the same rules deprived the system of one of its major 
requirements – predictability – and introduced an additional element of worry 
into trade relations.  
Moreover, when exiting rules were deliberately ignored by the parties, 
the damage done was even more serious. Rules became useless and the 
credibility of the entire system was diminished. 
At the Punta del Este Meeting a negotiating group was set up to start 
negotiations aimed at improving and strengthening the rules and the 
procedures of the dispute settlement process. The negotiations had to include 
the creation of a system of oversight and monitoring of the procedures to 
assist in the enforcement of the resolutions adopted.166
All GATT members appreciated the importance of a functioning 
dispute settlement process. Malaysia was aware that improved trading rules 
and enforcement procedures would provide more protection for a small 
                                                                                                                              
Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 74. For instance, the EEC twice refused to adopt panels’ 
recommendations regarding its agricultural policies. 
165 Croome (1999): 120. 
166 See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986) D. Subjects for Negotiations, 
Dispute settlement. Reprinted in Croome (1999): 349 Annex. 
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developing economy.167 Improved dispute settlement procedures were 
essential for defending national interests in trade disputes and to guarantee the 
existing agreements and of the new commitments that the country was going 
to accept as outcome of the Round.  
 
THE NEW ISSUES 
The addition of ‘new subjects’, namely services, intellectual property 
rights, and trade-related investment measures, to the agenda for negotiations 
was extremely controversial. 
A very determined alliance of less developed nations, led by Brazil 
and India tried to have these items excluded from the Round; it took a 
significant effort on the part of industrialized countries, supported by a group 
of middle-income developing countries, to keep the ‘new’ issues on the 
negotiators’ table. 
 
7) TRADE IN SERVICES 
The service sector consists of activities as diverse as transportation of 
people and goods, financial intermediation, communications, distribution, 
hotels, education, health care, and accounting. Services are indispensable 
inputs for all economic activities; hence service sector policies have a great 
influence on national economies.  
During the 1980s, technological developments created the opportunity 
for introducing competition in markets previously considered natural 
monopolies, for instance telecommunications. As a result, some governments 
                                                 
167 See for instance, MITI (1993):62. 
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started to deregulate the service sector. Reforms were generally supported by 
manufacturing and agricultural lobbies since they stood to benefit from more 
competitive markets for services.  
New sectoral policies in industrialized countries and technological 
innovations caused a spectacular growth in global trade in services. In the 
1980s, service trade expanded at a faster rate than trade in goods, and “the 
potential to exploit recent and emerging technological developments that 
allow cross-border trade in services … [was] enormous.”168  
The United States was the first country to propose the adoption of 
multilateral rules for trade in services. Service industries in the United States 
lobbied aggressively in support of a multilateral services agreement to 
improve their access to foreign markets.169  
As the launching of the Uruguay Round approached, all the interested 
industries united to form a Coalition of Service Industries with the aim of 
promoting their liberalization goals at the negotiating table.170 According to 
Sell, the Coalition’s primary target was the highly regulated service market in 
Japan and East and Southeast Asia.171
The United States negotiators advanced the most trade-liberalizing 
proposal: they supported an agreement similar to GATT, with generally 
                                                 
168 UNCTAD and the World Bank. (1994) Liberalizing International Transactions in 
Services: a Handbook. Geneva: United Nations. Quoted in Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 
241. 
169 “Private-sector activists convinced the US government to incorporate services in revisions 
to its trade laws, and the United States pursued Section 301 against Europe and Japan for 
barriers to service trade.” In Sell Susan K. (2000) “Big Business and the New Trade 
Agreements.” In Stubbs R. and G. R. Underhill (eds.) (2000) Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order.” Dom Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press: 177. 
170 Prominent members of this Coalition were the American Express bank and the Arthur 
Andersen consulting group. 
171 Sell (2000):177. 
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binding obligations and universal sectoral coverage.172 The United States 
assumed that its industries enjoyed a strong comparative advantage in the 
provision of services, and tried to link the success of the negotiations on ‘old 
issues’ to the liberalization of trade in services. 
The European Community’s proposal backed the American argument 
that all kinds of service transactions should be included in the negotiating 
agenda.173 However, the European position was more moderate than the 
Americans’: any potential agreement would have required the participants to 
accept only limited binding obligations, and national treatment was to be 
negotiated on a sector-by sector basis. 
Many developing countries had opposed the inclusion of services in 
the negotiating agenda. The G-10, a developing country grouping led by 
Brazil and India, had vigorously resisted the extension of multilateral rules to 
new areas, and its opposition continued during the Punta del Este meeting. 
They argued that the Round must focus on the traditional issues, those of 
interest to the developing countries, instead of concentrating on new areas of 
negotiations to the benefit of industrialized nations alone. 
The attempt to link up improved market access for manufactured 
goods to the liberalization of service trade was a source of grave concern for 
all developing countries, even those that had supported the launching of the 
Round and the inclusion of services in the negotiations. Moreover, 
                                                 
172 “MFN was to apply to all signatories and national treatment was to be a binding, general 
obligation. Trade was to be defined broadly, including FDI (commercial presence). All 
measures limiting market access were to be put on the table.” Hoeckman and Kostecki 
(2001): 249-250. 
173 “The EU proposed establishing a committee to determine the ‘appropriateness’ of 
regulations, with inappropriate measures to become the subject of liberalization negotiations 
and commitments on a sector-by-sector basis for all participating countries.” Hoeckman and 
Kostecki (2001): 249. 
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developing countries were worried at the prospect of having to expose their 
relatively weak, primitive and traditionally heavily-protected service sectors 
to unrestrained competition by powerful foreign companies.174
The hostility of many developing countries to the inclusion of services 
in the GATT framework was overcome by dividing the negotiations into two 
distinct sections. The Punta del Este Declaration is made of two parts: Part I 
is dedicated to negotiations on trade in goods, and Part II deals with trade in 
services. Part I was endorsed by the contracting parties, while Part II “was 
adopted separately by ministers acting simply as representatives of their 
governments.”175 Formally at least, services remained outside the GATT 
framework.  
A Group of Negotiations on Services176 was formed whose aim was to 
“establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in 
services, … with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization. …. Such framework shall respect 
the policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying to 
services.”177
The Group decided to define services according to the ways in which 
they can be delivered, i.e. their ‘mode of supply’. The delivery of services 
may or may not require the establishment of a commercial presence in the 
country where the service is bought, as happens frequently for banking and 
consulting services.  
                                                 
174 See, for instance, Asmat bin Kamaruddin (1986): 39. 
175 Croome (1999): 25. 
176 Its equivalent for goods was the Group of Negotiations on Goods, chaired by the Director-
General of the GATT. 
177 See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986) Part II – Negotiations on 
Services. Reprinted in Croome (1999): 352 Annex. 
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Clearly negotiations in this area were raising a new range of 
politically sensitive issues because they dealt with behind-the border policies. 
At the beginning of the negotiations, many developing countries, supported 
by the UNCTAD, held the view that negotiations should not include service 
transactions supplied through FDI.178 Although the demand was clearly made 
for domestic political reasons – the governments wished to retain their ability 
to impose conditions on FDIs and to protect domestic industries – the official 
reason was the scarcity of reliable data. 
Actually, negotiators had to rely on extremely weak data on services 
and on the barriers to trade in services. The lack of relevant information was 
such that it was necessary to depend on rules of thumb to determine 
negotiating priorities. Even by the end of the Round, cross-country data on 
the size of barriers to trade in services did not exist. It is also important to 
note that “because services are generally intangible and nonstorable, barriers 
to trade do not take the form of import tariffs. Instead, trade barriers take the 
form of prohibitions, QRs [quantitative restrictions], and government 
regulations.”179
The scarcity of data and the difficulties negotiators were bound to 
confront had they tried to identify and quantify trade barriers, virtually 
prohibited the adoption of the traditional methods of negotiations based on 
progressive liberalization through cuts in tariffs. Instead, “subjective notions 
                                                 
178 “UNCTAD … proposed that trade in services be defined to occur only when the majority 
of value added was produced by nonresidents. This definition excluded virtually all 
transactions through FDI, as foreign factors of production that relocate are generally 
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Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 249. 
179 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 242. 
 73
of reciprocity became the focal point of negotiations.”180
 
MALAYSIA’S POSITION 
In 1987, as negotiations on services effectively were getting 
underway, the Malaysian service sector’s contribution to the GDP was about 
48 percent,181 in line with the country’s position as a middle-income 
country.182  
Malaysia, however, had traditionally run a deficit in its services 
account, due largely to net factor payments, freight costs and insurance. Net 
factor payments consisted of interest payments on foreign loans, and 
repatriation of profits and dividends on foreign investments.183 Not only did 
net factor payments comprise the bulk of the invisibles account deficit, but 
they were on the increase: in 1980, they accounted for 30 percent of the 
deficit, rising to 60 percent by 1993.184  
The government was deeply involved in the sector both for regulatory 
and political reasons. Banking, insurance, and transportation and 
telecommunications were among the most protected activities; as “a 
protectionist trade-in-services policy [was] tightly bound up with the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), the Malaysian Government’s long-standing 
comprehensive affirmative action programme in favour of the ethnic Malay 
                                                 
180 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 249. 
181 Lim Chze Cheen. (2006) Malaysia: Strategies for the Liberalization of the Services 
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183 Ariff (1991):19. 
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majority.”185
Although a privatization policy was being enacted, “privatization 
[was]… expected to open up new opportunities for Malaysians entrepreneurs, 
particularly Bumiputera, within the context of the NEP.” 186 The sector, in 
other words, was expected to be and stay an entirely domestic precinct. The 
rationalization of this argument took the traditional form of the infant industry 
case: Malaysian service sector was too young and small to be able to sustain 
international competition. 
The issue of trade in services was further complicated by the 
complexities of the subject and the lack of reliable information.187 The 
novelty of the subject, the lack of detailed information, and uncertainty even 
about what information should be available to negotiators, added to the 
Government’s perplexities. However, Malaysia was one on the developing 
countries that supported the launch of the round, together with its ASEAN 
fellow members.  
The ASEAN consensus on the issue had not been easy to achieve; 
actually, the fact that consensus had been achieved was unanimously 
presented as unprecedented proof of ASEAN cohesion.188  
As soon as the negotiations started, Malaysia tried to secure consensus 
on the possibility of total or partial exclusion of certain sectors from any 
eventual framework agreement, and the recognition that developing countries 
                                                 
185 Sally, Razeen. (2004) Southeast Asia in the WTO. Singapore: ISEAS Publications: 30 
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187 In 1988, the conclusion of Lee (Tsao) Yuan’s study on the service trade of ASEAN 
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from powerful foreign intrusion. 
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“should be accorded differential treatment based on their levels of 
development as a whole and also of specific service sectors.”189 Malaysian 
negotiators were ready to agree upon a framework agreement that would 
ensure that barriers to trade in services were transparent and non-
discriminatory and would take into appropriate consideration the needs of the 
‘infant’ service industries in developing countries.190
It was certainly in Malaysia’s best interest to participate in the 
creation of a code that would regulate trade in the sector. Since a range of 
concepts had yet to be defined, and the choice of one definition over another 
was expected to carry economic consequences, it would have not been 
prudent for Malaysia to let industrialized countries simply act according to 
their national interests. 
Moreover, given the impact successful negotiations would have on 
market access issues, the country had to accept the service sector inclusion in 
the agenda, if only to strengthen its own and the ASEAN negotiating 
positions. 
 
8) TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) 
Among the subjects on the negotiating table, the Punta del Este 
declaration included the very controversial issue of protection for intellectual 
property rights. Intellectual property, which can be described as information 
of commercial value in the market place, covers industrial property and 
copyrights. Industrial intellectual property rights protect mainly inventions 
and trademarks. Copyrights are associated with literary and artistic 
                                                 
189 Ministry of Finance (1989): 28 Feature Article 1. 
190 See, for instance, Asmat bin Kamaruddin (1986): 39. 
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production. 191
Governments regulate intellectual property rights with the aim of 
encouraging innovation, since patented technologies and processes enjoy a 
temporary monopoly, while ensuring that the information will be available to 
the industry and the general public at the expiration of the patent.  
Intellectual property rights’ inclusion in trade negotiations was due to 
two main causes. First, during the 1970s and the 1980s, trade in manufactures 
increased relative to trade in commodities, and international trade in so-called 
‘high-technology products’ –those with generally a valuable knowledge 
content- increased relatively to global trade in other manufactured goods. 
Second, technological development made it comparatively easier and cheaper 
to ‘copy’ goods with IP content.192  
Governments from industrialized countries reached the conclusion 
that their industries were being damaged by the lack of proper IPR protection 
in many developing countries. Business associations lobbied their 
governments to create multilateral rules for IPRs, arguing that appropriation 
of intellectual property was as serious a violation of their property as theft. 
Developing countries unanimously disagreed with the proposed 
adoption of multilateral rules. They maintained that regulation of IPRs should 
remain a domestic policy issue and that more stringent IPR rules would 
inevitably result in welfare losses for their populations and become an 
obstacle to economic development. These countries also maintained that 
existing international conventions offered sufficient protection for IPRs. 
                                                 
191 See Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 274. 
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Lego toys … as well as pirated copies of compact discs, software, and videos.” Hoeckman 
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In fact, there are a number of international conventions dealing with 
intellectual property rights. The Paris Convention covers industrial property 
IPRs; the Berne Convention deals with copyrights and the Rome Convention 
oversees sound recording and music. The Paris and Berne conventions were 
negotiated for the first time at the end of the 19th century, and revised many 
times thereafter, while more recently a new convention was added, the Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.  
The purpose of these conventions is to extend the domestic protection 
in signatory’s countries to foreigners; the conventions also stipulate minimum 
standards of protection. All these agreements are managed by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, a UN body based in Geneva. And, 
according to the developing countries the WIPO was precisely the most 
appropriate forum for discussion of IPRs protection. 
However, industrialized countries were not convinced that the existing 
conventions were sufficient to regulate trade-related IPR issues and they 
wanted to use the GATT to improve on the protection offered by the existing 
agreements. 193
There were important issues they wanted to address; first, 
industrialized countries demanded stronger rules against counterfeiting; 
second, they asked for stronger and better enforced national laws on 
trademarks; third, they supported the establishment of a multilateral dispute 
settlement system to deal with the frequent IPR-related disputes. 
Before the Uruguay Round, very few GATT rules dealt with 
                                                 
193 The existing conventions had left open some gaps. “For example, the Paris Convention 
does not stipulate the minimum duration of patents, or define what should be patentable. No 
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intellectual property rights; trade in counterfeited goods was the most 
common issue discussed at the GATT level. In fact, during the Tokyo Round, 
informal negotiations on the matter were started, but the parties could not 
reach an agreement.  
Disputes on trade–related intellectual property rights were frequent, 
and they were generally solved through bilateral negotiations, where bigger 
trading nations used threats of sanctions – often successfully – to induce 
developing countries to change their IPRs laws or to enforce them more 
strictly.194
The United States used the threat of sanctions more frequently than 
other industrialized nations. In fact, American firms, through their industry 
associations, lobbied the US government to force its trading partners to 
improve legal protection of IPRs and to fight trade in counterfeited goods 
more vigorously. When it became clear that a new round of MTN was to be 
launched, twelve US transnational corporations formed a new lobby group 
(the International Intellectual Property Committee) with the declared aim of 
promoting their views during the negotiations.195 The Committee held talks 
with European and Japanese business associations196 and successfully 
achieved a wide consensus on the issue: at the opening of the Round, the 
United States, the European Community and Japan were supporting firmly 
the inclusion of trade-related intellectual property rights in the negotiating 
agenda.  
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The newly-created international lobby presented a proposal – the 
‘Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property’ – to their 
respective governments in June 1988; the US government endorsed the 
industry-backed proposal during the negotiations. 
The mandate of the negotiating group on trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights was twofold; negotiators were asked “to develop a 
multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with 
international trade in counterfeited goods” and to “clarify GATT provisions 
and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines” on intellectual 
property.197 In accomplishing their mandate, they had to take “into account 
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, and [should] ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate 
trade.”198
The negotiations on TRIPs were very difficult and slow, because of 
the divergence of objectives and opinions between industrialized and 
developing countries. Industrialized countries asked for negotiations to cover 
the widest range of IPRs, and insisted that IPRs rules should be enforced both 
at the multilateral level, via a GATT dispute settlement mechanism, and at 
national level.  
Developing countries dissented. They were favorable to negotiations 
on trade in counterfeited goods, but maintained that the mandate of the 
negotiating group was limited to clarification of existing GATT rules. 
                                                 
197 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round. (1986) Part 1, Section D, Subjects for 
Negotiation. Reprinted in Croome (1999): 349 Annex. 
198 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round. (1986) Part 1, Section D, Subjects for 
Negotiation. Reprinted in Croome (1999): 349 Annex. 
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Developing countries had three main concerns: first, they wished to limit the 
damage on legitimate trade made by industrialized countries’ unilateral 
actions taken for IPR protection. Second, they did not want to endorse 
international rules that would reinforce monopoly rights of foreign 
multinationals on many pharmaceuticals goods and agricultural inputs. Third, 
developing countries had concerns about the higher costs they would most 
likely incur, both in acquiring technology and in administering complex 
agreements. 
In effect, the negotiations on TRIPS were about adopting a 
multilateral legal regime of IPRs that would require signatories to adapt and 
modify their national regulations.199 Industrialized countries’ negotiating 
agenda focused on the introduction of global standards of IPRs protection. 
During the first two years of negotiations very little progress was 
made. However, developing countries did not present a perfectly 
homogeneous front. Some nations had unilaterally changed their IPRs laws in 
order to attract high technology FDIs. Others reformed their domestic 
regulations under the threat of sanctions. These two groups of developing 
countries believed it was in their best interest to adopt a more positive attitude 
at the negotiating table. When the European Commission tabled a new 
proposal in July 1988, Korea and the ASEAN countries indicated that they 
might start to cooperate on the issue. 
 
 
                                                 
199 TRIPs agreement ‘is an example of … ‘positive integration’. This contrasts with the 
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MALAYSIA’S POSITION 
Malaysia shared the concern of developing countries that stricter 
multilateral rules on intellectual property rights “might inhibit access to 
technology and new information.”200 It was also critical of the industrialized 
countries’ request for a broad agreement, and supported the alternative 
approach put forward by developing countries: a TRIPs agreement dealing 
only with trade in counterfeited and pirated goods, and would leave other 
aspects of intellectual property rights protection under the jurisdiction of 
national laws and existing international conventions. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, “the main contentious issues [in 
TRIPs negotiations] related to the applicability of the concepts of MFN and 
National Treatment. It [was] felt the resulting equal treatment accorded to all 
parties goes much further than what existing IPR conventions [provided]. 
This agreement [might] also not cover various exceptions granted by existing 
IPR conventions.”201  
As a matter of fact, many developing countries were not signatories of 
the mentioned conventions, and those who were had frequently exercised 
their right to exempt many pharmaceutical products, agricultural products and 
processes from IPR protection.202 Those exceptions would generally not be 
permitted under a new multilateral agreement. 
On the other hand, Malaysia was actively promoting the technological 
upgrading of its industrial system. Singapore had been reasonably successful 
in cooperating with foreign investors in this field and Malaysia had high 
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hopes to succeed as well. If foreign investors were to add more sophistication 
to their production lines in Malaysia, they had to be reassured about the legal 
protection of their property rights, intellectual or otherwise. 
Moreover, the government had recently enacted new intellectual 
property laws that conformed to the standards defined by the Berne and Paris 
Conventions. Therefore, domestic regulations were largely TRIPs 
consistent.203  
As in the case of services, Malaysia’s position was that the benefits of 
a comprehensive MTN agreement outweighed the cost of any concessions the 
country had to make. 
 
9) TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES (TRIMS) 
The decade that preceded the opening of the Round saw a robust 
growth in the flows of foreign investments. Many changes in the global 
economy contributed to this increase not the least of which was the 
liberalization of foreign investment regimes in many nations. In several cases, 
governments tried their best to attract those investments, and the 
competition’s outcome was a vast array of tax incentives, export subsidies 
and other measures aimed at attracting multinational firms.  
On the other hand, these governments wanted to retain a measure of 
control on foreign activities, and therefore imposed various requirements that 
had to be met by investors prior to project approval. 
The policies that governments used to compel foreign investors to 
                                                 
203 Aslam Mohamed and Jomo K.S. (2001): 47. 
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meet some performance standards had some effect on trade flows.204 The 
most common of these policies was local content requirements; local content 
requirements prescribed that a given proportion of inputs used to manufacture 
a good be sourced locally. These measures were often blamed for distorting 
trade because they caused discrimination against imports. 
TRIMs were a very controversial issue during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. Developing countries rejected the idea that the GATT could 
include rules on trade-related investment measures.  
On the contrary, the US and some industrial countries argued that 
some of the regulations on foreign investment and performance requirements 
imposed by host countries were having a pernicious effect on trade. 
Investment restrictions and performance requirements were often used to 
deny access to the host’s domestic markets and to subsidize exports, in patent 
violation of GATT principles. 
American firms lobbied their government to promote an agreement 
that would guarantee non-discrimination of foreign investors, particularly 
regarding the right of establishment, national treatment and the prohibition of 
trade-distorting investment measures, such as local content and export 
performance.205 As in the case of services, the US firms’ main objective was 
to obtain access to the markets of East and Southeast Asia. 
The United States, therefore, proposed an ambitious agenda for the 
negotiations with the final goal of creating a GATT for investments. 
However, developing countries wanted to defend their sovereignty over 
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investment policies and resolutely opposed the American proposal. 206
The Punta del Este Declaration gave the negotiators the mandate to 
examine the existing GATT provisions on TRIMs and to elaborate, if 
necessary, new provisions in order to avoid distortions of trade flows.207 The 
negotiating group was split in three camps: the United States and a few other 
industrialized nations supported a broad agreement covering most incentives 
and controls on foreign investments; a second group of developed nations, 
including the EEC, focused their interests on restricting the use of a few trade 
related measures; and the majority of developing countries who, in the words 
of a witness, “would concede nothing unless they had to.”208
As usual, the group started its work trying to clarify the issue by 
identifying the trade restrictive measures and supposed distorting effects of 
investment measures.209  
The United States tabled a list of 13 kinds of requirements that, in its 
view, were trade related. Local content and export performance requirements 
and variants on them were on the list; more controversial was the inclusion of 
foreign equity restrictions and requirements on technology transfer. As 
mentioned earlier, other industrialized countries did not wish to engage on 
those issues, and developing countries, including those that had been actively 
seeking foreign investments, objected to the proposal.  
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MALAYSIA POSITION 
Malaysia dissented from the idea that local content and export 
performance requirements had an adverse effect on trade. Its position was that 
investment measures had developmental objectives.210  
The Malaysian government had launched a vigorous effort to attract 
foreign investors. In the Fifth Malaysia Plan the Malaysian government could 
not have been more explicit: it stated that “the economy is entering another 
phase of industrialization that will place new demands on capital, technology, 
skills and global marketing capabilities. Greater foreign management and 
expertise will also be required to meet these demands.”211  
Malaysia offered generous fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to foreign 
companies that operated production facilities in Malaysia. The government 
normally attached incentives to performance requirements, such as local 
content and export performance in order develop a local base of suppliers and 
therefore foster local entrepreneurship. 
In fact, Malaysian authorities encouraged producers to use domestic 
products mainly through incentives; only the automotive industry had a 
mandatory local content requirement.  
All the incentive schemes administered in the country had been 
established to promote export growth and the use of locally produced inputs. 
One of the leading incentive programs, the Investment Tax Allowance (ITA) 
had local content requirements as one of its eligibility criteria.212 Another 
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very important incentive program, the Pioneer Status (PS) had no formal local 
content requirements; however, the Ministry of Trade and Industry could 
impose requirements that “would contribute towards promoting and 
enhancing the economic or technological development of the country.”213  
Local equity requirements were also prominent in Malaysian 
industrial policy. The creation of a critical mass of national industrial firms 
was a very important goal of the Malaysian government and local equity 
provisions were another fundamental means to this end. The Industrial 
Coordination Act of 1975 was the means through which the government 
compelled local and foreign firms to restructure equity and employment 
according to the New Economic Policy rules. There were two aspects of the 
ICA relevant for foreign investments: the foreign equity provisions, and the 
licensing system.  
The NEP prescribed a limit of 30 percent equity share for foreigners, 
but the rule had been relaxed as part of the incentive package envisaged to 
attract new foreign investments.214 However, the government was unwilling 
to renounce completely equity requirements since it was an instrument with a 
potent political significance. The Fifth Malaysia Plan had reiterated that “the 
major task of economic development is to forge a nation which is united, and 
an important part of this task is to remove the glaring socio-economic 
                                                                                                                              
Gustafsson, Fredrik (2007), “Malaysian Industrial Policy, 1986-2002.” In Jomo K.S. (ed.) 
(2007). Malaysian Industrial Policy. Singapore: NUS Press: 49. 
213 MIDA (1986): 12. Quoted in Gustafsson (2007): 49. “In fact, a local content requirement 
of 30 percent has been attached to both PS and ITA since 1991.” Gustafsson (2007): 49. 
214 The ICA regulations were relaxed for domestic and foreign investors in 1986; 
manufacturing companies with shareholders’ funds of less than RM2.5 million, or those with 
less than 75 full-time employees did not have to apply for a manufacturing license. As for 
foreign investments, no equity conditions were imposed on projects that exported 80 percent 
or more of their production, and foreign equity ownership of up 100 percent could be allowed 
for firms that exported at least 50 percent subject to some conditions. Source: MITI (1993): 
154. 
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differences among the major ethnic groups” and local equity requirements 
were as politically necessary as ever.215
All manufacturing firms had to obtain from MITI a manufacturing 
license.216 This mechanism allowed the government to choose which 
manufacturing activities and investments should be carried out in Malaysia. 
The licensing system clearly was used as a tool for industrial policy, and the 
government did not wish to put it up for negotiations. 
In 1985, however, the Industrial Master Plan had expressly pointed at 
the inadequacy of the incentive system as one of the main structural 
weaknesses of the Malaysian industrial system. The authors of the IMP 
stressed that “although the Government has adopted ‘export-led industrial 
growth’ as a key industrialization strategy, the current incentive system in 
force has worked with a strong bias against export.”217 Therefore, there was 
some acceptance of the possibility of changing export incentives and 
performance requirements in exchange for substantial MFN tariffs cuts. 
Malaysia shared the opinion of many developing countries that while 
foreign investors should be treated fairly, local governments had the 
responsibility to ensure that the activities of the multinational firms did not 
conflict with national development objectives.  
The national priority, however, was to encourage FDIs, not to contain 
them; therefore, once again distinguishing itself from the LDCs hardliners, 
Malaysia and its ASEAN partners accepted a qualified inclusion of the 
                                                 
215 Fifth Malaysia Plan. (1986): 17. 
216 see footnote 138. 
217 Medium and Long Term Industrial Master Plan (1986-1995). Executive Highlights. 
UNIDO August 1985: 15. 
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subject into the Uruguay Round agenda. There was certainly room for 
compromise. 




MALAYSIA: INTERNATIONAL EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES, 1987-1992. 
(As a percentage of total exports) 
 1987 1990 1992 
Primary Commodities 54.3 39.7 29.7 
(Agriculture) 33.9 21.3 17.0 
(Mining) 20.4 18.4 12.6 
   
Manufactured Goods 45.0 59.1 69.0 
Others 0.7 1.2 1.3 
   
Total Exports (RM Million) 45,224.9 79,824.5 103,487.1 
 





MALAYSIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY OF ORIGIN 
(Share of GDP %) 
 1985 1990 1995
Primary Sector 30.4 28.4 21.0 
Agriculture 20.3 18.7 13.6 
Mining 10.1 9.7 7.4 
    
Secondary 24.3 30.5 37.5 
Manufacturing 19.1 27.0 33.1 
Construction 5.1 3.5 4.4 
    
Tertiary 44.0 41.1 41.5 
 
Source: Economic Planning Unit. Prime Minister’s Department. Fifth Malaysia Plan. (Table 




 CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round differed from the previous ones for two main 
reasons: the effective participation in the negotiations of a significant number 
of developing countries and the focus on rules instead of tariffs. In fact, 
developing countries, and particularly the export-oriented ones, choose to 
participate first and foremost to strengthen the multilateral trade system. 
Developing countries asked for clarification, revision and 
improvement of GATT rules, and as in the GATT tradition, they had to be 
ready to make concessions.  
Developing countries’ initial concession – and one that molded the 
whole Round – was the acceptance of the fact that the outcome had to be a 
single undertaking. A “single undertaking meant that all the agreements were 
to apply to all members, and that all members had to submit schedules of 
concessions and commitments" with the only exception of few plurilateral 
codes.218
The single undertaking concept also helped in easing the 
                                                 
218 Hoeckman and Kostecki. (2001): 382. “Four Annexes to the WTO define the substantive 
rights and obligations of members. Annex 1 has three parts: Annex 1A entitled Multilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Goods, contains the GATT 1994; … Annex 1B, which contains the 
GATS; and Annex 1C, the Agreement on TRIPs. Annex 2 contains the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) …Annex 3 contains the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Finally, Annex 4 consists of Tokyo Round codes 
that were not multilateralized in the Uruguay Round, and that bind only signatories.” 
Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 51. [The most important of the plurilateral codes is the 
Government Procurement one.] 
 90
transformation of GATT into WTO. All developing countries that were 
contracting parties in the old GATT - and those that were in the process of 
becoming contracting parties- joined the WTO automatically when they 
signed the UR agreement. 
The making of concessions by developing countries was very much a 
novelty. Since 1965 Special and Differential treatment meant that they were 
exempted from the principle of reciprocity, in other words, in exchange for 
concessions by rich nations, they did not have to make offers. 
At the end of the 1970s, industrial countries started to demand that 
developing countries with large domestic markets and/or with high levels of 
trade be integrated fully into the multilateral system. The emergence of Asian 
exporting countries with large trade surpluses acted as a catalyst for pressures 
for graduation. It became apparent to many developing countries’ 
governments that they had either to participate fully in the negotiating process 
or to confront unilateral and discretionary retaliatory measures by their 
biggest trade partners. 
The negotiating agenda of developing countries at the UR can be 
divided into targets and concessions. Targets were the inclusion of agriculture 
and textiles and clothing into GATT disciplines, the reduction of tariffs for 
manufactured goods (and a decrease in tariff escalation), the revision of 
safeguard measures, the improvement of the dispute settlement mechanism. 
Negotiations on services, intellectual property rights and investment measures 
were considered a major concession. 
Developing countries succeeded in preserving the principle of special 
and differential treatment (S&D) in the Uruguay Round. Special provisions 
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for developing and least-developed countries are included in every 
agreement.219  
Malaysia’s priorities in joining the negotiations are positively 
reflected in the final outcome. The members of a new institution, the WTO, 
had agreed on reintegrating two politically sensitive sectors–agriculture and 
textiles and clothing-into the GATT system, abolishing VERs and other 
quantitative restrictions, and improving the reliability and the efficacy of 
dispute settlement procedures. Some countries were more enthusiastic than 
others about the inclusion of new issues in the multilateral negotiations and 
rules. In spite of special and differential treatment provisions, poorer 
countries found the Agreement unduly onerous and difficult to implement. 
However, Malaysia was among those nations that were expected to benefit 
the most from the revamped international trade order. Its agricultural and 
manufactured goods faced lower tariffs in industrial markets; its exporters 
could rely on stricter safeguards regulations that would limit anti-dumping 
actions against their goods; new and better procedures were regulating the 
dispute settlement mechanism.220
Malaysia had to make concessions, and the implementation of its new 
obligations implied no negligible costs. The bulk of changes and reforms, 
however, was in line with existing government priorities, and would have had 
to be introduced, at in least in part, even without WTO agreements: protection 
of intellectual property rights was already on the executive agenda and better 
                                                 
219 [They] can be grouped into five headings: lower level of obligations, more flexible 
implementation timetables, and commitments by developed countries to take into account 
developing country interests, more favorable treatment for least-developed countries, and 
promises of technical assistance and training” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 392. 
220 Malaysia was a party in the first case brought to the WTO. Singapore versus Malaysia 
(1994): Singapore complained about some Malaysian rules on plastic materials. 
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standards for Malaysia’s products were a necessity imposed by the markets. 
The service sector, in spite of GATS, remained the precinct of domestic firms 
and groups.  
 
2) AGRICULTURE 
THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
Since the very beginning of the Round it became apparent that 
reaching an agreement on trade in agricultural goods would be extremely 
arduous and the issue almost brought the entire negotiations to a premature 
and inconclusive end in December 1988. 
A compromise between the positions of the United States and the 
European Union was finally achieved in November 1992 with the so-called 
Blair House Accord and the agricultural sector’s exclusion “from the broad 
sweep of trade liberalization and [insulation] from the normal disciplines of 
market forces and international competition” was eventually reduced, even 
though not completely.221 In fact, the European Union obtained to exclude 
from the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) its compensation payment 
policies. The United States, in return, had its deficiency payments excluded 
from the AMS.222
The main goal of the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture was 
“to provide a framework for the long-term reform of agricultural trade and 
domestic policies over the years to come. [The agreement] makes a decisive 
move towards the objective of increased market orientation in agricultural 
                                                 
221 GATT Secretariat. (1979) Report on Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Geneva: GATT:7. 
For a comprehensive account of the UR negotiations on agriculture, and the US-EC trade 
conflict, see Swinbank, Alan and Carolyn Tanner. (1996) Farm Policy and Trade Conflict: 
The Uruguay Round and CAP Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
222 See the section “Domestic Support.” 
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trade. The rules governing agricultural trade are strengthened which will lead 
to improved predictability and stability for importing and exporting countries 
alike.”223
The very much-awaited inclusion of agriculture into the GATT’s 
system of rules represented a significant achievement for the negotiators 
representing the interest of primary commodities exporting countries. The 
work of the delegations centered on four key subjects: market access, export 
competition, domestic support and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The 
agreement introduces new rules in the four areas and commits the members to 
a reduction in the levels of both support and protection. 
Developing countries were granted special and differential treatment 
and therefore less stringent rules apply in their cases; special provisions were 
adopted for food-importing developing countries and least-developed 
countries were exempted from all commitments. 
 
Market access224
The agreement entails two main obligations for signatories: first, to 
convert non-tariff border measures into tariffs, and, second, to bind all tariffs. 
Signatories have committed to reduce tariffs over a period of time, six years 
for developed countries and ten for developing countries, by an average of 36 
percent and 24 percent respectively. Members are required to apply minimum 
                                                 
223 GATT. (1994) “News of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The 
Final Act, Press Summary.” Uruguay Round Newsletter. No.84. Geneva: Information and 
Media Relations Division: 8. 
224 The following sections draw on Josling, Tim (1994) “Agriculture and Natural Resources.” 
in Collins S.M. and B.P. Bosworth. (eds) (1994) The New GATT. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution. See also Srinivasan T.N. (1998) Developing Countries and the 
Multilateral Trading System: From GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future. New York: 
Harper Collins, and Baldwin Robert E. (1995) “An Economic Evaluation of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements” in S. Arndt and C. Milner (eds.), The World Economy: Global Trade 
Policy 1995 Oxford: Blackwell Publications.  
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reductions under each tariff line. Developing countries can opt out of the 
commitment to liberalize trade in agricultural products that are predominant 
staples in their traditional diets. 
A very significant step towards securing market access is the 
establishment of the “minimum access” principle: the principle requires 
members to ensure that a minimum share of the domestic consumption of a 
product subject to prohibitive import restrictions (for example, rice in Japan 
and Korea) is provided for by imports. 
The conversion of nontariff barriers into tariffs was hailed as the 
greatest success of the negotiations. However, most WTO members, 
including developing countries, bound their tariffs at levels higher than the 
tariff equivalent of NTBs applied in the 1986-88 base period. The European 
Union set bindings around 60 percent above the tariff equivalent of the CAP, 
and the United States bound its agricultural tariffs about 45 percent higher 
than its NTB equivalent. Because of ‘dirty tariffication’, the overall level of 
protection since the year 2000 is not lower than it used to be in the 1980s.225  
Moreover, countries that have bound their tariffs at high levels, but 
have kept their actual tariffs at a lower level, can vary the applied tariff 
according to their domestic needs. It is, therefore, unlikely that ‘tariffication’ 
will provide stability to agricultural prices in world markets. In spite of this 
and other limitations, ‘tariffication’ and the binding of tariffs are expected to 
create a more transparent environment for both importing and exporting 
nations. 
 
                                                 
225 Hoeckman and Kostecki. (2001): 217. 
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Export subsidies 
The agreement prohibits the introduction of new export subsidies and 
asks for a reduction of the existing ones. The value of export subsidies have 
to be cut from the 1986-90 levels by 36 percent over six years for developed 
countries and 24 percent over ten years for developing nations. The volume of 
subsidized exports has likewise to be curtailed by 21 percent over six years 
from the 1986-90 levels for developing countries and 14 percent over ten 
years for developing countries.  
The sensitive nature of the negotiations on agriculture is epitomized 
by the decision to reduce export subsidies: during the same round of 
negotiations export subsidies for manufactured goods were forbidden. 
 
Domestic support 
A considerable achievement of the Uruguay Round was to bring under 
scrutiny, for the first time in the history of multilateral trade negotiations, the 
measures for domestic support for the agricultural sector and to make parties 
agree upon a set of definitions, rules and commitments. Domestic support 
measures were divided into two categories: those having a minimal impact on 
trade patterns, and those considered trade-distorting. For policy measures 
belonging to the first category, the so-called green box policies, no reductions 
were requested. These include support for scientific research, disease control, 
infrastructure development, structural adjustment programs, environmental 
programs and measures that aim at ensuring food-security.  
Developing countries are allowed to continue to support rural 
development projects, to maintain their subsidies for agricultural inputs, 
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together with investment programs and agricultural diversification subsidies. 
The agreement requires reductions to be applied on all measures not 
included in the “green box” list, i.e. the trade distorting category. Negotiators 
introduced the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) to measure the support 
that was given by government to the agricultural production. “The AMS 
includes expenditures on domestic subsidies as well as market price support 
policies such as administered prices. … In principle it covers all support 
policies that affect trade.”226 Each government had to calculate their own 
AMS and to attach the results to their schedules of commitments together 
with their final and bound commitment level of domestic support for 
agriculture. Developed and developing countries have to cut their programs 
by 20 percent and 13.3 percent respectively during the implementation 
period. 
The success of the negotiations has been mitigated by the fact that, as 
already mentioned, some farm supporting programs in the United States and 
the European Union have been allowed to continue and that Japan has 
accepted only negligible commitments. 
 
OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS ON RELATED ISSUES  
At the beginning of the Round, fifteen negotiating groups were 
created.227 Among them, those working on tropical products (chaired by 
Malaysia) and natural resources-based products were of particular interest for 
                                                 
226 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 218. 
227 Two groups worked on trade barriers (tariffs, nontariff barriers); four were assigned to 
specific sectors (natural resource-based products, tropical products, textile and clothing, 
agriculture); six to issues regarding the GATT system (safeguards, subsidies and 
countervailing measures, GATT articles, MTN agreements and arrangements, functioning of 
the GATT system, dispute settlement); three worked on the “new” issues (TRIPs, TRIMs and 
trade in services). 
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developing countries. At the Punta del Este meeting it was decided that both 
issues would have negotiating priority.228
 
Tropical Products 
Initial discussions were dominated by the problem of ‘reciprocity’: 
developed countries were unwilling to make their offers unless developing 
countries showed their resolve to actively participate in the process, i.e. they 
should make offers, too. The so-called hard-liners, namely India and Brazil, 
strongly opposed that idea that developing countries should reciprocate 
industrialized countries’ concessions. However, the impasse was ended when 
a group of developing countries - Malaysia among them - decided to present 
their offers.  
The negotiating group was consequently able to produce a proposal 
for what could have been the first market-opening agreement of the Round. 
The agreement covered about US$20 billion of trade in tropical products out 
of a total of US$70 billion.  
Negotiators considered it as particularly important because it had been 
reached through real negotiations between the would-be contracting parties 
“rather than [being] a gesture by the richer countries.”229  
Unfortunately, the Round’s near collapse at the Montreal ministerial 
meeting made the early adoption of the agreed package impossible. In fact, 
from December 1988 all negotiations dealing with agriculture, including 
those on tropical products, were taken over by the negotiating group on 
                                                 
228 The following sections draw on Greenaway, David. (1995) “Agenda, Expectations and 
Outcomes.” in Arndt S. and C. Milner. (eds.) The World Economy: Global Trade Policy 
1995. Oxford: Blackwell Publications. See also Croome (1999), and Baldwin (1995). 
229 Croome (199): 167. 
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agricultural trade: at the ministerial meeting in Brussels, in 1990, there was 
not a separate draft concerning trade in tropical products. However, the 
results achieved by the original negotiating group were either incorporated 
into the final schedules of concessions or were covered by subsequent 
agreements on agriculture and other subjects. 
 
Natural resource-based products 
The negotiating group on natural resource-based products found itself 
in a situation somewhat analogous to the group negotiating on tropical goods. 
The main issues of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers were discussed by other 
groups, as well as the problems regarding subsidies and safeguards. They 
could only focus on the definition of which goods were to be included in the 
category. Therefore, there was not a draft or final agreement specific to the 
sector.  
 
SANITARY AND PHITOSANITARY MEASURES230
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phitosanitary 
Measures is a separate one although it has been negotiated as part of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. Exporting countries were extremely worried by 
the possibility that importing countries could use technical standards as a 
means to impose a disguised protection of their domestic markets.  
The outcome of the negotiations consists of a set of general guidelines 
that should govern the behavior of the contracting parties in the areas 
                                                 
230 “A SPS measure is defined as any measure applied to protect human, animal or plant 
health from risks arising from the establishment or spread of pests and diseases; from 
additives or contaminants in foodstuffs; or to prevent other damage from the establishment or 
spread of pests” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 197. 
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concerned. These guidelines are based on the two principles of harmonization 
and equivalence. When national standards are based on those agreed upon by 
international institutions, domestic rules are presumed to be consistent with 
GATT disciplines: in these cases, it is the principle of harmonization that is 
applied. When harmonization at international level has not been achieved, or 
it is not regarded as necessary, the principle of equivalence is used: importing 
countries accept that exporting countries’ technical standards, although not 
identical, are equivalent to its domestic ones, insofar as they provide the 
required levels of sanitary and phitosanitary protection. 
Were a country to insist on using its own standards, therefore denying 
the equivalence of standards between importing and exporting countries, it 
must apply domestic rules in a non-discriminatory manner and not in any way 
that could result in a restriction of trade. The country objecting to the 
application of the principle of equivalence must provide scientific evidence to 
substantiate its claims. 
The implementation of the Agreement undoubtedly depends on how 
governments interpret its guiding principles. Developing countries could ask 
for exemptions; however, exemptions were limited in time. Developing 
countries were given until mid-1997 to meet the requirements and least-
developed countries until mid-2000. 
 
EXPECTED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The total welfare (or real income) effects of agricultural trade 
liberalization following the Uruguay Round are generally projected to be 
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modest.231 Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Thailand were among 
those expected to benefit the most from the reduction in tariffs and tariff 
escalation on tropical products natural resource-based products  
 
3) TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING  
The Uruguay Round succeeded in finally integrating the textiles and 
clothing sectors into the GATT system.232 As for agriculture, the main thrust 
of the agreement consisted in the “tariffication” of quantitative restrictions: it 
was decided to end bilateral quotas by the 1st January 2005 and to phase out 
the Multifibre Arrangement in three stages over a period of ten years.  
In the first phase, on the 1st January 1995, quotas on imports 
amounting to at least 16 percent of total imports of textiles and clothing in 
1990 had to be removed. On the 1st January 1998 a further 17 percent of the 
quotas (to be estimated on the total imports in 1990) had to be withdrawn, and 
another 18 percent was to be eliminated on the 1st January 2002. At the end of 
phase three, by January 2005, all quantitative restrictions had to be 
transformed into tariffs. 
Negotiators also agreed on the establishment of a formula that would 
have ensured, during the ten-year implementation period, a minimum increase 
of those textiles and clothing imports still subjected to quantitative 
restrictions. 
                                                 
231 Several studies have reached quite similar conclusions, although they have adopted 
different approaches and models. For a review, see Martin W. and L.A. Winters. (1996), and 
Whalley, John. (2000) What Can the Developing Countries Infer from the Uruguay Round 
Models for Future Negotiations. New York and Geneva: United Nations.  
232 This section draws on Srinivasan T.N. (1998). See also Baldwin (1995), Deardorff (1994), 
and Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001). 
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The greatest limit of the agreement resided in being heavily ‘back 
loaded’: a large proportion of products (around 49 percent) has been 
integrated into GATT rules only at the very end of the implementation period. 
Exporting countries also complained that importing countries were allowed to 
choose which products to liberalize and at what stage  
 
EXPECTED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN TEXTILES AND 
CLOTHING
Estimates of the welfare impacts of the new regime vary widely. 
However, it is expected that consumers in the United States and in Europe 
will benefit in a substantial manner, while firms and workers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America will lose out.  
Consumers in importing countries were expected to benefit from the 
elimination of MFA because this would bring to an end rent transfers between 
importing and exporting countries. These rents were caused by the quota 
system: exporters were able to sell their products at higher prices due to the 
artificial scarcity created by the quotas. The removal of quotas lowered prices 
in importing countries, therefore eliminating the rents.  
Exporters in Latin and Central America and Africa were less 
constrained by MFA restrictions than Asian producers. Therefore, they had 
less market access to gain from the removal of the MFA and more to loose 
from stronger competition.233  
There is variance among estimates of the possible job losses in 
industrialized countries. South Asian countries may emerge as beneficiaries if 
                                                 
233 Whalley, John. (1997) “The Impact of the Multifiber Arrangement Phase-out on the Asian 
Economies.” In Arvind Panagariya, M.G. Quibria, Narhari Rao (eds) (1997), The Global 
Trading System and Developing Asia. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press: 275. 
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they will be able to face the very fierce Chinese competition. Actually, China, 
Indonesia and Thailand are indicated as possible “winners” in the post-MFA 
world.  
The MFA removal is likely to produce efficiency gains because of the 
phasing-out of the national systems of quota allocation. These systems often 
permitted the reallocation of the quotas to the same firms every year. In 
countries where trade in quotas was not allowed, the systems ended up 
protecting quota holders against competition of more efficient producers. In 
models trying to estimate the effects of MFA restrictions, the gains of 
developing countries from the elimination of MFA quotas become 
substantially larger when the additional distorting effects associated with 
internal quota allocation schemes are considered.234
 
4) TARIFFS 235
TARIFFS AND TARIFFS’ BINDINGS 
Traditionally, multilateral trade negotiations have focused on tariffs. 
Prior to the Round, the average tariffs in the industrialized world stood at 
about 6.9 percent; this means that the average tariff is 4.0 percent. As a result 
of the Uruguay Round, industrial countries cut their tariffs on manufactured 
goods (excluding textiles and clothing products) by 39 percent. 
A decrease of only a few percentage points is not expected to bring 
dramatic changes in international trade patterns; however, reductions have 
varied across the many tariff lines, and some industries are expected to 
                                                 
234 See Trela Irene and John Whalley. (1993), Internal Quota Allocations Schemes and the 
Costs of the MFA. London, Canada: Centre for the Study of International Economic 
Relations, University of Western Ontario. 
235 This section draws on Baldwin R. (1995). See also, Srinivasan T.N. (1998), Deardorff 
(1994), and Martin and Winters (1996). 
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benefit substantially from trade liberalization. In fact, tariffs have been totally 
eliminated in a number of sectors such as steel, pharmaceuticals, medical 
equipment, construction equipment, and agricultural equipment. There have 
also been large tariff reductions for the semiconductors and computers 
sectors.  
It has been emphasized that the share of goods exported to developed 
countries without being subject to tariffs doubled, from 20 percent to 44 
percent, and that tariffs higher than 15 percent apply only to a small fraction 
of total imports (5 percent; prior to the agreement it was 7 percent). The 
liberalization should benefit developing countries’ manufactured exports 
since only 5 percent of their exports face tariffs higher than 15 percent (down 
from 9 percent).In addition, industrialized countries accepted to increase the 
number of their tariff bindings from 78 percent to 99 percent.  
Developing countries agreed to reduce some of their tariff rates; more 
importantly, they accepted to bind a sizeable number of tariffs: 73 percent of 
their lines were bound, up from a mere 21 percent. It constitutes a dramatic 
shift in developing countries’ approach to trade negotiations, although more 
in ideological than in practical terms, given that tariffs have been bound at 
levels conspicuously higher that the applied ones. 
An essential objective for the developing countries’ negotiators was to 
reduce tariff escalation: the practice of imposing higher tariffs on final goods 
than on raw materials or intermediate goods. According to estimates made 
after the agreement entered into force, while tariff escalation for 
manufactured goods has declined in absolute terms, it is still detectable, 
although at a more modest level. 
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EXPECTED REAL INCOME EFFECTS OF THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN GOODS 
A measure of the economic impact of a trade agreement is the 
projected change in real GDP. Studies236 carried out in the 1990s anticipated 
an increase of one percent in global GDP, with the more optimistic estimate 
0.60 percent higher than the most pessimistic one.237 The economic impact 
can, therefore, appear quite moderate.  
 
5) SAFEGUARDS AND EXCEPTIONS 238
SAFEGUARDS
The negotiating group on safeguards had to confront many 
controversial issues. The European countries wished to introduce the 
possibility of applying safeguard measures in a selective manner. Developing 
countries demanded to limit the use of such provisions and to clarify the kind 
of situations in which safeguards could be invoked by importing countries. 
The GATT disciplines were also put under severe strain by the use of the 
grey-area measures (measures neither explicitly prohibited nor allowed).  
The final agreement did not allow for safeguard action to be directed 
selectively and, instead reaffirmed the validity of the most-favored nation 
principle. The signatories also decided that grey-area measures had to be 
phased-out: voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing arrangements 
and similar measures had to be ended over a period of four years. As part of a 
safeguard action, the imposition of import quotas was allowed; however, 
                                                 
236 See Martin and Winters (1996) for a review of the most cited models. See also Whalley, 
John and Colleen Hamilton. (1996) The Trading System After the Uruguay Round. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.  
237 Srinivasan T. N. (1998): 46. 
238 These sections draw on Deardorff (1994). See also Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001) and 
Baldwin R. (1995). 
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quantitative restrictions should be used in a non-discriminatory way and their 
imposition should not cause a disproportionate contraction of import levels (a 
reduction is considered excessive if imports fall below the average of the last 
three representative years). 
The agreement also specifies that safeguards measures cannot 
continue for more than eight years (after the first four, the importing country, 
if the situation is unchanged, can prolong the action for another four years). 
On the other hand, exporting countries at which the safeguard action is 
directed, cannot call for compensation or initiate a retaliatory action for the 
first three years. In addition negotiators have clarified the procedures to be 
abided by members invoking Article XIX239 and have agreed on a more 
transparent definition of what constitutes “serious injury.”240
The principle of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries has been respected and they are allowed to leave safeguard 
measures in place for longer periods of time. 
 
ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS 
A sign of mounting protectionist pressures on international trade was 
the increase in the number of anti-dumping actions; some countries, and the 
United States prominently among them, had been using anti-dumping actions 
and the threat of it as a means to restrict access to their domestic markets. The 
Round was expected to review GATT rules and to add clarity and 
transparency to the matter. 
                                                 
239 “Article XIX is the GATT general safeguard clause. It permit government to impose 
emergency measures to protect domestic producers seriously injury by imports Hoeckman 
and Kostecki (2001): 311. 
240 “Serious injury is defined as a significant overall impairment in the situation of a domestic 
industry” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001):313.  
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The final agreement defines with greater precision the steps and the 
procedures that must be followed by members when determining that 
dumping241 is occurring. Signatories willing to initiate anti-dumping (AD) 
actions have to take care that the comparison between price and normal value 
of an imported product is fair; and that data used to determine costs of 
production of a good, including administrative costs and profit margins, are 
appropriately and realistically applied to the firm accused of dumping. As for 
safeguards, the definition of what constitutes serious injury is restated in 
detail, and signatories are reminded about the need to investigate whether 
dumped imports are the sole and major cause for domestic producers’ 
difficulties. The agreement also imposes a limit of five years for AD actions. 
A country can ask to prolong its AD actions because of the persistence of the 
risk of dumping; however, the exporters can require a dispute settlement 
panel to be created to examine if the importer’s evaluation of the risk of 
dumping is balanced and objective.242
A provision targeted at reducing the number of ‘nuisance’ AD actions 
requires all cases where the dumping margin is found to be less than 2 percent 
to be terminated. 
 
SUBSIDIES  
Government subsidies have been divided into three groups: non-
actionable subsidies, actionable subsidies and prohibited subsidies.  
Subsidies aimed at research activities are listed as non-actionable 
                                                 
241 “Dumping is defined in GATT as offering a product for sale in export markets at a price 
below normal value. Normal value is defined as the price charged by a firm in its home 
market, in the ordinary course of trade.” Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001):317. 
242 For a discussion about the limits of the agreement see Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 
327-28. 
 107
subsidies, although some restrictions still apply. Government can support 
regional development programs as well as subsidize investments in individual 
industries faced with new environmental requirements. Subsidies that are not 
industry-specific, i.e. that are not explicitly directed to a particular firm or 
sector, are also recognized as non-actionable, i.e. they cannot be subjected to 
countervailing measures. 
Subsidies conditional on export performance or the use of domestic 
products in preference of imported ones are prohibited. 
Actionable subsidies are those subsidies that are not prohibited but 
might be identified by another member as damaging for its domestic 
industries. In these cases, members have to follow the consultation and 
dispute settlement procedures and the contested exports can be the object of 
countervailing duties. 
Least-developed countries and developing countries are granted 
special and differential treatment: the former are exempted from the 




The agreement establishes that countervailing duties cannot be 
imposed against non-actionable subsidies. Members that judge themselves to 
be damaged by non-actionable subsidies may ask the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing measures to examine the issue. 
Negotiators have reaffirmed that countervailing duties should be 
administered in a non-discriminatory manner and should not be imposed for 
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more than five years, except if subsidies are expected to continue. The 
disciplines relevant to the possible circumvention of CV duties, such as 
exports of components to be assembled in the importing countries when the 
final product is subject to the duties, have also being strengthened. 
 
6) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the dispute settlement procedures were 
built around the principle of consensus. The main rationale for preferring 
consensus-based decisions to more legalistic approaches was that, since the 
parties had to agree on the outcome, implementation would have been less 
problematic. However, the system had witnessed a growing number of 
disputes blocked by one of the parties. Even when the panel was not blocked 
at the very beginning of the process, there was the possibility that the big 
trading nations would ignore its recommendations, as the European Union 
had already done twice. Developing countries in particular were vocal in 
asking for urgent reform. 
The final agreement reinforces the dispute settlement procedures by 
“eliminating the possibility of blocking the establishment of a panel or the 
adoption of panel reports, introducing time limits for the various stages of 
panel proceedings, standard terms of reference for panels, creation of an 
appeal process, improved surveillance of the implementation of panel reports, 
and automaticity of approval for retaliation in cases of noncompliance with a 
panel recommendation.”243  
Developing countries’ concerns have been addressed by special 
                                                 
243 Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 74. 
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provisions; for example, the WTO secretariat, if requested, has to provide 
legal assistance to developing countries involved in trade disputes; 
developing countries can also ask for at least one panelist from a fellow 




The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights differ from the 
GATT in two key ways: (i) they introduce two new areas to the negotiations 
and the disciplines of the multilateral trading system, and (ii) they venture 
into territories, such as investment policies and domestic regulatory regimes 
that were traditionally regarded as exclusive domains of national 
governments. 
The GATS consist of two parts: the first contains the concepts, the 
principles and the rules to which the signatories are committed. The key 
principles are those of most-favored nation treatment – although, in the case 
of GATS, members can notify exceptions- and transparency in all national 
laws and regulations concerning trade in services. National treatment has 
been incorporated into the GATS, but as a sector-specific commitment.  
The second part of the agreement contains the national schedules of 
commitments. While the general rules and principles apply to all the service 
sectors, signatories have subscribed only to very specific commitments 
applicable only to service sectors and subsectors listed in their schedule (in 
fact, commitments are made on a sector-by-sector and mode-of-supply 
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basis).244 The complexity of the issue, combined with the intense controversy 
that surrounded the inclusion of services in the negotiations, has resulted in 
the compilation of extremely detailed schedules: everything that is not 
explicitly included is excluded.245 Even measures listed in the market access 
article as prohibited can continue to apply if the country has declared in its 
schedule the intention to leave them in place.246
The different nature of the international trade in services, as compared 
to the trade in goods, has caused the negotiators to adopt a sectoral approach 
in their discussions. The outcome has been a dual system of lists. The MFN 
principle is reflected in a so-called negative list presented by each member: it 
applies to all sectors apart from those for which the individual governments 
asked for exemption.247 National treatment and market access commitments 
are instead enunciated in a positive list: they apply only to sectors explicitly 
mentioned in the schedules, and again only for listed modes of supply.248
Developing countries had the option of offering a smaller number of 
concessions than developed countries.  
                                                 
244 “The Agreement applies to four modes of supply through which services may be 
exchanged: 
Mode 1: cross border supply (not requiring the physical movement of supplier or consumer); 
Mode 2 : movement of the consumer to the country of the supplier; 
Mode 3: services sold in the territory of a member by foreign entities that have established a 
commercial presence; 
Mode 4: provision of services requiring the temporary movement of natural persons.” 
Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001): 250. 
245 “Specific commitments apply only to listed service sectors and subsectors and then only to 
the extent that sector-specific qualifications, conditions, and limitations are not mentioned.” 
Hoekman, Bernard M. (1994) “Services and Intellectual Property Rights.” in Collins S.M. 
and B.P. Bosworth. (eds.) (1994) The New GATT. Washington: The Brookings Institution: 
91. 
246 Six measures are prohibited; they consist “in limitations on: the number of service 
suppliers allowed, the value of transactions or assets, the total quantity of service output, the 
number of natural persons that may be employed, the type of legal entity through which a 
service supplier is permitted to supply a service (for example, branches versus subsidiaries 
for banking), and participation of foreign capital in terms of a maximum percentage limit of 
foreign shareholding or the absolute value of foreign investment.” Hoeckman (1994): 91. 
247 Article II of the GATS. 
248 Respectively, Article XVII and XVI of the GATS. 
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Developing countries appear to have amply used the possibility of 
making offers on a mode-of-supply basis, specifically the option to privilege 
commercial presence, in order to stimulate foreign investments. When a 
member schedules only commercial presence as allowed mode of supply for a 
service sector, foreign firms will have to establish a commercial presence, 
even if the supply of the service does not actually require it. 
All GATS members have accepted to commit themselves to not adopt 
measures intended to restrict market access to any service sector (stand-still). 
 
8) TRIPS 249
THE MAIN CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT
The agreement on Trade-Related Property Rights commits the 
signatories to apply common standards of protection of intellectual property 
rights: members have to ensure that those rights receive effective protection 
under their respective domestic legislations. This characteristic marks the 
fundamental difference between this agreement and the GATT and the GATS 
since it compels governments to adopt special policies; on the other hand, the 
TRIPS agreement has more in common with the agreement on sanitary and 
phitosanitary measures: both set minimum standards and leave to national 
governments the responsibility to incorporate those standards in their 
domestic legislations.250 Actually, they two agreements present similar 
challenges and problems in their implementation, especially for developing 
countries. 
In comparison with the agreement on trade in services, the TRIPs 
                                                 
249 The following sections draw on Hoeckman (1994), and Bhagwati (1994).  
250 Article I: “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing 
the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” 
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adopts a stricter approach in terms of members’ general commitments: the 
national treatment and non-discrimination (MFN) principles translate into 
obligations that must be enforced.251
Industrial countries have pressed for strict rules and developing 
countries shared an interest in limiting the opportunities for retaliatory 
actions. The agreement, therefore, defines enforcement and dispute settlement 
procedures: in particular, countries wishing to avoid being the target of 
unilateral retaliation by other members –particularly by United States and the 
European Union- have to demonstrate that intellectual property rights are 
properly protected by their national laws and enforcement agencies. National 
laws must guarantee that any infringement of intellectual property would be 
prosecuted and punished. 
Developing countries have been granted a delay of four years for the 
implementation of the agreement. Least-developed countries received special 
and differential treatment: a ten-year implementation period and could request 
further extensions. 
 
EXPECTED ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Developing countries’ governments, since the preliminary discussion 
on whether a Round should be called, had been aware that such an agreement 
could be very costly. Although credible estimates of economic impact of the 
TRIPs implementation on developing countries are not yet available, and 
even allowing for more positive dynamic effects in the long run, “all the 
                                                 
251 Developed and developing countries alike had one year to satisfy the requirements related 
to national treatment and MFN. 
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evidence and arguments … point to the conclusion that TRIPs is a 
redistributive issue: irrespective of assumptions made with respect to market 
structure or dynamic response, the impact effect of enhanced IPR protection 
will be a transfer of wealth from LDC consumers and firms, to foreign, 
mostly industrial-country firms.”252  
The agreement can be seen as part of a trade-off: developing countries 
accepted onerous obligations in exchange for progress in other areas of 
negotiations. However, during the 1980s, developing nations had begun to 
change their opinion about the desirability of foreign investments. 
Governments were hoping to persuade multinationals to invest more in their 
countries and became persuaded that IP protection was viewed by foreigners 
as one of the critical factors in their choice of the ideal host nation and the 
enforcement of protection of intellectual property rights was an important 
condition for inviting technology intensive investments. Empirical studies had 
found evidence of positive correlation between IP protection and American 
investments.253 An additional powerful reason to agree on multilateral rules 
was the threat of unilateral actions by the US and the EU. 
 
9) TRIMS 254
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
prohibits the imposition of requirements on foreign firms that do not apply to 
domestically owned companies. It reaffirms the principle of national 
                                                 
252 Rodrik, Dani. (1994) “Comments on Maskus and Eby-Konan.” In A. D. Deardorff and R. 
Stern (eds) (1994) Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 449. 
253 See Mansfield, Edwin. (1994) Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct 
Investment, and Technology Transfer. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.  
254 This section draws on Baldwin (1995), and Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001). 
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treatment and reiterates the proscription of quantitative restrictions.255 The 
text contains a list of measures that are banned; including local content, trade-
balancing, foreign exchange-balancing and domestic sales requirements; 
governments had to notify the WTO secretariat of the policies in 
contravention to the agreement. The implementation period, at the end of 
which all forbidden measures had to be eliminated, was fixed as two years for 
developed countries, and five and seven years for developing and least-
developed countries respectively. 
Negotiators decided to forbid not only mandatory requirements, but 
also incentives, i.e. measures that guarantee an advantage (for example, tax 
cuts) in exchange for compliance. Notably, export performance requirements 
are not prohibited, although under GATT disciplines export subsidies are 
prohibited.  
 
10) THE OUTCOME FOR MALAYSIA 
MALAYSIA’S COMMITMENTS 
Malaysia’ commitments under the Uruguay Round agreement were 
substantial; they implied not only traditional market opening measures, such 
as tariffs cuts or tariff bindings, but also reform or review of a considerable 
number of national laws and regulations. 
 
Tariffs and other border measures 
According to the Report by the Government of Malaysia, presented 
for the Trade Policy Review in 1997, Malaysia’s market access offers 
                                                 
255 Article III and Article XI respectively. 
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covered 70% of Malaysia’s total imports.256 In the years following the 
Uruguay Round, tariffs of 3426 items were reduced. The products benefiting 
from the reduction ranged from plastic products to medical equipment and 
some agricultural imports were subjected to accelerated tariffs cuts. The TPR 
1997 estimates that Malaysia had reduced its import tariffs by “roughly one-
half.”257 The most dramatic outcome, as far as border measures are 
concerned, was the increase in tariff bindings from 1 percent to 65 percent. 
The secretariat noted also a significant increase in the lines with duty-free 
applied rates. However, Malaysia adopted a cautious approach and its bound 
rates are higher than its applied rates, thus preserving room for unilateral 
increases in import tariffs. 
Malaysian agricultural policies, according to the TPR, were 
“remarkably liberal”: import tariffs on agricultural products are low (around 
4.8 percent in1997); however, specific duties were imposed on some 
products, bringing the average tariff up to 20 percent.258
Tariffs on manufactured goods ranged from zero to 290 percent: the 
automobile and the textile and clothing industries were the most protected. 
Although the average tariffs were decreased, according to Malaysia’s 
commitments, tariffs escalation has widened.259
Import licensing was the second most prominent border measure; it 
applied mainly to forestry and logging, agricultural and mineral items, and the 
                                                 
256 World Trade WT/TPR/G/31 Report by the Government. 
257 World Trade WT/ TPR/G/31 Report by the Secretariat. 
258 Specific duties are duties other than tariffs and are not subjected to bindings or reduction’s 
commitments. 
259 WTO. (1997) Trade Policy Review – Malaysia. Geneva: GATT September 1997:41-43. In 
particular, see “Tariff dispersion” and “Tariff escalation.” “Overall average nominal tariff 
protection dropped from 15.2 per cent too 8.1 per cent [in the period between the first TPR – 
1993 – and the second TPR - 1997.]” 
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automobile sector.260 Since import licenses were used for monitoring and 
administrative purpose (with the exclusion of the automobile sector), they 




The most widely used non-border measures were incentives. The TPR 
found that “an array of tax and non-tax incentives existed; some were granted 
to all sectors, while other were aimed at specific firms or industries.”261 
Malaysia’s authorities usually granted incentives in a non-discriminatory 
manner, with the exception of some aimed at the car industry. 
 
Measures applying to the agricultural sector. 
Malaysia had made extensive use of subsidies as part of its strategy 
for agricultural development. The most important, and politically sensitive, 
programs were the price subsidy and the minimum price guarantee for rice.262 
The programs were notified to the WTO as exempted from reduction 
commitment, being a ‘green box’ type of policy. Other agricultural 
development measures were exempted, in particular agricultural credit. It was 
exempted under the provisions of special and differential treatment, being 
categorized as ‘development program.’ 
Malaysia did not have any forbidden export support subsidy measure 
in place at the time of the agreement. 
                                                 
260 The ‘National Car’ Proton was an import-substitution project very dear to PM Mahathir. It 
was granted very adequate infant industry protection. 
261 World Trade WT/TPR/S/31. Report by the Secretariat. 
262 See Chapter 2, Agriculture: 40-41 
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In short, the agricultural sector has benefited from the Round. 
Malaysian government estimated that “as a result of tariff liberalization 
commitments in the agricultural sector, tariffs in some of Malaysia’ major 
markets [were] reduced by 35%.”263
 
Measures applying to the manufacturing sector. 
Industrial development policies in Malaysia have made sizeable use of 
non-border policies, such as standards requirements, government procurement 
preferences and tax and non-tax incentives.264 Notwithstanding the presence 
of guidelines for foreign ownership of manufacturing firms, the Government 
had kept the sector open to foreign investments. 
The ‘incentives’ approach had been particularly successful in 
attracting foreign investors: in 1993, at the time of the first trade policy 
review, more than half of the manufacturing firm’s equity was foreign-
owned, and foreign ownership was even larger in export-oriented 
industries.265
Electronic firms located in Export Processing Zones had benefited 
from substantial export promotion measures, such as exemptions or 
drawbacks for import duties and other indirect taxes. 266
                                                 
263 World Trade WT/TPR/S/31. Report by the Government.  
264 WTO. (1997): 99 
265 See Jomo, K. S. and Chris Edwards. (1993) “Malaysian Industrialisation in Historical 
Perspective.” In Jomo K. S. (ed) (1993) for an economic appraisal of the ‘incentive approach’ 
on Malaysian industrialization and Jesudason (1989) for the political economy of the 
investment policy in Malaysia.  
266 For an analysis of the incentive regime for high-tech industries,see Jomo, K.S. and Greg 
Felker. (eds.) (1999) Technology, Competitiveness and the State: Malaysia’s Industrial 
Technology Policies. London: Routledge and Jomo, K.S., Greg Felker and Rajah Rasiah. 
(eds.) (1999) Industrial Technology Development in Malaysia. London: Routledge. See also 
Jomo, K.S. (ed.) (2007) Malaysian Industrial Policy. Singapore: NUS Press.  
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The textile and clothing sector was also largely foreign owned;267 
however, the industry had gone through a restructuring exercise and had 
received assistance under a special provision, the ‘Industrial Adjustment 
Allowance.’ 
The automotive industry was the most protected, and some of the 
provisions applying to the sector had to be revised because of the UR 
agreement. In particular, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures prohibits local content requirements.268 The Government of 
Malaysia, in accordance with the TRIMs agreement, notified the Committee 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures that “Malaysia [had] no local content 
laws or regulations. However, the government [encouraged] the use of local 
content materials in the manufacturing sector and the use of local content 
[was] taken into account in the granting of investment incentives provided by 
the Government. In particular, there was a local-content programme for motor 
vehicles which [was] encouraged through administrative measures.”269 The 
Government, therefore, had to review the program. 
Among other changes imposed by the Agreement, was the 
introduction of the anti-dumping legislation. At the time, it was yet 
incomplete. On the other end, the reform of the GATT rules on dumping was 
among Malaysia’s objective, since its exporters were facing the threat of anti-
dumping and countervailing actions in foreign markets. These threats were 
justified by foreign governments by the fact that Malaysian exporters were 
being unfairly subsidized by their government. The new rules should help 
                                                 
267 In 1993, according to the TPR, foreign equity and foreign labor constitute about 75% and 
25% of the sectoral total respectively. 
268 For a discussion and data about the local content issue see, Gustafsson. (2007).  
269 Notification by the Government of Malaysia, 12 April 1995. WTO document 
G/TRIMS/1/MYS/1. 
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mitigate the risks of those actions being used as protectionist measures. 
Malaysia was not part of the Plurilateral Agreement of Government 
Procurement, and therefore was under no obligations to change its 
government procurement preferences.  
Overall, the outcome of the agreement was in line with Malaysia’s 
objectives: it achieved significant cuts in tariffs by its trading partners, and 
the changes in its domestic legislation were already expected to take place, 
given its regional trade commitments. Although there were complaints about 
the supposed high price to be paid by Malaysia for having to modify some of 
its trade and industrialization policies – in particular the local content 
requirements and export subsidies – even the most ardent critics recognized 
that “gains for Malaysia in terms of a 45 percent (weighted average) tariff 
reduction in major markets … [would] benefit the country’s manufactured 
exports.”270  
 
Measures applying to the service sector. 
Malaysia “has not made any horizontal commitments covering cross-
border supply and consumption abroad.”271 In fact, most commitments, albeit 
on a limited basis, have been made on commercial presence. Commercial 
presence is limited to joint ventures in which foreign equity participation is 
restricted. Strong limitations apply also to services that involve movement of 
personnel. In practice, Malaysia has committed to nothing different than what 
was already allowed by domestic laws, as the Secretariat noted “commitments 
                                                 
270 Akhtar Hassam and Mohamed Aslam. (1996) “The New GATT.” In Jomo.and Ng Suew 
Kiat (1996) Malaysia’s Economic Development: Policy and Reform. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publications: 72. 
271 World Trade WT/ TPR/G/31. Report by the Secretariat. ‘Horizontal’: that covers all 
sectors and mode of supply. 
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were all consistent with current policy affecting foreign participation in the 
domestic services sector.”272 Some exceptions have been made for financial 
or consultancy firms willing to operate offshore in Labuan.  
The Malaysian government was extremely unwilling to include the 
service sector into the negotiating agenda.273 It has successfully managed to 
keep its commitment to a minimum.  
 
Measures applying to intellectual property rights 
Although Malaysia had already introduced legislation protecting 
intellectual property rights, it had to revise it to conform to the TRIPs 
agreement. The government stressed that it attached a strategic importance to 
the issue and considered the legislation an essential “tool of industrial 
policy.”274 Protection for intellectual property rights was deemed vital for the 
development of the Multi-Media Super Corridor; the effort to attract high-
tech investors in the country had to be complemented by adequate IP rules. 
In fact, although Malaysia, as a developing country, had asked for a 
five-year implementation delay, it signaled its intention to adopt the amended 
IP laws ahead of time. 
 
2) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UR AGREEMENTS 
Malaysia had to modify some of its domestic legislations and policies 
to comply with its commitments; it had also to introduce new laws and reform 
some state agencies. After three years from the entry into force of the 
Agreement, the implementation agenda included: 
                                                 
272 World Trade WT/ TPR/G/31. Report by the Secretariat. 
273 See Chapter 2, Trade in Services: 74. 
274 World Trade WT/ TPR/G/31. Report by the Secretariat. 
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“-phasing out local content measures tied to incentives by 2000 
-adjustments to the custom valuation system 
-phasing out export subsidies in the manufacturing sector by the year 
2003 
-ensuring consistency of the Malaysian Countervailing Duty and Anti-
Dumping Act 1993 with the WTO agreement 
-formulating additional legislation to provide further protection of 
intellectual property rights 
-drafting a new Act to accommodate all the provisions in the SPS 
Agreement and other inadequacies in the existing Act. National standards of 
control, inspection and approval procedures will be developed based on 
relevant international standards 
-existing Malaysian standards are being reviewed to align them to 
international standards. The existing incentive system is being reviewed to 
ensure incentives are consistent with WTO disciplines as embodied in the 
TRIMs and Subsidies agreement.”275  
The list describes a massive administrative endeavor. It has certainly 
required the mobilization of large bureaucratic and technical resources, and it 
has certainly been a costly exercise. However, Malaysia’s economy is highly 
dependent on trade, and it is questionable that without the agreement it would 
not have had to make numerous changes to its practices to accommodate its 
powerful trading partners. Some reforms could be even considered overdue 
for a country at Malaysia’s stage of development.  
 
                                                 
275 World Trade WT/ TPR/G/31. Report by the Government. 
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CONCLUSION 
The satisfactory end to years of negotiations had been achieved by the 
Malaysian government through a combination of domestic and international 
strategies. 
Internationally, Malaysia acted on three different fronts: as a member 
of ASEAN in order to develop the strongest possible regional cohesion, as a 
member of the Cairns Group in order to achieve concrete results in the 
agricultural negotiations and, indirectly, to break the trap of North-South 
confrontation, as a member of the Informal Group in order to preserve special 
and differential treatment for developing countries. 
Domestically, the government mobilized its bureaucratic resources 
and consulted the private sector in order to ensure consistency and unity 
between trade negotiations and domestic policies.  
In the next chapter the external factors that pushed Malaysia to engage 












 CHAPTER 4 
 
EXTERNAL FACTORS PUSHING MALAYSIA AS AN EXPORT-
ORIENTED SMALL ECONOMY TO PARTICIPATION TO 
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. 
 
“The real danger to the GATT is not that a trade war will break out, 
but that the major signatories to the GATT will simply pretend that the 
General Agreement is not there … This would effectively end the GATT” 
Arthur Dunkel, Director General of the GATT (1982)276
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the main factors at the international level 
that exerted a powerful influence on trade policy choices from the early 
1980s, when the discussions about the desirability of a new round started, to 
the early 1990s when it became clear that the acceptance by developing 
countries of the ‘grand trade-off’ was the inevitable price of stabilizing the 
international trading system.277
These are factors that by definition cannot be controlled in any 
significant way by small export-oriented economies. 
The next section will briefly introduce the main features of the 
economic situation in industrial and developing countries during the years 
                                                 
276 Speaking in Washington, DC, at the National Press Club, July 15, 1982 [quoted in A. W. 
Wolff, “Need for New GATT Rules to Govern Safeguard Actions.” in Cline (1983). 
277 See Ostry, Sylvia. (2000) The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications 
for Future Negotiations. The Political Economy of International Trade Law: University of 
Minnesota. 
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following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round (1979). Rich and poor countries 
alike were confronted with recession and the need for structural reforms. 
While industrialized countries in the West used their economic and political 
power to limit the costs of domestic adjustment, developing countries started 
a process of progressive integration into the global economy: the large 
number of LDCs signing the Final Act of the Uruguay Round in 1995 is 
testament to this new level of global economic integration. 
An analysis of the most visible effects of ‘globalization’ on the world 
economy is the object of Section 3. Significant technological advances 
allowed transnational corporations operating in both manufacturing and 
service sectors to adopt new global production and marketing strategies; the 
outcome has been a considerable transformation of the international division 
of labor. 
The evolution of protectionist policies in the major industrial countries 
is described in Section 4. Domestic agricultural policies in the 1980s of the 
US, the EEC, and to a lesser extent Japan, wreaked havoc in international 
markets and inflicted heavy losses upon competitive agricultural producers. 
Protectionist measures in other sectors increased in intensity and scope. New 
forms of trade barriers, grey-area measures and ‘contingent’ protection 
(protection targeted at specific foreign competitors) put the GATT rules-
based system under tremendous pressure. 
The last section discusses the wave of new regional agreements that 
took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. A renewed enthusiasm for regional 
schemes is linked to the instability (both real and perceived) and potential 
fragmentation of the international trading system. 
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2) AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND (1979) 
The conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979 was followed by a severe 
decline in international economic conditions; recession in most industrial 
nations prompted the rise of protectionist pressures and affected the rate of 
growth of world trade. The dependability of a multilateral trading system in 
regulating trade relations was increasingly in question. 
The economic crisis caused many countries, both developed and less 
developed to adopt policies that, though ostensibly conflicting, resulted in 
greater integration of the world economy. 
 
DEVELOPED NATIONS 
While recession in the United States and Western Europe brought 
high unemployment rates a number of newly industrializing countries were 
enjoying economic success, particularly in East Asia. The reaction to this new 
threat was swift: measures were adopted to protect American and European 
industries from competition by low-cost producers. Protection was 
administered mainly through non-tariff barriers such as quotas and voluntary 
export restraints. Non-tariff barriers were preferred not only because more 
traditional increases in tariff levels were not feasible under GATT rules, but 
also because they allowed for discrimination against specific competitors both 
at firm and country levels. 
Traditional protectionist measures are directed against all foreign 
competition, irrespective of provenance. Measures could be tailored to 
specific domestic industry needs, but, until the 1980s, they were designed to 
respect the non-discriminatory nature of the GATT. However, the success of 
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Japanese and NICs firms was perceived as the result of deliberate state 
policies aimed at exponentially increasing exports to Western industrial 
countries while preventing imports to enter their markets. Demands from 
industry and workers’ unions to put an end to “unfair” trade practices became 
intense and unrelenting. They were even more difficult to oppose because of 
the widespread public belief in the US and Europe that in many cases (for 
instance, textile, steel, and auto industries) the crisis was structural and 
prolonged protection would be necessary to accommodate an orderly 
restructuring of these sectors. Furthermore, something had to be done to 
promote those other sectors (in particular, service industries) where US and 
European firms still had a significant comparative advantage, but were stifled 
by unfair and restrictive practices abroad.  
Contingent protection differs from the traditional type because it “is 
designed to deter particular ‘unfair’ practices, and if necessary, change the 
behavior of the exporting country’s firms and governments through threat or 
imposition of sanctions. Protection is contingent on the behavior of the 
target.”278  
By the end of 1985 the continuing rise of the US trade deficit and the 
challenges posed by a very strong dollar to American industries had 
considerably strengthened protectionist voices inside the American Congress. 
The Reagan administration tried to contain congressional pressures in 
two ways: by renewing its diplomatic efforts to start a new round of GATT 
negotiations, and by calling on the traditional allies of liberal trade policies, 
that is multinational firms with vast operations abroad. To this aim, the 
                                                 
278 Haggard, Stephan. (1995) Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution: 27. 
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administration gave assurances that concerns over trade in services, 
intellectual property rights and investment protection, and about ‘fair’ trade in 
general, would be duly addressed both at the multilateral and bilateral level. 
Congress, however, was not easily placated: although the dollar had 
fallen significantly after the Plaza Accord, the trade deficit had not been 
reabsorbed; some attempts by the administration to negotiate through GATT 
on sector-specific issues had failed: Senator Gephardt presented an 
amendment to the Trade Act where mandatory retaliation was proposed 
against countries which would not act to reduce their trade surpluses. The 
administration managed to stop the very popular Gephardt Amendment; 
however, in 1988 the Congress decided to act and amend American trade 
laws; the scope of Section 301 was widened transforming it into a potent 
instrument for bilateral actions. 
The Cold War was ending and trade interests had now priority over 
traditional strategic considerations; a momentous outcome of the rewriting of 
Section 301 has been that “by the late 1980s, bilateralism had become the 
most significant route towards deeper integration for the advanced developing 
countries.”279
 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Developing nations confronted a number of negative circumstances. 
The prices of all major commodities, including oil, had significantly fallen; 
high interest rates at the beginning of the 1980s had increased the debt 
burden; and as a consequence to the Mexican crisis in August 1982, 
                                                 
279 Haggard (1995):28. 
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commercial lending had virtually stopped. 
Many LDCs governments had to implement dramatic changes in their 
exchange rates regimes, cut public expenditure, and raise interest rates.  
Developing countries with serious debt problems faced stricter 
interpretations of the ‘conditionality norm’ enforced by international financial 
institutions: financial assistance was granted in exchange for policy 
adjustments by recipients. Both the IMF and the World Bank were strong 
advocates of fiscal prudence, limited public intervention in the economy, 
privatization of many industries and services, and liberal trade policies. 
Privatization policies were followed by new rules and regulations, and 
enforcement agencies had to be created. Typically, practices of the English-
speaking industrialized world were the main models for those reforms. 
Adjustment programs prescribed by international financial institutions 
undoubtedly contributed to the progressive integration into the world 
economy of many of the most indebted LDCs. However, their importance is 
comparable to the actions that were taken independently by other 
governments in the developing world as they struggled to promote themselves 
to foreign investors. 
A momentous and long-lasting consequence of those years was that 
many LDCs governments determined to call on foreign investors in order to 
finance industrial development plans they were unable to sustain on their 
own. LDCs governments were confronted by the above mentioned sensible 
reduction in international commercial lending, at a time of rising balance of 
payments deficits and dwindling domestic investments: they then had to 
consider how best to appease foreign creditors and attract foreign investors. 
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Therefore, for many developing countries, renewed interest in foreign 
direct investments meant to embark on a series of far reaching policy reforms 
including relaxing sectoral and equity investment restrictions, adapting 
existing performance requirements, introducing various kinds of industrial 
incentives, and allowing for the repatriation of capital, profits and dividends. 
Some governments went as far as liberalizing the capital account. 
 
3) GLOBALIZATION 
The crisis of confidence in the multilateral trading system was taking 
place at a time when the introduction of new technologies was changing long-
established patterns of production, investment and trade. New technologies 
that enabled accurate, fast and efficient exchanges of information, offered to 
corporations the chance to build truly global strategies and organizations. 
Over a relatively short period of time, the so-called ‘globalization’ of 
financial services, FDI flows, and trade became apparent: in 1992 world 
financial markets were roughly three times larger than in 1982, and amounted 
to twice the world gross domestic product; foreign direct investments surged 
in the second half of the 1980s, averaging an increase of 20 percent per year; 
the volume of world trade was growing faster than world production, pointing 
to greater integration among participants in the world economy.280
Multinational firms used their newly acquired technological abilities 
to spread their production networks, definitively transforming the traditional 
international division of labor. Establishing a presence in all the major areas 
of the world economy was at first considered useful to minimize the impact of 
                                                 
280 Sander, Harald. (1996) “Multilateralism, Regionalism and Globalisation.” In Sander H. 
and A. Inotai (eds.) (1996) World Trade after the Uruguay Round. London: Routledge: 35.  
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volatile exchange rates; however, it soon became apparent that, with new and 
more flexible production systems, international corporations would be able to 
exploit low-cost production locations. This, in turn, caused a marked change 
in the character of foreign direct investments by multinational corporations. 
In general, FDIs had long been used either for market-opening purposes or to 
gain access to raw materials. In contrast, the wave of FDIs that started in the 
second half of the 1980s had been essentially driven by efficiency and long-
term strategic considerations. This new perspective was complemented by 
innovative forms of equity and non-equity corporate ventures such as cross-
border alliances and networks of suppliers. Multinational firms were now 
“controllers of …[a] system of interlocking value-added activities.”281
One of the most visible signs of the changes in the systems of 
production was the increase in intra-firm trade: goods moving across national 
boundaries between units of one firm. In 1989, 34 percent of all exports and 
41 percent of all imports of the United States were intra-firm trade; in Japan 
they stood at 33 percent and 29 percent respectively.282
Newly acquired flexibility in the design of efficient production 
networks has been a factor in both the globalization and the regionalization of 
industries. Firms that wish to compete internationally strive to establish 
themselves in all major areas of the world creating regionally integrated 
production networks. The development of these networks, and therefore of 
trade (both intra-firm and inter-firm, since a sizeable amount of production is 
done by non-equity partners) is affected by differences in national policies 
and business practices. Typically taxation levels, the availability of 
                                                 
281 Sander, Harald and Andras Inotai. (eds.) (1996) World Trade after the Uruguay Round. 
London: Routledge: 29. 
282 According to UNCTAD (1994): 143. 
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investment incentives, and the existence of a more or less friendly business 
environment will influence the choice of a possible location - or relocation - 
of production facilities and/or suppliers. Investment flows have, therefore, 
become progressively more sensitive to shifts in locational advantages. A 
classic example has been the reaction to the loss of preferential treatment 
under the General System of Preferences by Singapore: a number of 
manufacturing activities have been moved to Johor State in Malaysia or 
Batam in Indonesia.  
These developments in transnational enterprises’ strategies and 
organization imply that a country’s potential as FDIs destination is assessed 
against a number of variables. Factors such as availability of natural and 
human resources continue to be important; however, the quality of the 
infrastructure and the level of technical and technological competence and 
experience, together with the degree of existing or potential integration in 
wider regional production networks are equally critical. 
A major consequence has been that governments in both developed 
and developing countries have lost some degree of autonomy in setting 
national economic policies; domestic goals must be balanced against the 
‘standards’ set by markets and other competing nations.  
Policies to enhance national competitiveness are deemed 
indispensable: they are however, complex to devise and to administer, 
especially if they are undertaken in isolation by developing countries with 
limited resources. The risk of unrestrained and damaging competition for 
foreign capital called for greater cooperation and policy coordination. The 
dynamics of ‘globalization’ are among the determinants of the many regional 
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economic initiatives that were started – or deepened in scope – since the 
second half of the 1980s. The participants’ intentions included the will to 
“send a signal to potential third country investors.”283
 
4) OLD AND NEW PROTECTIONIST POLICIES  
Governments generally regard participation in the GATT as a means 
to access foreign markets rather than a commitment to open their domestic 
market to foreign competition. If the system is perceived as not functional in 
achieving national economic goals, individual countries either attempt to 
minimize the impact of global rules, or circumvent them altogether. 
 
AGRICULTURE284
A classic example has been the agricultural sector: it has been noted 
that “the international trade rules relating to agriculture have been adjusted to 
fit the different national programs designed to protect farmers”285 since the 
very beginning of the GATT. 
Since the very beginning of the GATT system, agriculture has enjoyed 
special treatment. GATT’s contracting parties agreed to regard it as an 
exception and most of the rules of the international trading system did not 
apply to this sector. 
During the 1970s, however, agricultural trade flows changed 
significantly, as did national agricultural programs. The consequences of 
                                                 
283 As declared by a Singaporean official at the launch of AFTA. Quoted in Oman, Charles. 
(1994) Globalization and Regionalism: the Challenge for Developing Countries. Paris, 
France: OECD: 2. 
284 The following section draws on D. E. Hathaway (1987), Agriculture and the GATT: 
Rewriting the Rules. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
285 Hathaway (1987): 1. 
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these transformations became apparent in the 1980s, when the international 
and domestic costs of those changes and policies caused bitter rows whose 
severity threatened the existence of the whole trading system. 
 
Historical overview  
On the 6th of May 1986, at the Tokyo Summit of the G7, the leaders of 
the most industrialized nations acknowledged that “a situation of global 
structural surplus now exists for some important agricultural products, arising 
partly from technological improvements, partly from changes in the world 
market situation, and partly from long-standing policies of domestic subsidy 
and protection of agriculture in all our countries.”286
The declaration seemed to admit that domestic agricultural programs 
implemented by the major trading powers were causing significant trade 
problems and that changes in the rules governing international agricultural 
trade would first require changes in national policies. 
During the 1960s the increase in world agricultural output did not 
match the pace of population growth in many developing countries; at the 
same time, in the industrialized nations economic growth both increased and 
diversified demand for agricultural products. 
This tendency became even more pronounced at the beginning of the 
1970s, when the USSR and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe 
started to import food, especially grains, to compensate for the deficiency of 
their domestic production.287
                                                 
286 Final Declaration of the G7 Tokyo Summit, 6th of May 1986. Quoted in Hathaway (1987): 
18. 
287 “In 1960/61 all developing countries (including China) imported a total of about 18 
million metric tons of grains. … The Soviet Union was a net exporter of 6 million tons. … At 
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This shift by the Socialist bloc from net exporter to net importer was 
dramatically highlighted when, in the 1972/73 crop year, a reduction in the 
global output of grains took place; the fall in production, although relatively 
small, was sufficient enough to trigger a massive rise in nominal and real 
agricultural prices and a vast increase in the volumes of agricultural trade.288
Around the world, governments responded to the perceived 
emergency by adopting policies directed at increasing national food 
production, thereby, isolating domestic economies from the vagaries of the 
international markets.289 These measures, implemented both in exporting and 
importing countries, included securing higher price guarantees for farmers, 
expanding cultivated land and related facilities (through, for example, 
irrigation and drainage works), subsidizing agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers and providing public credit to farmers. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the volume of trade in grains was about 
three times higher than it was in the early 1960s; more importantly, the 
directions of trade flows had changed. Developing countries (including 
China), the Soviet Union and its East European allies were importing a total 
of 124 million tons while the EEC had become a net exporter. 
The assumption behind the agricultural policies adopted in the 1970s 
was that both global economic growth and world trade growth would 
continue in the 1980s, and therefore, demand for agricultural products would 
                                                                                                                              
that time, Western Europe was the major importer of wheat and coarse grains.” Hathaway 
(1987): 8. 
288 “The volume of world grains trade jumped a quarter from 1971/72 to 1972/73. Prices of 
traded wheat, corn and rice doubled in nominal dollar terms. The IMF index of food 
commodity prices rose 80 percent in nominal dollar terms and 54 percent in real terms.” 
Hathaway (1987): 8. 
289 It is important to note that the perceived food shortage happened to coincide with the first 
oil shock (1973). 
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continue to increase at a fast pace. The reality turned out to be very different: 
global economic growth and world trade growth weakened and, in 1982, 
international trade in agricultural products started to slow down.  
Agricultural production, however, did not decrease since the measures 
taken by many governments to augment output were still in operation. Export 
markets were unable to absorb the increases in supply, and a fierce 
competition began among major producers to get hold of shrinking market 
shares. The European Economic Community had been particularly successful 
in stimulating agricultural output growth: internal production had risen well 
above domestic consumption. The EEC was, nevertheless, able to conquer 
external markets by means of massive use of subsidies. Traditional exporters, 
such as Canada, Australia, and Argentina managed to increase their market 
shares at the beginning of the 1980s. Those successes happened at the 
expense of the United States, whose market shares and export earnings 
decreased quite severely. However, prices were falling for all participants and 
the costs of domestic support programs were soaring. Not only was price 
support getting more onerous, but the cost of managing colossal stocks of 
agricultural products was becoming prohibitive. The solution was most often 
found in increasing export subsidies. 
When discussions started about the opportunity to call a new round of 
international trade negotiations, the tensions provoked by the unbridled use of 
subsidies and the continuing fall in agricultural commodity prices were high 
and rising.  
The situation of international markets had serious economic 
consequences for a large number of nations: some were experiencing 
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significant reductions in export earnings, while others were confronted with 
the soaring costs of maintaining farm support programs. 
 
Is agriculture different? 
The special treatment that has been reserved to the agricultural sector 
has been generally justified by a number of characteristics that are associated 
with it. First, agricultural output still depends on variables that cannot be 
easily modified by man-made technology, such as weather or pests. Second, 
the inevitable cycles associated with agriculture (from planting to harvesting) 
enforces a limited response to changes in market conditions: choices about 
the quality and quantity of production are routinely made long in advance. In 
other words, the supply of agricultural products shows little elasticity to the 
price. The most important consequence of low supply and demand elasticity, 
at least in the short term, is the considerable variability of prices for many 
agricultural commodities. 290
Although farmers around the world have consistently shown their 
ability to respond to market signals, there are a number of constraints that 
also act on long-term supply changes. Investments in agriculture are 
extremely industry-specific and any technology with the potential of 
increasing output while cutting costs will be applied even if prices are falling.  
The structural rigidity of the sector, coupled with inherent price 
instability, has created the political need for extensive state intervention in 
agriculture. Governments have financed agricultural research, infrastructure, 
and credit in most industrialized countries and in many developing nations as 
                                                 
290 The demand for food is also inelastic because of the natural limits of human consumption; 
however, higher incomes generally translate into a more diversified and protein-rich diet. 
Therefore, more affluent countries will consume, for example, more meat and less grain. 
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well.  
Public intervention has also extended to price control of agricultural 
products. Governments have enacted policies to stabilize national food prices 
and, in doing so, they have significantly impacted on trade. Generally 
speaking, all measures that keep internal prices considerably above or below 
international prices influence trade. 
 
Domestic agricultural policies and their global impact (EEC, Japan, US) 
The agricultural trade crisis of the 1980s originated from the domestic 
agricultural policies of the major players in world trade. Their impact was felt 
beyond their domestic markets and was not confined only to the agricultural 
sector.  
• The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EEC291 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic 
Community was based upon three principles: a) preference would be granted 
to producers from member states; b) there would be common agricultural 
prices in the Community; c) the policy’s funding would be shared by the 
members and administered by the European Commission. 
Producers in the (increasingly numerous) member states were 
protected by the imposition of a variable levy on most agricultural imports. 
                                                 
291 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed on March 
25, 1957 in Rome by six West European nations (Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). It came into force on January 1, 1958. These six 
European states belonged also to the European Coal and Steel Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community. They shared common institutions: the Council of the European 
Communities and the Commission of the European Communities. There have been numerous 
amendments to the Treaties. The Maastricht Treaty (signed in December 1991, and entered 
into force on November 1, 1993) did ‘strike’ the word ‘Economic” from the title of the EEC 
Treaty, which was thereafter known as the ‘Treaty Establishing a European Community’ 
(EC). In November 1993, the European Union was born; The EU includes the three European 
Communities, in particular the European Community on which the CAP and the GATT 
negotiations are based.  
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The amount of the levy was fixed in accordance to the difference between the 
lowest price asked on global markets and a “suitable” price set in Brussels. In 
practice, the EEC internal prices ended up being higher than world prices; 
EEC exporters were given the difference through an export restitution 
mechanism.  
Establishing a common price was no easy feat for the Commission, 
due to the great differences among the national agricultural sectors of member 
countries.292 Moreover, internal differences had increased over the years: 
successive enlargements brought in both high-cost and low-cost producers. 
Prices were set high enough to be considered ‘fair’ by the farmers from high-
cost countries; logically, high prices constituted a bonus for lower cost 
producers. The system provided exceptionally efficient incentives to increase 
output in both high and low cost areas of the EEC. 
The CAP was to be financed by the revenues from the variable levy 
and members had to transfer a percentage of VAT to Brussels for the same 
purpose. 
The CAP was planned and began operations in the first half of the 
1960s, when the six EEC members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg) imported large amounts of most agricultural 
products. As long as the EEC internal demand was rising, the CAP could to 
control and maintain stable domestic prices. Although it was in essence a 
trade measure, it did not have any significant impact on international markets, 
since EEC consumption exceeded EEC output. 
The policy was very successful in strengthening farmers’ incomes all 
                                                 
292 Farm size, efficiency, type of crops, to name a few. 
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over the Community, encouraging technical innovation, promoting efficiency, 
and expanding production. In a little less than ten years, the Common 
Agricultural Policy succeeded in turning the Community from large importer 
to rising exporter of many agricultural commodities: from grains to butter, 
from wine to sugar.293 The almost immediate consequence was a massive 
increase in the costs of running the CAP itself. 
The huge and unanticipated growth of domestic output made the 
export mechanism too expensive, and it became necessary to introduce a 
system to purchase and stock excess supply. However, this measure did not 
ease the pressures on the agricultural budget. 
The CAP survived the first half of the 1980s because world 
agricultural prices are set in US dollars; in those years, the American dollar 
was very high against European currencies. After September 1985, the dollar 
started to fall and the budget problems of the CAP began to soar. Member 
countries had to agree to an increase of their VAT contribution while 
implementing some production controls.294 These limits on production were 
extremely unpopular with European farmers. 
Some Europeans started to think that the CAP had to be reformed. 
Their aim, however, was to protect the EEC finances. In the meantime, the 
outside world was loudly protesting the CAP for its consequences on 
international trade in agricultural products. Highly subsidized exports out of 
the EEC were creating problems for more efficient producers around the 
globe. 
                                                 
293 The EEC imported 25 million tons of grains in 1976/77; it exported 15 million tons in 
1986/87. 
294 They introduced some limits of milk and diary production: EEC in 1986 was still the first 
exporter in dairy products. 
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EEC policies are very well illustrated by the European Commission’s 
exploitation of a critical loophole in the agricultural sector’s protection: 
oilseeds and oilseeds products. Oilseeds are used to produce vegetable oils 
(such as palm, coconut, soybeans) and protein meals for animal feeds.295 The 
European Economic Community bound its tariffs on these imports in the 
early 1960s, at the Dillon Round. Since oilseeds and oilseed products were 
subjected to low tariffs, imports increased over time given the growth of dairy 
farming in Europe at the expense of internally produced (and priced) 
alternatives (wheat and coarse grains feed, for example). 
In the late 1970s, when the impact of this loophole became apparent, 
the Commission attempted to minimize the consequences. The EEC, 
therefore, implemented a special oilseed policy designed to foster domestic 
production with the specific aim of displacing competitive foreign imports. 
Farmers were guaranteed a ‘target’ price for their harvest and European 
processors were paid handsomely to process expensive European-produced 
oilseeds. Not surprisingly, the program was highly successful. Both oilseeds 
cultivation and output rose promptly, as did the costs for the European 
taxpayer and consumer.296 However, the main objective of Brussels was to 
limit imports. The EEC even managed to convince Thailand, the largest 
exporter to Europe of tapioca (a nongrain feed substitute) to enter in a 
voluntary restraint agreement.297
                                                 
295 Palm oil production is dominated by Malaysia. 
296The Community even hinted at the possibility of a special consumption tax to be imposed 
on all vegetable oils in order to finance the very costly oilseed program. The proposal was 
strongly resisted by the US that threatened to retaliate. 
297 For a detailed account of the EEC-Thai negotiations, see Surakiart Sathirathai and Ammar 
Siamwalla. “GATT Law, Agricultural Trade, and Developing Countries: Lessons from Two 
Case Studies.” In The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 1, No. 4 (September 1987): 595-
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• Japanese Agricultural Policies 
The main goals of the Japanese agricultural programs were to 
maintain self-sufficiency, especially for rice, and to ensure that farmers’ 
incomes did not fall behind those of the rest of the population. These aims 
were realized by drastically limiting imports of final goods; Japanese 
consumers were required to pay higher than world market prices for their 
food. 
A state agency manages the trade in rice, wheat and barley: it is the 
exclusive importer and buys the whole domestic output from the Japanese 
farmers. 
A number of other goods are subject to quotas; however, raw 
materials, such as animal feed, are imported liberally, restrictions applying 
basically only to final products. 
The objectives of the state policies have been only partially realized. 
Although Japan is self-sufficient in rice, it has become more and more 
dependent on imports for its domestic needs. Being an affluent society, food 
consumption has shifted from grains (in this case, rice) to meat, poultry, and 
fruit and vegetables. At the end of the 1980s, Japanese producers were 
supplying only 52 percent of the total food consumption of their country.298
The Japanese solution to the agricultural issues has relied principally 
on consumers’ tolerance of very high prices. The budget costs have been 
remarkably limited, especially in comparison with the American and 
European experience. Japan has successfully managed to isolate its 
                                                                                                                              
618. The VRA brought down imports of tapioca from 8.5 million to 5.5 million tons between 
1984 and 1985. 
298 In terms of calories consumed. Hathaway (1987): 80. 
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agricultural sector from the world markets, and, in fact, its policies had no, or 
very limited, effects on the international agricultural trade. 
• US Agricultural Policies 
The agricultural policies of the United States were created during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. Three intervention methods were established 
during that crisis, and were kept in operation for many decades afterwards: 
price supports, production controls and deficiency payments. 
Price supports took the shape of special government loans granted to 
farmers; they were called price supports, because if a crop’s market prices 
were insufficient for the farmer to repay the loan, the harvest itself was to be 
used as payment. In practice, these loans worked as a minimum price 
guarantee.  
Production controls were introduced to reduce the land under 
cultivation when prices for specific crops were falling, or expected to fall.  
Deficiency payments were also made to integrate farmers’ income 
when market prices were deemed by the authorities to be lower than a 
politically determined ‘target’ price. 
The system, therefore, worked to sustain farmers’ incomes through a 
combination of direct contributions, (deficiency payments); surplus 
management (price support) and limits on output (production controls). This 
mix worked extremely well during the 1970s when world prices for 
agricultural commodities were high and American producers were enjoying 
healthy world market shares. 
In 1981 the dollar began to appreciate against major world currencies. 
Its rise did not stop until after the Plaza Accord in 1985. Meanwhile, world 
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prices started to fall.  
The price support system meant that as early as 1982, the US 
government had to manage growing surplus stocks. The strength of the dollar 
was one of the factors that were contributing to the loss of market shares by 
American exporters against traditional competitors, such as Canada and 
Australia, and new ones, as the EC. The Reagan administration was 
confronted with the worst crisis in the sector since the Depression: high 
interest rates and low commodity prices were decimating the American 
farming community. The administration faced an immediate and growing 
budget problem; it proposed to reform legislation on basic products, such as 
grains, oilseeds and sugar. Price supports had to be reduced and deficiency 
payments had to disappear over a few years. The Congress, however, was 
determined to continue to help American farmers; price supports would be 
lowered, but a massive program of export subsidies (direct export subsidies, 
subsidized credit, 10-year export-credit programs) was to be introduced. The 
changes in the US agricultural policies did not change the direction of world 
prices for agricultural goods. In fact, export subsidies and bigger outputs were 
reinforcing an already negative trend. The American lawmakers, however, did 
not lose confidence in export subsidies, and in 1986 and 1987, they were still 
asking the administration to enlarge the scope of the programs, in order to 
cover more products and new destinations. Unsurprisingly, many US 
competitors were very concerned and directly affected by these developments 
in American trade policy. Canadian corn growers even managed to persuade 
their government to impose countervailing duties on imports from the United 
States.  
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A telling example of the distortions that the American subsidies were 
causing in the world market is the US rice program. The United States has 
never been a large rice producer but it has managed to be the world second 
largest exporter after Thailand. Under a massive support program, US 
producers received large deficiency payments.  
Without subsidies, Japanese and American rice production would 
have been substantially reduced; the policies followed by the two countries 
have brought further pressure on international prices, one by encouraging 
exports (the US) and the other by restraining imports (Japan).299
 
Consequences on the International Trading System 
International tensions arose principally over three issues: agricultural 
prices, subsidies and the aims of the international trading system represented 
by the GATT. 
The agricultural policies adopted by the European Community, the 
United States and Japan were creating considerable surpluses, affecting world 
prices for a growing number of commodities. Falling agricultural prices 
caused real financial difficulties for farmers and governments around the 
world. 
In many countries where farmers’ incomes were not guaranteed by 
support programs, farmers’ incomes had fallen; where such programs were in 
operation, their costs were escalating and they were reducing the resources 
available for more productive investments.300
In Malaysia, the government supported rice producers through a 
                                                 
299 “The real price of rice in 1986 was less than one-fifth of its 1974 peak, and down by over 
one-half from 1981, and only about one-third the level of the 1960s.” Hathaway (1987): 28. 
300 Hathaway (1987): 28-29. 
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guaranteed minimum price program. During the Fifth Malaysian Plan period 
(1986-90) the program’s expenditure amounted to Ringgit 1.193 million. The 
total provision of other various forms of incentives for crop production (from 
padi to rubber, from pepper to livestock rearing) amounted to Ringgit 525.3 
million.301  
In Argentina there were no support programs available to farmers. 
However, during the first half of the 1980s, exports of grains and grains by-
products almost doubled in volume, but the increase in export value was only 
about 39 percent. During the same period the international price for grains 
had diminished considerably: in 1986 it was only 63 percent of its equivalent 
in 1980.302  
Agricultural producers around the globe were clamoring that farmers 
in the United States, Japan and the European Community were able to survive 
in a very difficult market situation – a situation that they themselves had 
created – only because of generous subsidies, more or less willingly paid by 
consumers and taxpayers in their own countries.  
It had become clear by the beginning of the Round that negotiations 
should address aggressively the issue of agricultural subsidies: without some 
reform in domestic policies trade problems could not even start to be 
resolved. 
In fact, the biggest disruption in global agricultural trade was not 
caused by the protection granted by the EEC to its producers, but the unfair 
competitive advantage that European products were enjoying in third 
                                                 
301 Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) Agricultural Development: 102. 
302 Cirio Felix M. and Manuel Otero. (1989) “Agricultural Trade in Argentina.” In Whalley 
John. (ed.) (1989) Developing Countries and the Global Trading System. London: 
MacMillan. Vol.1.  
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markets.  
However, the most effective pressures to reform of the CAP were 
coming from within the Community. The founding assumptions of the policy 
had been that the EEC’s imports would not decrease overtime and, therefore, 
the CAP would neither translate into a substantial burden to Brussels’ 
finances nor would it upset world trade.  
On the contrary, a relatively weak growth of domestic demand and a 
strong rise in production levels, both internally and globally, gave rise to 
questions about the long-term sustainability of the CAP.  
The Japanese agricultural policies were being questioned as well. The 
United States wanted Japan to accept more foreign competition in all sectors 
of its domestic economy, while agricultural exporters pressed to gain access 
to the wealthy Japanese consumers. However, if the Japanese government 
accepted to enter negotiations on agricultural issues, it was because of rising 
internal dissatisfaction with the privileges enjoyed by the powerful 
agricultural constituencies. 
American policymakers had to admit, as their European counterparts, 
that there was a serious crisis in agricultural trade. US support programs were 
internationally resented: the official line was that the US had had to expand 
the use of subsidies because some competitors (i.e. the EEC) were already 
using and abusing subsidization. Even though the American Congress was 
still largely in favor of keeping the programs, including export subsidies, the 
severity of the crisis meant that the budget expenditure on agricultural support 
had to be contained. 
The difference in treatment that has characterized agricultural trade 
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since the beginning of the GATT system has consisted in the fact that rules 
had to be adapted to existing national policies, and not vice versa as it 
happened for, say, trade in industrial goods. This approach led to a situation 
where disputes about subsidies among contracting parties have focused on the 
definition ‘equitable’ world market share. It set a dangerous precedent: the 
market share approach implied that subsidies were to be allowed unless they 
would interfere with the consolidated world trade pattern.  
The reasons cited for subsidization were basically the same as those 
invoked by those who favor managed trade as opposed to competition, open 
markets and non discrimination in international trade. 
The success of agricultural lobbies in securing high levels of 
protection exerted a powerful influence over protection-seeking groups in 
other sectors; in fact, during the 1980s both the American and European 
approaches to trade issues seemed to shift towards some form of managed 
trade built on bilateralism.303
 
OLD AND NEW PROTECTION IN MANUFACTURES AND SERVICES 
 “The weight and structure of established Atlantic and European 
interests in international economic diplomacy are heavily directed towards 
the stabilization of trade shares and reactive protection of the present 
international order, and against adjustment to dynamic economic growth 
such as that now taking place in East Asia and the Pacific. 
Peter Drysdale (1988)304
                                                 
303 The negotiation of agreements between two parties that are not subject to a mutually 
agreed set of international principles and rules and in which states are not limited in their 
recourse to sanctions to realize their objectives. Haggard (1995): 27. 
304 Drysdale, Peter. (1988) International Economic Pluralism. Sydney: Allen & Unwin:75. 
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 Traditional and New Forms of Protection 
In 1982 Arthur Dunkel, then Secretary General of the GATT, 
observed that governments were increasingly adopting “special arrangements 
with protectionist effects” when confronted with sectoral crisis.305 ‘Special 
Arrangements’ were largely applied to trade in textiles and clothing: however, 
they were spreading to numerous other sectors, including steel, shipbuilding, 
automobiles, and consumer electronics. Bilateral agreements directed at 
restraining imports had been used among industrial countries since the 1970s, 
but the same kind of ‘special arrangements’ were more and more frequently 
directed at manufactured imports from developing countries. 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) were the measures through which 
the Multifibre Arrangement functioned. In 1986, however, there were 99 
VERs in operation, other than those pertaining to the MFA, up from about a 
dozen in the early 1970s.306 About half of these (49) related to exports from 
developing countries, with Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan among the most 
targeted. 
A Voluntary Export Restraint was a limit on exports that was imposed 
at the request of an importing country’s government, acting on behalf of the 
affected domestic sector or firm. The measure was called ‘voluntary’ because, 
in principle at least, the exporting nation could modify or nullify the 
agreement unilaterally. Moreover, the enforcer was the exporting country, 
                                                 
305 Address in Hamburg, March 5, 1982. GATT Press Release no. 1312, Geneva March 5, 
1982. Quoted in Malmgren, Harald B. (1983) “Threats to the Multilateral System.” In Cline 
(1983). 
306 Grilli, Enzo. (1990) “Responses of Developing Countries to Trade Protectionism in 
Industrial Countries.” in Pearson C. S. and J. Riedel. (eds.) (1990) The Direction of Trade 
Policy: Papers in Honor of Isaiah Frank. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell: 111. 
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which had to monitor the movements of goods at its own border.  
Interestingly, governments of the importing countries would 
frequently pretend they were even not aware of the existence of such 
arrangements and they would be very happy to stress the unilateral nature of 
the restriction. According to most analysts, however, “in reality, … most 
VERs [were] bilaterally negotiated arrangements.”307
In addition to VERs, there were other types of quantitative restrictions 
that resulted from negotiations between the importing and exporting 
countries: the Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs) and Voluntary 
Restraint Arrangements (VRAs). They were openly bilateral and could be 
modified only with the consent of both parties. The OMAs were typically 
negotiated at the governmental level, while the VRAs often involved a more 
direct participation of the interested business groups. During the 1980s, there 
was also a proliferation of even greyer measures that, although less formal in 
nature, were effectively reducing market access and were in fact “open [ing] 
the door to a paralegal trading system.”308
The alarming nature of these arrangements was made more evident by 
the fact that, when possible, they were kept secret. 
Those measures were commonly used by the United States, the 
European Community, Australia, and Canada and they were directed 
especially at the newly industrializing countries; in 1986, for instance, the 
share of Korean exports in total restricted exports reached a level of almost 80 
                                                 
307 Kostecki, Michael. (1987) “Export-Restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization.” In 
The World Economy. Vol. 10, No. 4, (December 1987): 425-434. See also Hindley, Brian 
(1987) “GATT Safeguards and Voluntary Export Restraints: What are the Interests of the 
Developing Countries?” In World Bank Economic Review Vol. 1, No. 4 (September): 698-
705. 
308 Kostecki (1987): 426. 
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percent, and more than 90 percent of quantitative restrictions were imposed 
through OMAs and VERs.309
The increase in the use of VERS, OMAs and VRAs had been 
facilitated by the corresponding increase in threats of anti-subsidy or anti-
dumping actions by the industrial countries. Anti-dumping cases against 
developing countries often ended with the adoption of a VER; the exporting 
country would generally prefer to enter in a “special arrangement” rather than 
suffer the imposition of a unilateral sanction. 
Between 1989 and 1992, the United States launched 55 percent of its 
subsidy and anti-dumping actions against developing countries; in 1992 
alone, 65 percent of the anti-dumping investigations by the European Union 
were directed at developing economies. 
It has been estimated that the trend towards what could be called a 
managed trade regime was so powerful that, by the mid-1980s, around 10 
percent of international trade was taking place under some form of export 
restraint arrangement.310
Estimates, however, could not measure the real impact on global 
trade: that is the amount of trade that did not take place because of this new 
and invasive kind of non-tariff barriers. 
As already noted for agricultural disputes at the time, the main 
problem when negotiating a VER or a similar agreement, was the definition 
of what constituted a ‘fair’ market share. Firms in industrialized countries, 
whose high costs would not allow them to compete in open markets, were 
                                                 
309 Eui Tae Chang. (1989) “Barriers to Korea’s Manufactured Exports and Negotiating 
Options.” In Whalley (1989). Vol.2: 147. 
310 Kostecki (1987): 429. For non-fuel trade the corresponding figure was 12 percent. 
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naturally supportive of these schemes. It has also been rightly pointed out that 
“for the major industrialized countries, where non-competitive behavior 
characterizes a number of industries, the oligopolistic-coordination aspect of 
export-restraint arrangements may also be very important.”311
Many of these agreements created opportunities for regular business 
meeting, where firms’ representatives would be able to solve issues amicably. 
The possibility of market cartelization was extremely real, and in some cases, 
probable: big industry players could use the opportunity offered by grey area 
measures to keep out new entrants from domestic and international markets. 
Developing economies could end up not only having to endure 
pressures to limit manufactured exports to rich country markets, but also with 
industrial development opportunities curtailed by anti-competitive behavior 
sponsored by industrial countries governments through the ‘special 
arrangements’. 
 
Section 301 and Its Siblings 
Protectionist policies and efforts in the 1980s focused on establishing 
and empowering a new and broad concept of ‘unfair’ trade practice. Actually, 
the ‘fairness’ scrutiny was not limited at trade practices, but went further, 
encompassing almost every strategy and policy that governments – or even 
firms – in developing countries could reasonably adopt in order to accelerate 
industrial growth and economic development. 
The attempts to contain manufactured imports’ growth and to 
discipline market access did not stop with the imposition of countervailing or 
                                                 
311 Kostecky (1987): 432. 
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anti-dumping duties: an aggressive definition of ‘unfair’ trade practice was 
progressively introduced in American and European legislation, accompanied 
by semi-automatic enforcement mechanisms. 
In 1985, immediately after the Plaza Accord, the Reagan 
administration announced that it would take a more pro-active stance in trade 
policy with the aim of eliminating unfair foreign barriers to American goods 
and services. 
The new US trade policy package, introduced on September 23, 1985, 
originated from the widespread American discontent with the international 
monetary and trade systems of the time. American policymakers and business 
leaders were complaining that there were no internationally sanctioned rules 
to force countries with large trade surpluses to take action and correct their 
imbalances; the issue of graduation from special and differential treatment of 
developing countries had urgently to be discussed and solved at the GATT 
level, because, as a commentator put it “It stands to reason that a developing 
country that maintained high import barriers to spur development of its own 
industries no longer needs those barriers when those industries have 
developed a capability to penetrate foreign markets.”312 And, last but not 
least, they were arguing that greater economic integration among the various 
regions of the world made the need for international agreements on new 
issues such as services, intellectual property rights and investment policies all 
the more urgent. 
The Reagan administration faced a strongly protectionist-oriented 
Congress; it tried to appease some of its members proclaiming that the 
                                                 
312 Feketekuty, Geza (1990) “US Policy on 301 and Super 301” in Bhagwati J. and H. T. 
Patrick (eds.) (1990), Aggressive Unilateralism, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press: 95. In 1990, G. Feketekuty was Senior Advisor to the US Trade Representative. 
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executive will launch investigations on its own. It was a significant political 
move, because, traditionally investigations had had to be solicited by firms 
claiming to be the victims of unfair trade practices. 
The administration’s will to be seen as active in the defense of 
American commercial interests offered new opportunities for business groups 
to lobby the US Trade Representative. They could try to influence the trade 
agenda both through Congress and through the White House. 
Multinational firms had long lamented about the obstacles their 
investments plans would encounter in some foreign nations: their demands 
informed the US proposal on trade-related investment measures. Service 
industries, especially those operating in the financial and telecommunications 
sectors, took an active part in the market-opening drive. 
The United States, while sponsoring and participating in the new 
Round of multilateral negotiations, signaled that it would act unilaterally to 
protect its interests when it considered international rules either lacking – as 
in the case of services – or insufficient – as in the case of intellectual property 
rights.313
It is against this backdrop that the Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 was introduced. The original Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act gave 
                                                 
313 Some legislative action had already been taken. “Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(Smooth-Hawley Act) …was dormant for nearly half a century, but procedural amendments 
introduced in the 1974 Trade Act made it more convenient to lodge complains and brought 
the statute to life. The original section made broadly defined unfair trade procedures unlawful 
but included provision on trademark, patent and copyright protection. The overwhelming 
majority of the more than 300 Section 337 cases filed since 1974 concerns intellectual 
property. Of the outstanding exclusion orders in force under the section as of the end of 1992, 
most are directed against developing countries, particularly the East Asian newly 
industrializing countries. Of seventy-nine separate country citations, forty-six are against 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. … many of these cases involved labor-intensive 
products for which cost differentials no doubt constituted a chief motive for the action. … 
Yet, Korea and Taiwan have been subject to actions against technologically sophisticated 
products, including semiconductors that have also been the focus of national industrial 
policies.” Haggard (1995): 29. 
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the executive the power to retaliate had US trade rights been threatened or 
violated.314 It also included a provision against ‘unreasonable’ barriers that 
might not be covered by existing international rules.  
The amendments of Section 301 in 1988 were linked to this last 
provision. The new 301 Section instructed the US Trade Representative to 
record all foreign trade barriers, to prepare a priority list of nations where 
serious unfair trade practices were found, set a deadline for reform, and 
administer retaliation in case of no compliance. Barriers to trade in services 
and foreign investment restrictions were explicitly mentioned.315 Special 301 
Section is devoted to the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). 
The 1988 Trade Act also mandated the US Trade Representative to 
scrutinize workers’ rights, export targeting and anti-competitive practices. 
The inclusion of targeting is particularly important because targeting “was 
defined permissively as any government action that seeks to increase the 
international competitiveness of an enterprise or industry. This is, of course, 
virtually a definition of industrial policy.”316
Section 301 represented a real challenge to the existing international 
trading system. It was discriminatory, because it would be applied on a case-
by-case basis; it sanctioned unilateralism as a means of resolving disputes; 
and it upheld a very restrictive interpretation of reciprocity. Section 301 could 
be usefully employed to close the US domestic market to foreign competitors 
and to open foreign markets to US firms. 
It was potentially a tool for managed trade: a government – or a firm - 
                                                 
314 For GATT-negotiated benefits, 301 complains would initially be taken through GATT’s 
dispute settlement machinery, and were thus in principle consistent with GATT rules. 
315 Barriers to telecommunications were dealt with in a separate provision, Section 1374(a). 
316 Haggard (1995):32. 
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could be convinced to consent to a certain level of US imports in exchange 
for an agreed upon amount of exports to the United States. 
In theory, transnational firms should have opposed the initiative: large 
corporations, with production networks spread around the globe, should favor 
open markets and fear foreign retaliation. Nevertheless, a significant portion 
of American multinationals, especially those in high-tech sectors, such as 
telecommunications, aircraft and semiconductors, supported the bill.317
If the more protectionist stance of some technology-intensive sectors 
introduced an element of change, the traditional supporters of protection were 
still very vocal and active: both the labor unions and industries from sectors 
threatened by new low-cost competitors used all their political influence to 
mobilize the Congress in their favor. 
 
Market-Opening or Market-Closing? 
On June 16, 1989, the list of first cases to be launched under Section 
301 was published: as many had anticipated, developing countries figured 
prominently on it. Six barriers had been identified to be urgently removed: 
three were directed against Japan, but the rest aimed at Brazil and India, the 
two countries which had most strongly opposed the inclusion of the new 
issues on the Uruguay Round agenda.  
It had become more and more clear that the United States intended to 
                                                 
317 “The new strategic trade policy literature suggests conditions under which some 
internationally oriented firms will prefer narrow, bilateral reciprocity. In a two-firm, two-
country duopoly where scale economies, R&D expenses and/or learning effects are very 
significant, aggressive reciprocity to force open foreign markets may be the optimal solution. 
Under these conditions letting one country keep its market closed while the other remains 
open can lead to a sizeable and irreversible cost advantage for the former country’s firm, 
which may then be able to drive the other out of business. Aggressive reciprocity should be 
preferred by firms in this situation.” Milner (1990): 170. 
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press on with a market opening agenda. Data on all regular and Section 301 
investigations from 1985 to 1992 show a marked increase of cases against 
developing countries: they were more numerous than those directed at 
industrial countries. It represented a significant change in the trend observable 
since 1974, when trade legislation was first amended to facilitate retaliation. 
It was also notable that, although the majority of the prosecutions dealt with 
traditional trade barriers, violation of intellectual property rights was the 
second most frequent reason for the launching of an investigation.318
The 1988 Trade Act was designed to put under the spot light those 
countries that appeared to be more reluctant to comply with US demands. A 
Special 301 priority watch list and a watch list were compiled: names were 
named of trading partners that would not ensure sufficient protection of 
intellectual property rights. On the first priority list eight out of eight 
countries were developing economies, and out of 17 on the watch list, 13 
were developing nations. 
In 1991 the United States launched Section 301 investigations against 
China, India and Thailand because of the inadequacy of their IPR legislation. 
The cases were generally successful, in the sense that they all 
achieved at least some of the policy changes the US was requesting. 
Foreign investment protection and regulation were also reviewed and 
bilateral action was taken by the US, following in this case in the footsteps of 
the EEC. Since 1981, the United States had sought to protect American 
investors in developing countries through bilateral investment treaties 
                                                 
318 Intellectual property had first been linked to trade in the 1984 Trade Act. 
 157
(BITs).319
The European Community had inaugurated the BITs and established 
‘dialogue’ partnerships with developing countries or regional institutions, 
such as ASEAN. Although Brussels had shown less propensity to use 
bilateralism as a means to open foreign markets, in 1984 a ‘new commercial 
policy instrument’ was introduced whose objectives are similar to those of 
Section 301: to facilitate the launching of anti-dumping actions. A 
redefinition of the concept of reciprocity was at the center of the EC‘s policy 
on financial services: a policy specifically devised to “extract concessions 
from Japan and the newly industrializing countries in the context of the 
GATT negotiations.”320
The Americans and the Europeans also adopted a bilateral approach 
towards issues such as subsidies and graduation.  
At the Tokyo Round separate code agreements had been introduced 
because of the determination of signatories to limit free riding by developing 
countries. However, a country could have applied the codes on a MFN basis, 
if it wished to do so. The United States followed a different course: the Trade 
Act of 1979 established that the United States would take action against 
countries which did not sign the Subsidy Code without first submitting the 
case to injury test. Moreover, the United States asked developing countries 
that had signed the Subsidy Code to enter into an additional bilateral 
agreement, a commitment policy to secure ‘responsible’ behavior in the 
                                                 
319 “By 1990 the United States had concluded eight such treaties, all with developing 
countries; such treaties include efforts to make conditions of entry simpler and more 
transparent, guarantee national and most favored nation treatment, facilitate financial 
transfers, and provide insurance against nationalization. They also provided for dispute 
settlement, typically by establishing that disputes will be submitted to the International 
Center for Settlements of Investment Disputes for resolution.” Haggard (1995): 37. 
320 Haggard (1995): 38. 
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administration of subsidies. 
Graduation from special and differential treatment of some major 
developing countries was also at the center of US negotiating strategy at the 
Tokyo Round:321 American negotiators accepted to support Special & 
Differential Treatment under the condition that it included a provision for the 
termination of it as countries progressed in their economic development. 
During the 1980s the issue of graduation remained of high importance 
for Western industrial countries and in 1988 the European Union announced 
that Korea would not be any longer eligible for its GSP; in 1989 the United 
States withdrew GSP status from Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
These actions were aimed at making unmistakably clear that both the 
Europeans and the Americans expected developing countries to acknowledge 
the new circumstances and prepare for reciprocal concessions. 
 
5) THE ‘NEW REGIONALISM’: SAFETY IN NUMBERS? 
“With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985 and the 
subsequent movement towards economic, monetary and political union in 
Europe in the 1990s, the terms of debate shifted drastically. The United States 
and Canada have signed a free trade agreement and have entered into 
negotiations with Mexico to extend that agreement to a North American Free 
Trade Agreement” 
J.A. Frankel and M. Kahler (1993)322
The mid-1980s witnessed what has been called the ‘second wave’ of 
                                                 
321 “Graduation refers to the phasing out and ultimate elimination for the more economically 
advanced LDSs of the differential treatment in trade that they now receive and the 
progressive alignment of their own trade policies with the generally applicable rules of the 
international trading system” Frank (1979): 289. 
322 Frankel and Kahler (1993): 1. 
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regional agreements. The first wave of regionalism took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s and it involved mostly developing countries that found inspiration 
in the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958323 and 
tried to provide a sustainable market size for their infant industries. 
The phenomenon repeated itself on an even larger scale twenty years 
later. In 1994 there were 108 regional agreements, and since 1990 the GATT 
had received notification of 33 new Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs). 
Almost all the then 120 members of the WTO were participating in one or 
more such schemes.324 In 1992, 45 percent of world trade was regulated by 
preferential agreements; the main factor in this seemingly strong 
‘regionalization’ of trade flows was the European Union: 32 percent of world 
trade was taking place inside its borders. NAFTA contributed for another 7.6 
percent. In fact, the European Union’s intra-regional trade accounted for more 
than 70 percent of its total trade in 1994; North America and East Asia 
presented a much less fortress-like picture, with 30 percent and 35 percent of 
intra-regional trade on their respective total trade figures.325
The new wave of regionalism differed from the first one in two 
important aspects: the United States and the European Community were 
leading the process and developing countries were joining in RIAs with 
industrialized nations. 
During the 1980s, in the United States there was a widespread 
perception that Japan and the NICs were successful exporters because of their 
‘unfair’ business practices. The Administration and the Congress were under 
a strong pressure to act to reduce this practices and to open export market to 
                                                 
323 See Chapter 4. Old and New Protectionism: 139. 
324 GATT. International Trade 1993-94. Quoted in Sander (1996): 24. 
325 Sander (1996): 27. 
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American businesses. Although the US had long been strong supporter of 
multilateralism, the Administration considered the creation of a web of Free 
Trade Areas with preferred partners an effective answer to those demands. 326
In 1985 the European Community announced it would become a 
Single Market (and a Union) by 1992 and in 1988 the Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement came into force. Both projects signaled the possibility for an 
inclusion of like-minded neighbors. 
The ‘regional’ policies of both the US and the EEC were generally 
interpreted by smaller trading nations as proof of their diminished support for 
the multilateral trading system. Many of their smaller neighbors quickly 
entered in negotiations to join the new (NAFTA) or the enlarging (EC) 
groups, hoping to secure a safe haven for their trade in case the GATT system 
would became unable to protect them any longer. 
Public opinion and political elites on both sides of the Atlantic shared 
a growing impatience with the GATT and its perceived failure to establish a 
‘level playing field’.327 A major complaint was that developing countries 
were still unwilling to open their markets and were jealously holding on to 
Special & Differential treatment irrespective of their economic development 
successes. More specifically, there was widespread conviction that the East 
Asian countries, following precisely in the footsteps of their big Japanese 
brother, had been successful in their export-drive because they were ‘unfair’ 
traders: the East Asian nations were consistently dumping their heavily 
subsidized goods in Western markets, while keeping their domestic markets 
                                                 
326 See, for instance, Schott, Jeffrey J. (1989) More Free Trade Areas? Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics. It was also consider a way of putting pressure on the 
EC because it was feared that the Single Market would turn the Community into a ‘Fortress.’ 
327 Soogil (1994): 183. 
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inaccessible through an array of tariff, non-tariff barriers and anti-competitive 
business practices. The United States and the European Community had the 
right to protect their own markets and therefore they had the right to use 
contingent protection, grey-area measures and aggressive market-opening 
strategies. In fact, it was argued “that the perceived threat to outsiders of the 
EC’s contingency protection in the form of antidumping action is so strong 
that a major advantage of full EC membership to the would-be-members such 
as the EFTA countries and other European neighbors is that it provides 
insurance against this protection.”328 Others have noted the same motivation 
behind the Canadian decision to initiate negotiations with the US for a free 
trade arrangement, namely “to bring US contingency protection against 
Canadian goods and services under tighter discipline.”329
Protectionist interests were undoubtedly trying to use regional 
arrangements to reinforce their otherwise declining competitive position. 
Bhagwati has described it as the “these are our markets” Syndrome: “it is also 
a sentiment that was beautifully expressed by Signor Agnelli of Fiat: “The 
Single Market must first offer an advantage to European companies. This is a 
message we must insist on without hesitation.”330
Even though not all attempts to create additional obstacles to 
international trade were crowned with success, they were numerous and 
dangerous enough to cause extreme concern among smaller trading nations in 
                                                 
328 Hindley, Brian “Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community”, in The 
World Economy. Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 1988): 445-463. Quoted in Soogil (1994): 180. 
329 Baldwin Robert E. (1993) “Adapting the GATT to a More Regionalized World: a Political 
Economy Perspective.” In Anderson, K. and R. Blackhurst. (eds.) (1993) Regional 
Integration and the Global Trading System. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Quoted in Soogil 
(1994): 180. Also Schott, Jeffrey J. (1989) More Free Trade Areas? Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics. 
330 Bhagwati (1993): 159. 
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general and developing countries in particular. 
In fact, the second distinctive trait of ‘new’ regionalism was the role 
and the goals of the participating developing countries. 331 While in the 1960s 
the emphasis was on ‘regional self-sufficiency’, in the 1980s the motives 
behind joining a RIA were twofold: to consolidate access to industrial 
countries’ markets in a changing and challenging international environment, 
and to increase national bargaining power in order to better resist pressure 
from competing regional economic blocs. 
Smaller trading nations moved by fears of rising protectionist regional 
blocs were thus seeking to enter in RIAs with their powerful trading partners 
and were also hoping that participation in those arrangements would increase 
their capacity to attract foreign investments.332 RIAs were also used by 
developing countries to reassure international investors about the seriousness 
of domestic liberalization efforts.  
Some scholars even suggested that “with trading blocs and 
quantitative trade barriers, the simple small country assumption underlying 
the proposition that unilateral free trade is optimal may simply not be valid. 
Even if the countries were to trade entirely freely, they may not be able to 
export and import as much without an FTA as with it.”333  
Participation in regional agreements, however, would not be without 
costs for smaller or developing countries members: significant concessions 
had to be made. There was a considerable risk of entering in a ‘clientelistic 
                                                 
331 Narlikar, Amrita. (2003) International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining 
Coalitions in the GATT and the WTO. London: Routledge: 156. 
332 “ … Mexico wishes to use a trade agreement … to attract inward foreign investment.” In 
de Melo Jaime and Arvind Panagariya (eds.) (1992) The New Regionalism in Trade Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: Centre for Economic Research. The World Bank.: 12. 
333 John Whalley on Mexico and NAFTA. Quoted in de Melo and Panagariya (1992):13. 
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relationship,’ that is weaker nations had to agree to liberalization measures in 
exchange of a respite from the excesses of protectionist behavior of bigger 
partners. 334
Rising protectionism in industrial markets, market-opening aggressive 
unilateralism and threats to create regional trade ‘fortresses' impenetrable to 
non-members’ exports, created a very challenging environment for economic 
policy makers in developing countries. 
Differences in the level of economic development meant that the so-
called Southern bloc of developing countries could no longer present a united 
front. Export-oriented newly industrializing countries had a strong interest in 
strengthening the multilateral trading system, even at a cost of accepting the 
principle of reciprocity of concessions: for the first time in the history of trade 
negotiations, coalitions were formed that included developed and developing 
nations.  
Since “the maintenance of a liberal trading system [was] increasingly 
being seen by Western Pacific developing countries as critical to their trade 
and development ambitions,” East Asian nations used all the diplomatic 
means they could muster to achieve their goal. 335
East Asian governments acknowledged that it was necessary to launch 
a new round of multilateral negotiations, and to forge alliances with like-
minded countries to enhance national bargaining power. Governments had to 
develop negotiating positions consistent both with national interests and those 
of coalitions partners, and to foster enough unity to resist the inevitable 
pressures from major trading powers to achieve a reasonably successful 
                                                 
334 See Ravenhill, John. (2001) APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 35. 
335 Drysdale (1988): 75. 
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conclusion for the round. 

























 CHAPTER 5 
MALAYSIA’S PARTICIPATION IN BARGAINING COALITIONS DURING 
THE URUGUAY ROUND 
 
“Most foreign policy issues do not have an immediate impact on the 
man in the street. Protectionism and trade barriers, on the other hand, can 
have a devastating impact upon peoples’ lives and their hopes and dreams. 
They might also undermine the fabric of national resilience and create 
conditions for political instability.”336




Coalitions are a common instrument used by industrial and developing 
countries alike to enhance national bargaining power. However, smaller and 
developing economies rely more heavily on coalitions to achieve their 
negotiating goals because they do not have many other instruments at their 
disposal. Joining the ‘right’ coalition is therefore a crucial political choice for 
governments in developing countries, given their insufficient bargaining 
power.  
Bargaining power can be defined as “the ability to bring the opposing 
party to the negotiating table and exchange concessions that are the least 
                                                 
336 Dato’ Haji abu Hassan Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address before the joint 
meeting of the Asia Society and the Malaysian-American Society, in Washington on October 
1, 1987 in Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. December 1987: 48. 
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unacceptable to both parties.”337 Generally, smaller and developing countries 
are at a great disadvantage versus their larger and vastly richer counterparts. 
Domestic resources are no match for their opponent’s: thus, finding allies in 
like-minded nations becomes indispensable.338
A substantial benefit for the participants in a coalition is the 
opportunity to ‘pool’ their bargaining resources: it allows the members of a 
coalition to use their collective weight in order to achieve real market power, 
for instance as major suppliers or buyers of a particular commodity.  
‘Pooling’ is also very important when it comes to organizational 
resources; many countries lack the human and/or technical resources to 
devote to research and appraisal of the issues on the negotiating table and find 
it very difficult to understand how best to protect and foster their national 
interests. 
Participants in a stable coalition reap additional benefits: the 
institutionalization of a coalition “reduces the transaction costs of finding new 
bargaining chips and building new diplomatic linkages every time a new set 
of negotiations begins.”339  
Coalitions are generally classified according to the main goal of their 
activities. Agenda-setting coalitions are formed in order to secure the 
inclusion or the exclusion of a particular issue or group of issues from the 
negotiations. Blocking coalitions clearly aim at stalling negotiations that are 
going in an undesired direction. Negotiating coalitions are formed by 
                                                 
337 Narlikar (2003): 11. 
338“Russia and America depend militarily on themselves. They balance each other by 
‘internal’ instead of ‘external’ means, relying on their own capabilities rather than on the 
capabilities of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing” 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA.: Addison 
Wesley:168. 
339 Narlikar (2003): 15. 
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countries that share a strong interest in the resolution of a specific negotiating 
issue, - for instance, the Cairns Group, which wished to bring about the 
reform of trade in agricultural products.  
Because of its purpose, it is considerably easier to maintain the 
cohesion of a blocking coalition than of a negotiating one. This is one of the 
reasons why it has been traditionally difficult for developing countries to 
form effective coalitions at the GATT; “the contractual obligations that were 
negotiated in the GATT” were more complex and had to be undertaken by 
individual countries, “as opposed to the declaratory documents that are 
approved in the UN.”340 Furthermore, most of the developing countries were 
not interested in active participation in the GATT prior to the Uruguay 
Round; they were therefore reluctant to abandon the tradition of the Informal 
Group and to pay the costs involved in the creation of new alliances. 
In this chapter Malaysia’s participation in bargaining coalitions during 
the Uruguay Round will be examined. The importance of ASEAN for 
Malaysian policy-makers and the ASEAN position at the Uruguay Round will 
be discussed in the following section. Malaysia and ASEAN were members 
of three major coalitions, the Café au Lait/G-20, the Cairns Group, and 
APEC. An analysis of the objectives, strategies, membership and eventual 
achievements of the three groupings will be the subject of Section 3, 4 and 5 
respectively.  
With the Uruguay Round came a dramatic change in the attitudes of 
many developing countries towards both the GATT as an institution and the 
multilateral trade negotiations. It has been said that “the intensity of 
                                                 
340 Narlikar (2003): 25. 
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participation of developing countries in the GATT since the pre-launch phase 
of the Uruguay Round [was] historic.”341 Their participation manifested itself 
in the activities of a large number of coalitions, some of which had mixed 




ROLE OF ASEAN IN MALAYSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
After achieving independence, Malaysia experienced a series of 
difficulties in its relations with its neighbors.342 On one hand, it tried to 
address the issue by keeping a “close relationship with Britain and the 
Commonwealth,”343 while trying to establish an acceptable level of regional 
cooperation.344 However, it was only with the creation of ASEAN in 1967 – 
“whose aim was to end armed conflict in … the region”345 - that Malaysia 
would be able to solve a number of urgent territorial and political issues, left 
open during the process of decolonization.346 As Stubbs has observed, 
“ASEAN emergence as an effective regional organization was a major boon 
                                                 
341 Narlikar (2003): 40. 
342 The most notable examples were the Philippines claims on Sabah, the Konfrontasi crisis 
with Indonesia, and the separation from Singapore. 
343 Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Address at the Malaysian 
International Forum in Kuala Lumpur on January 29, 1986, in Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 
19, No. 1 (March 1986): 26. 
344 Malaysia actively participated in the creation of two regional organizations: the 
Association of Southeast Asia, in 1959 (with Thailand and the Philippines), and ‘Maphilindo’ 
in 1963, with the Philippines and Indonesia. “Both these organizations fell apart with 
President Sukarno’s launch of his confrontation against Malaysia” Camroux (1994): 14. 
345 Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Address at the Malaysian 
International Forum in Kuala Lumpur on January 29, 1986, in Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 
19, No. 1 (March 1986): 26. 
346 Stubbs (1990: 106-108) has indicated four factors that made ASEAN especially important 
for Malaysia: “Firstly, it contributed to the diffusion of lingering hostility between Indonesia 
and Malaysia, resulting from Konfrontasi. Secondly, it enabled cooperation with Thailand 
over problems that played their common borders. Thirdly, it provided a forum for dealing 
with the Philippines over its territorial claim to Sabah. Finally, it helped to facilitate exchange 
with Singapore.” 
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for Malaysia:”347 ASEAN offered its members an effective framework for 
solving regional conflicts and building on common interests. It has been 
noted that the existence of ASEAN has limited regional interference by the 
Big Powers. It has also boosted the confidence of its members about their 
capacity to promote their foreign policy goals, and, as a multilateral 
institution where decisions are taken on reaching a consensus after careful 
negotiations, has helped its members to acquire a taste for pragmatism and 
compromise.348
Prime Minister Mahathir repeatedly affirmed the importance of 
regional cooperation in achieving development and progress for its members 
and reiterated that “regional cooperation as manifested by ASEAN 
[remained] the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy.”349 He also insisted 
that without political cooperation “none of the ASEAN countries would have 
developed economically.”350 Although ASEAN economies were undoubtedly 
competitors in the international markets, they shared many similarities and 
interests; most prominently the Southeast Asian nations, given their export-
oriented economies, shared a strong interest in strengthening the multilateral 
trade system which, in their view, constituted “the basis for further expansion 
of international trade and the removal of trade restrictions.”351  
In fact, ASEAN members overcame the typical obstacles faced by 
developing nations when attempting to establish regional organizations; in 
                                                 
347 Stubbs (1990): 106. 
348 Karim Azhari M. (1990): 76. 
349 Prime Minister Speech at the Opening Session of the Third Meeting of the ASEAN Heads 
of Government, Manila, December 14, 1987, in Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 20, No. 4 
(December 1987). 
350 Address by the Prime Minister at the opening of the First ASEAN Economic Congress, in 
Kuala Lumpur, March 13, 1987, in Foreign-Affairs Malaysia. Vol. 20 No. 3 (June 1987). 
351 Speech by the Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen at the opening session of the 
19th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, June 23, 1986, in Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 
19 No. 2 (June 1986). 
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particular, the creation of ASEAN, facilitating the solution of regional 
conflicts, avoided that state-making in the area translated into stronger states 
encroaching on their weaker neighbors.352 The Southeast Asian nations were 
able to pool their resources and to engage as a unit in various international 
settings, including trade negotiations. 
 
ASEAN IN THE GATT 
The cooperation among ASEAN members at the GATT dates back to 
1973, when the ASEAN Geneva Committee was established. Although 
economic cooperation at the time was quite limited, the Southeast Asian 
nations were aware that presenting a united front would give them a definite 
advantage in negotiating with their trading partners.353 However, for many 
years, the ASEAN countries’ participation in the GATT process was 
negligible. In fact, ASEAN members became contracting parties at different 
times, and some were pursuing import-substitution policies that made full 
participation in the GATT less than politically attractive.354
The attitude of the Association’s members towards the multilateral 
trading system changed dramatically in the first half of the 1980s during the 
pre-launch phase of the Uruguay Round. The ASEAN Geneva Committee 
                                                 
352 See Narlikar (2003): 12 
353 See next section: ASEAN Regionalism. At that time ASEAN members were not active 
members of the GATT; however, they were engaged in the UNCTAD negotiations; 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were especially involved in the negotiations of the Tin and 
Rubber ICAs. It is plausible to argue that the pooling of scarce resources was considered 
advantageous. The Geneva Committee served both GATT and UNCTAD. 
354 “Early in the GATT existence (1950 and 1957, respectively), Indonesia and Malaysia 
became contracting parties through the process of succession. The GATT was applied de 
facto to Singapore from 1961, and Singapore finally became a GATT contracting party in its 
own right in 1973. … The Philippines acceded provisionally to the GATT … in 1973, and 
became a GATT contracting party in 1979 following the Tokyo Round. In 1982 Thailand 
acceded. … Brunei is still not a GATT contracting party (1996).” Stephenson, Sherry M. 
(1994) “ASEAN and the Multilateral Trading System.” In Law and Policy in International 
Business. Vol. 25, No. 2 (1994): 445.  
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became the center of intense activity: the ASEAN ambassadors to the GATT 
met regularly once a week, and consultation was frequent among lower level 
officials whose role was to examine the various issues in greater detail.355 
Each member took regular turns at the Chairmanship of the Committee. In 
fact, since the mid-1980, ASEAN members have spoken through a single 
negotiator. It is notable that ASEAN gained official recognition as a coalition 
by the GATT, a rare occurrence especially for coalitions that include 
developing countries. As a result, ASEAN presented a united front during the 
negotiations. In order to preserve the group’s cohesion, ASEAN 
representatives took extreme care to consistently distinguish their own 
regional agenda and negotiating stance from those of the other alliances that 
the Southeast Asian nations joined during the Uruguay Round.356
 
ASEAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM 
The objectives of the founders of ASEAN did not encompass strong 
economic cooperation. The main goals of the Association were “to achieve 
greater regional autonomy in the political and security sphere.”357 In addition, 
opportunities for cooperation were thought to be limited because the national 
economies were not complementary: instead they were competing for access 
to the same developed countries’ markets. Not surprisingly, intra-regional 
trade was rather small: in 1975 it represented 15% of the members’ global 
trade.358 In 1979 ASEAN launched the Preferential Trading Arrangements 
initiative; the impact of this and other projects aimed at fostering economic 
                                                 
355 See Sally (2004): 40 and Narlikar (2003): 169. 
356 Narlikar (2003): 169. 
357 Acharya Amitav. (2000) The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. 
Singapore: Oxford University Press.: 123 
358 Acharya (2000): 97. 
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integration was negligible.359 In addition to the objective difficulties in 
increasing trade between complementary economies, the ASEAN 
governments were convinced that “ASEAN countries owe their economic 
prosperity to trade and investment links with the outside world. Measures in 
the name of regional integration that discriminate against more efficient 
producers [could] undermine this.”360 Instead, ASEAN nations decided to 
cooperate to maintain and possibly expand their access to the international 
markets.361
 
THE ASEAN WAY 
The regional organization was founded upon a set of principles that 
would regulate relations among members. These norms included reciprocal 
non-interference in domestic affairs, the repudiation of the use of force and 
the friendly settlement of disagreements.362
These principles have been scrupulously abided by the Southeast 
Asian nations and have fostered the development of the so-called ASEAN 
Way, that is a supposedly typical regional fashion of inter-governmental 
interaction. The ASEAN Way prescribes the “avoidance of formal 
mechanisms and legal procedures for decision-making and reliance on 
consultation and consensus to achieve collective goals” and the “rejection of 
                                                 
359 “Intra-ASEAN trade as a proportion of total ASEAN trade rose … to a peak of 20% in 
1983 (it fell to 16% in 1985). Much of the total intra-ASEAN trade volume would be 
accounted for by bilateral trade between Singapore and Malaysia and Malaysia and 
Indonesia. In addition, about 65% of intra-ASEAN trade was fuel trade. … Thus, the increase 
in … the early 1980s was due largely to increases in fuel prices.” Acharya (2000): 97. 
360 Summary Record: New Directions for ASEAN Economic Cooperation (1987): 8. 
361 ASEAN’s efforts at economic integration were to be revived at a later date, when AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area) was first envisaged and then launched in 1992.  
362 Acharya Amitav. (1999) “Imagined Proximities” In Southeast Asian Journal of Social 
Science. Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999): 67. 
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adversarial posturing in negotiations.”363 The avoidance of formal 
mechanisms has meant that the group has adopted a ‘light’ bureaucratic 
structure as opposed, for instance, to the European Community. The non-
adversarial behavior has produced a preference for quiet diplomacy and 
conferred a relatively secretive style to the dealings of the group.364 The 
ASEAN Way, according to Noordin Sopiee is the expression of the “real 
‘spirit of ASEAN’, which has been effective in sublimating and diffusing 
conflicts.”365
Another important character of the Association is that, since its 
founding, it has been driven almost exclusively by the national elites. Its 
creation was part of a region-wide effort by the post-colonial elites to secure 
regime survival in a complex and threatening international environment. 366 
The stress was on reciprocal, almost personal, support and the existence of 
the group facilitated the establishment of a “pattern of intense, flexible and … 
communicative … interactions among [the regional] power elites.”367
 
ASEAN’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS  
The Southeast Asian governments realized the potential benefits of 
engaging the international community as a group; important instruments to 
this aim were the so-called ‘Dialogue Partnerships’. When the Uruguay 
                                                 
363 Acharya (2000): 128. 
364 See, for instance, Camroux. “Examining the action of the particular national members 
within ASEAN is a difficult task. A highly complex decision-making process, much of it 
informal, and the stress on a consensual style obscures the initiatives of particular national 
leaderships.” (1994): 14. 
365 Quoted in Acharya (2000): 128. Sopiee was the first director of the Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies (ISIS - Malaysia) and an advisor on foreign policy to Prime 
Minister Mahathir.  
366 Acharya (1999): 69. 
367 Ghazali Bin Shafie Moh. (1975) “ASEAN’s Response to Security Issues in Southeast 
Asia.” In Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Jakarta: Centre for International and Strategic 
Studies: 45. 
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Round was launched ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners were the European 
Economic Community, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and the 
United States. 368
The Association engaged with its Partners through four channels.  
First, the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) where foreign ministers 
from ASEAN and the Dialogue Partner countries met annually.369 The post-
ministerial conferences took place for the first time in 1984. The PMC 
followed the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. 370
Secondly, the ASEAN Committees; ASEAN ambassadors to Dialogue 
Partner countries form these Committees. As in the case of the ASEAN 
Geneva Committee, each member took regular turns at the Chairmanship. 
Thirdly, the Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs); these Committees met 
once a year and the meetings were attended by senior officials from ASEAN 
nations and the dialogue partners. Fourthly, the Economic Ministers Dialogue 
Meeting where economic ministers from ASEAN met their counterparts from 
Japan (annually) and from the EEC (every 18 months). 
The ASEAN governments have used the Post Ministerial Conferences 
to boost international recognition of the group’s positions on a variety of 
international issues, and to discuss more practical matters, such as trade 
preferences. In fact, as the Malaysian Foreign Minister noted in January 1986, 
since “the concept of a broad North-South dialogue on a global scale is 
                                                 
368 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was also formally a Dialogue 
Partner, but ASEAN relations were structured differently. See Alagappa, Muthiah. (1987) 
“ASEAN Institutional Framework and Modus Operandi.” In Noordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See, 
Lim Siang Jin. (eds) (1987) ASEAN at the Crossroads: obstacles, options & opportunities in 
economic co-operation. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies (ISIS): 186.  
369 This section draws on Alagappa (1987): 186. 
370 [The Ministers] annually held eight meetings: the ‘six plus six’ [ASEAN-6 plus all the 
Dialogue Partners], the ‘six plus five’, and six ‘six plus one’ meetings.” Alagappa (1987): 
186. 
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becoming less promising than ever, ASEAN countries … need to address 
their problem of falling commodity prices and access to markets … to the 
forum between ASEAN and their Dialogue partners.”371
Notwithstanding the intense cooperation in multilateral diplomacy, 
officially ASEAN did not (and still does not) have collective representation in 
any multilateral political or economic forum. While ASEAN representatives’ 
style at the GATT during the Uruguay Round might have resembled that of 
the EEC, the institutional reality was very different, and the Southeast Asian 
government maintained an elevated degree of autonomy, both at the decision-
making and the implementation level. 
The reliance on informal, non-bureaucratic structures and processes 
has been criticized for creating inefficiency and ambiguity; the regional 
governments have nevertheless considered it necessary to preserve ASEAN 
solidarity and cohesion because it has allowed room for discreet 
disagreements and ‘face-saving’ exercises. 
 
ASEAN AND THE URUGUAY ROUND  
At the 19th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila in June 1986, the 
Foreign Ministers “reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to an active 
participation in the preparatory process for the launching of new round of 
multilateral negotiations. … They further reiterated ASEAN’s readiness to 
discuss new issues, and urged that issues of interest to ASEAN should be 
                                                 
371 Address by the Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen at the Malaysian 
International Affairs Forum in Kuala Lumpur, January 29, 1986. In Foreign Affairs-Malaysia 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (March 1986). 
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given priority in the new round.”372 The Southeast Asian governments were 
aware that negotiating together as ASEAN would confer them greater 
bargaining leverage.  
ASEAN had experienced the advantages brought by cohesion and 
diplomatic cooperation at the multilateral level.373 The group’s reputation, 
reinforced by the dynamism of its members’ economies, contributed to 
ASEAN’s recognition as a credible negotiating partner. 
In fact, as the Malaysian Minister of Trade and Industry noted at 
Punta del Este “according to GATT statistics, the ASEAN countries 
accounted for … 3.5 percent of the world trade last year [1985]. Of this, 
imports accounted for 3.2 percent … and exports were 3.8 percent.”374
The ASEAN countries, in addition to their intense participation in 
international trade had embraced export-oriented economic policies, and had 
consistently supported multilateralism; ASEAN’s negotiating agenda echoed 
“the liberalizing stance of the GATT” and, therefore, enjoyed a “unique 
legitimacy.”375
ASEAN members agreed on a common position through internal 
negotiations that involved bilateral deals.376 The coalition’s members were 
only five; hence it was possible to re-discuss bilateral agreements with other 
interested parties. It was relatively easy to attain intra-coalition compromises 
because of the commonality of interests; they were all export-oriented 
                                                 
372 Joint Communique’ of the 19th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila on June 23-24, 
1986. 
373 Most notably the “boat people” crisis, see for instance, Acharya (2000) and Camroux 
(1994). 
374 Statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry of Malaysia, on behalf of ASEAN, in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, on September 16, 1986. 
375 Narlikar (2003): 175. 
376 See Narlikar for an account of the negotiations over the inclusion of services. (2003): 174-
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economies in need of open markets for commodities and manufactures, and 
held compatible positions on the new issues. 
The group’s agenda constituted the outcome of intense consultation 
and coordination; in the process, ASEAN governments displayed a great deal 
of flexibility and pragmatism. When a common position could not be agreed 
upon, “members [would go] separate ways … without weakening co-
operation overall.”377 Pragmatism was decisive in the service negotiations 
when considerations of efficiency and systematic evaluation of comparative 
advantage at national level prevailed over ideological rejection. Negotiators 
were also aware of the need to preserve the cohesion of the group and were 
careful to maintain a moderate stance. As a former Malaysian official 
affirmed: “[Malaysia] could not afford to say no when everyone else would 
agree.”378
The ASEAN members showed great diplomatic skills in using the 
same elements that had made regional economic integration arduous, such as 
the competitive nature of their economies, to create one of the strongest 
bargaining coalitions at the Uruguay Round 
 
THE ASEAN WAY IN A MULTILATERAL SETTING  
The ASEAN nations were able to join the relatively small group of 
countries that participated in the ‘Green Room’ discussions. 379 They also 
                                                 
377 Sally (2004): 3. 
378 Personal interview with a Malaysian official, July 2003. 
379 “During the Tokyo and Uruguay Round, contentious issues on which deals had to be 
struck were often thrashed out in the so-called Green Room, a conference room adjacent to 
the Director-General’s offices. Green Room meetings were part of a consultative process 
through which the major countries and a representative set of developing countries – a total 
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participated in broader coalitions that were formed before and during the 
Round. They were particularly active in the Café au Lait coalition, which 
played a fundamental role in the pre-launch phase of the Uruguay Round and 
in bringing the negotiations on new issues to a successful conclusion. Four of 
the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) 
were also members of the Cairns Group. ASEAN also joined the APEC 
initiative, albeit with some reservations, mainly to revive what seemed to be a 
moribund MTN round, after the failure of the Mid-Term Review in Montreal. 
The Café au Lait coalition and the Cairns Group were constituted 
before the official start of the negotiations, while APEC was launched during 
the Round. The attitudes and the priorities of many participants, including 
Malaysia, were changing following the profound transformations that were 
taking place at global level and in their own economies. 
In the next three sections, the three different coalitions, their 
membership, strategies and objectives will be analyzed. It is important to note 
how the ASEAN way was compatible with the first two alliances, while the 
style and some of the objectives of APEC limited effective ASEAN 
participation. 
The Café au Lait/G-20 was an issue-based coalition. It was created in 
order to explore the services issue. An important part of its initial activities 
was the gathering and exchange of technical information. Since it was the 
first time that the issue had been introduced at multilateral level, there was an 
urgent need, especially among developing countries, to acquire specific 
knowledge and decide their negotiating stance on the matter. The coalition 
                                                                                                                              
gatherings, no matter where they are held. Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001):60 [the emphasis 
is mine]. 
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presented itself as a bridge-builder, between the intransigence of the hard-
liners among the developing countries and the Quad. It consistently tried to 
reach the widest consensus and to achieve a common position among its very 
diverse membership. It came to represent the pragmatic answer to ideological 
inflexibility. Significantly, the Café au Lait/G-20 gained popularity among 
GATT officials because of its adherence to the multilateral system principles 
and practices, which were under considerable strain at the time. 
The Cairns Group shared many similarities with the Café au Lait 
coalition: a diverse membership that included developed and developing 
nations from four continents and a mandate of negotiating agricultural trade 
reform without venturing into other fields; the Group carried out technical 
studies and supported its position with relevant and accurate information. 
Since its inception, the Cairns group sought to mediate between the two big 
rivals, the United States and the European Community, while trying to ensure 
due attention was paid to the needs of developing countries. The Cairns 
Group’s members had to show flexibility and pragmatism not only towards 
the big trading nations, but also in their internal dealings; their proposals had 
to balance the views of temperate and tropical agricultural exporters, of food 
and cash crops producers. The Group succeeded in putting agriculture on the 
negotiating table and keeping it there, in spite of the mighty efforts by the EC 
to stop any significant agricultural reform. However, the Cairns Group 
experienced some serious difficulties in keeping together its diverse 
membership. The coalition was put under significant strain by Canada’s will 
to continue to protect its dairy industry. The gap between developed and 
developing countries came to light again when the Latin American walk-out 
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from the negotiations was not supported by the group in its entirety. The 
actual resilience of the coalition originated from its fervent adherence to the 
GATT principles. The group’s members were middle-powers or small trading 
nations, with a critical interest in the survival of the multilateral system. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Community is linked to the Round only 
indirectly. It was not a coalition operating inside the negotiating groups. 
However, it was established at a critical time during the Uruguay Round and 
ASEAN’ support for APEC was based on the belief that it would have 
constituted “a useful informal group for the purpose of the GATT Uruguay 
Round, of like-minded countries with a common interest in a successful 
outcome of the Round.”380
While ASEAN nations had joined the Café au Lait with shared 
enthusiasm, there were some reservations about the Cairns Group. Prime 
Minister Mahathir would have preferred the tropical producers to form a 
coalition of their own. An intense struggle was expected to take place 
between the US and the EC; tropical exporters could avoid waiting for the 
final outcome of the battle and try to gain concessions before the Round’s 
end. Malaysian reservations about APEC were stronger. Prime Minister 
Mahathir declared that its government was “initially not keen on the APEC 
proposal as we thought that ASEAN countries would be lost in the grouping 
which would have bigger powers. Since we have to along with our ASEAN 
partners, we joined APEC as well!”381
 
 
                                                 
380 Lee, Hsien Loong, [at the time] Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry. Speech before 
the Indonesia Forum, Jakarta, July 11, 1990. Quoted in Sopiee (1987): 383. 
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3) THE CAFÉ AU LAIT COALITION 
THE JARAMILLO GROUP 
 
The Jaramillo group and its evolution into the G-20/Café au Lait 
group (and its subsequent transformation into the G-48) signified a 
remarkable change in coalition diplomacy in the GATT.382 The change was 
motivated by differences in trade interests among developing countries: those 
differences were growing and ultimately created the conditions for a split 
inside the Informal group, the traditional alliance of developing countries.383
The American proposal to introduce new issues in the GATT agenda 
created an urgent need, especially, but not exclusively for developing 
countries, to gather and exchange what was then preciously scarce 
information about, for instance, the global trade in services. In fact, the 
Jaramillo group started its meetings in order to facilitate the exchange of 
information among its members. 
In 1982 GATT’s contracting parties were urged to initiate national 
studies on trade in services and to share the information with other interested 
countries. Since no official avenue for this process was offered by the GATT 
Secretariat, in 1983 a number of industrialized and developing countries 
started a series of ‘informal’ meetings to discuss the matter.384 Those 
meetings were chaired by the Colombian ambassador to the GATT, Felipe 
Jaramillo.385  
                                                 
382This section draws on Narlikar (2003). 
383 The G-77 was known as the Informal Group at the GATT. 
384 For the problems created by the ‘smallness’ of the GATT Secretariat see the Introduction 
in this chapter. 
385 For an analysis of the issues linked to the introduction of services into the negotiating 
agenda see Drake, William J. and Kalypso Nicolaidis. (1992) “Ideas, Interests, and 
Institutionalization: Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round.” In International 
Organization. Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992): 37-100. 
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The choice of ambassador Jaramillo, then Chairman of the contracting 
parties, helped to create a direct link between what were ‘informal and 
spontaneous’ meetings and the GATT proper and, in the process, offered the 
emerging group visibility and legitimacy. In fact, in 1985 at the autumn 
session of the GATT, the important role it was playing was recognized and 
the contracting parties officially asked the Jaramillo group to present its 
conclusions as a basis for discussion at the following session. 
 
MEMBERSHIP AND EVOLUTION 
The Jaramillo group/G-20 was created to respond to the emergence of 
new and more complicated trade issues. Not only would negotiations take 
place on matters never before discussed, but the issues themselves were 
contentious. There was not even a general agreement on the definition of the 
various categories of services. Developing countries faced the considerable 
risk to be presented with an agenda set entirely by their developed 
counterparts. The decision whether to accept the inclusion of the new issues 
in the agenda was a difficult one; although divergences were already starting 
to emerge inside the Informal Group, even the hard-liners that would 
eventually be called the G-10 participated in the discussions chaired by 
ambassador Jaramillo.  
If the participation of the hard-liners was marred by “suspicion and 
[brought very] few positive inputs or attempts to reach compromise”, other 
developing countries showed a vivid interest in the process.386 Among the 
countries most dissatisfied with the attitude of the hard-line leaders of the 
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Informal Group (i.e. India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and Yugoslavia) were 
the East Asian countries. The ASEAN countries, South Korea, and Hong 
Kong were feeling more and more uneasy about the positions of the hard-
liners and the Jaramillo group offered them a good opportunity to explore the 
issues and to assess their national interests.  
In fact, the ASEAN countries, South Korea, and Hong Kong together 
with Colombia, Jamaica, Chile and Zaire were to form a sub-group of the so-
called “Enthusiasts.” These countries were convinced that the potential 
benefits of a multilateral round of negotiations were larger than the potential 
losses to be suffered from the inclusion of the new issues. In fact, the 
Enthusiasts believed that it would have been possible to use the inclusion of 
the new issues to their advantage as a bargaining tool to achieve ampler 
concessions on the old issues they were most interested in. 
The ASEAN countries and South Korea had until then adopted a 
rather passive approach to the GATT; however, when it became clear that 
there was a definite risk of blocking the multilateral negotiations had the 
initiative been left in the hands of the hard-liners, they took the lead in 
opposing the G-10 stance. When in June 1986, India presented a draft to the 
Informal Group that did not take into considerations any of the positions 
expressed by the Enthusiasts, Singapore, on behalf of ASEAN, submitted an 
alternative proposal. The ASEAN draft took the midline between the US 
proposals and those of the Big Five as the developing countries ‘common 
position.’387 ASEAN signaled its will to engage in negotiations over the new 
issues while explicitly asking that other issues of high importance for 
                                                 
387 India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and Yugoslavia were known as ‘the Big Five.’ 
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developing countries, such as agriculture, should be granted due attention and 
priority.  
The draft was welcomed by a number of other developing countries 
who appreciated the opportunity to distance themselves from the blocking 
position of the hard-liners. The Jaramillo process had provided these nations 
with vital research work; it had also facilitated the definition of national 
interests in the new areas and allowed the group’s members to set a concrete 
agenda for the future negotiations. 
The Jaramillo group and the Enthusiasts had shown no intention to 
openly antagonize the leaders of the Informal Group, but the Indian draft 
made it impossible to ignore the gulf between the two positions any longer: as 
a consequence, the G-20 was officially born.388
The G-20 consisted of Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Zambia and Zaire. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of the new coalition was to actively contribute to 
the definition of the negotiating agenda. The G-20 looked for allies among 
industrialized countries and found them in the G-9 group of middle and small 
developed economies, whose members were Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
This unprecedented move by a group of developing countries brought 
                                                 
388 “Until as late as early-1986, South Korea articulated support for Brazil’s position … by 
asserting that, unless there were firm commitments on standstill, rollbacks, and safeguards, 
“there is nothing in the new round” for developing countries.” Narlikar (2003): 88. 
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about the formation of the first ‘crossover’ alliance in GATT history, the Café 
au Lait coalition.389 The members of the new alliance quickly embarked on a 
series of meetings to coordinate their positions and a draft was submitted by 
Colombia and Switzerland to the Preparatory Committee of the GATT on the 
17th July, 1986.390 The Café’ au Lait proposals were welcomed by other 
countries willing to start the new round: almost fifty members, hence the 
name of G-48, showed unequivocal support for the draft. 
A revised version of the draft was presented to the Preparatory 
Committee on the 30th of July. The Café au Lait coalition had succeeded in 
producing a “document [that] represents the culmination of intensive 
consultations among a large numbers of participants in the Preparatory 
Committee,” a document that they believed had “broad support to be the basis 
for discussions by ministers at Punta del Este.”391 The group repeatedly 
emphasized its willingness to compromise and its openness to other 
members’ contributions. While the Café au Lait had consulted with the 
United States, the European Economic Community and Japan, it had also 
shown readiness to incorporate concerns of smaller developing economies. 
This tactic was highly successful and the 30th of July draft was adopted as the 
basis for the Punta del Este declaration that launched the Uruguay Round. 
ASEAN officially endorsed the document. 392
The Café au Lait/ G-48 draft expressed the preoccupations of the 
developing world over the permanence of the Special and Differential 
                                                 
389 The name ‘Café au Lait’ was given to the coalition because of the joint leadership of 
Colombia and Switzerland. 
390 The GATT committee in charge of preparing the new round. 
391 Colombia-Switzerland draft W/47/Rev. 2, (30 July 1986). Quoted in Narlikar (2003): 95. 
392 [Prep. Com (86) w/47/Rev.2]. See the Statement by the Minister of Trade and Industry of 
Malaysia, on behalf of ASEAN, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on September 16, 1986. In 
Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol.17, No.3. (September). 
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Treatment; however, the group introduced a newfound flexibility in the 
negotiations. The document affirmed that “the developed countries do not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations” but 
it also conceded that “less-developed contracting parties expect that their 
capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions or take over 
mutually agreed action under the provisions and procedures of the General 
Agreement would improve with the progressive development of their 
economies and improvement in their trade situation and they would 
accordingly expect to participate fully in the framework of rights and 
obligations under the General Agreement.”393 It also addressed the issue of 
standstill and rollback measures to be adopted immediately; this was a very 
precise request by the East Asian countries. The draft expressly indicated the 
need for urgent consideration of the issues that were of utmost importance for 
a large number of developing countries, such as tropical products, natural-
resource based products, textiles and clothing, and agriculture. The new 
issues of services, intellectual property rights and investment protection were 
also included. In contrast to the hard-liners, the Café au Lait position on 
services suggested that “negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a 
multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a 
view to increasing transparency and liberalizing trade, having regard to the 
growth and development concerns of developing countries.”394
The draft clearly showed the will of its proponents to compromise in 
order to facilitate the launch of the round. 
 
                                                 
393 Colombia-Switzerland draft W/47/Rev.2 (30 July 1986). Quoted in Narlikar (2003): 96. 
394 Colombia-Switzerland draft W/47/Rev.2 (30 July 1986). Quoted in Narlikar (2003): 96. 
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STRATEGY 
The Cafe au Lait coalition introduced a dramatic change in the 
consolidated pattern of GATT diplomacy. For this first time, a coalition had 
both developed and developing countries among its members. The fact that its 
membership was not aligned along the usual North-South divide implied not 
only that an issue-based coalition was a viable alternative to block diplomacy, 
but also that small and middle economies had the will and the capacity to 
make themselves heard. 
The legitimacy that the Jaramillo process acquired in a relative short 
time had its roots in the pivotal role the group played in gathering and 
disseminating information about the very contentious issue of services. The 
research work was important in two ways: first, it offered its smaller and 
developing members an opportunity to examine the issue at length and to 
participate actively in the preparation of the draft. Many less-developed 
nations lacked the necessary resources to do this kind of research on their 
own. Second, greater legitimacy was credited to deliberations based on 
knowledge rather than ideological prejudice. 
The group managed to consistently present itself as a bridge-building 
coalition. At a time when the art of confrontation rather than of compromise 
was practiced by the big players from the First and the Third world alike, the 
group’s commitment to the GATT helped give it both weight and legitimacy. 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
The Café au Lait/G-20395/G-48 initiatives achieved a number of goals, 
                                                 
395 They were also known as the “Friends of the Negotiations.” 
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the most impressive of which was the adoption of its draft as the basis for the 
declaration of Punta del Este. It was credited with having rescued the GATT, 
both as an institution and a set of principles, from the risk of dissolution. And 
for the first time, a group of relatively small developing economies had been 
participating in setting the agenda for the negotiations, transforming them 
“into players that even developed countries desired to ally with.”396
The example of the Café au Lait coalition put in motion a series of 
other initiatives that tried to imitate its strategies and repeat its successes; the 
most famous of those issue-based, cross-over alliances is the Cairns Group. 
 
4) THE CAIRNS GROUP 
The Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations was officially founded in 
Cairns, in August 1986.397 It was the culmination of a period of consultation 
among some of the traditional agricultural exporters that agreed on the need 
for urgent action to stop the subsidies war raging between the US and the 
EEC. In April 1986, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand and Uruguay 
attended the first meeting in Montevideo; a few weeks later a second meeting 
took place, this time in Pattaya, Thailand, with the participation of a larger 
number of agricultural exporters, including the ASEAN countries (with the 
exception of Singapore). In Cairns, the membership had further expanded to 
include a member of the G-7 (Canada), a country from Eastern Europe, 
Hungary (in 1986 still in the Soviet sphere of influence), two leaders of the 
hard-line G-10 (Argentina and Brazil), and Australia, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, 
                                                 
396 Narlikar (2003):103. 
397 This section draws on Narlikar (2003), and Richard A. Higgott and Andrew F. Cooper. 
“Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.” In International Organization. Vol. 44, No. 4 
(Autumn 1990): 589-632. 
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New Zealand, Uruguay, and the ASEAN countries. 
The heterogeneity of the group masked what was a shared 
fundamental goal: the reform of agricultural trade. For all its members, 
agricultural products were an important source of export earnings, with 
agricultural exports ranging from 18% of total exports (Canada) to 73% 
(Argentina) in 1986.398 Moreover, the agricultural sector was a major source 
of jobs and income for their populations. 
The Cairns Group members had another characteristic in common: 
they did not, and they could not afford to, – subsidize their agricultural 
exports; therefore, when during the 1980s the US responded to the EEC’s 
CAP with the Export Enhancement Program, they had suffered a substantial 
decline in both their terms of trade and global market share.399
The strength of the group’s interest in reforming the agricultural trade 
was matched by the collective weight of its members in the sector: the Cairns 
group’s share of world’s agricultural exports was 26% in 1986; the United 
States’ share was 14% and the European Community’s was 31%.400
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE COALITION 
The first objective of the new coalition was to ensure that agricultural 
issues would be part of the negotiating agenda of the new round. In their first 
official declaration the “Ministers emphasized the importance of the MTN 
negotiations addressing agricultural trade issues as a high priority” and 
“seriously questioned the value of a new round which failed to solve the 
                                                 
398 Higgott and Cooper (1990): 603, table1.  
399 See Chapter 3: Agriculture. 
400 Higgott and Cooper (1990): 605, figure 1. 
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longstanding problems in agricultural trade.”401
When the group was founded the United States was pressing for a 
radical approach to agricultural trade reform while the EEC was reluctant to 
accept anything but very minimal changes to the status quo. The pressure 
applied by the Cairns Group was strong enough to persuade both parties that 
serious negotiations on agriculture and tropical products could not be delayed 
any further. 
Malaysia and the exporters of tropical products joined the Group with 
the aim of discussing the tariff preferences that the ACP countries were 
enjoying in the European markets. Although, as Higgott and Cooper have 
argued, “individual members may have been unclear about what they were 
committing themselves to [in August 1986], the Cairns Group successfully 
managed to maximize the coalition’s –and therefore individual members’ – 
influence within the international political economy.”402
The initial success strengthened the alliance’s resolve to use the round 
to achieve concrete results. Following the example of what the Café au Lait 
coalition had done with the issue of services, the Group, with Australia 
playing a central role, embarked on a series of detailed studies at the sector 
and subsector levels. The results of those studies and the ensuing discussions 
formed the basis for a common negotiating position. The Cairns Group 
presented its first proposal at the Negotiating Group on Agriculture in 
October 1987.  
The document called for an end to all “inappropriate” agricultural 
                                                 
401 The Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of Fair Traders in Agriculture, Cairns, 
Australia, 27 August 1986. 
402 Higgott and Cooper. (1990): 614. 
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policies. 403 The Group, however, adopted a more moderate position than the 
United States: the proposal allowed for some relief for affected exporters and 
for longer phasing out periods of support measures. 
The coalition’s proposal formed the basis for the negotiations at the 
Montreal Mid-Term Review in December 1988. The intransigence of the EC 
and the US over agriculture led to a dramatic walk-out by the representatives 
of the Latin American members of the Cairns Group. They made clear that 
would not allow any agreement to be reached that did not include provisions 
for agricultural trade reforms. The Mid-Term Review had to be delayed. As 
Narlikar stresses “the effective threat of the Latin American walk-out 
reaffirmed the important role that developing countries could play, even when 
they worked in alliance with the developed countries.”404 The US and the EC 
had to acknowledge that the round would not reach a positive conclusion 
unless they could find a compromise on agriculture. Three-party talks were 
started among the United States, the European Community and the Cairns 
Group, and, in April 1989, an agreement on a standstill on tariffs and 
subsidies was reached. 
The Cairns Group introduced a Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Reform of Agriculture at its meeting in Thailand in November 1989. The 
Comprehensive Proposal called for “substantial improvements in market 
access opportunities and greater transparency. … the conversion of non-tariff 
measures to tariffs, combined with subsequent reductions and binding of 
those tariffs at low or zero levels. Prohibition of new [export subsidies] and 
phase out of existing export subsidies. Substantial reduction in, and 
                                                 
403 The Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of Fair Traders in Agriculture, Cairns, 
Australia, 27 August 1986. 
404 Narlikar (2003):131. 
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disciplines on, the internal support provided to agriculture … .Elaboration of 
the development dimension of trade in agriculture of interest to developing 
countries. The concerns of net food importing countries [should be] taken into 
account.”405 The proposal also incorporated “modalities for special and 
differential treatment for developing countries.”406
A few days later, the document was presented for discussion at the 
GATT agricultural negotiations group meeting in Geneva with the aim of 
ending the impasse.407  
In December 1990, the talks neared complete collapse again over the 
EC’s refusal to consent to substantial reductions in agricultural protection 
levels. Once again, the Latin American countries threatened to block the 
round. Finally, in 1992, the US and the EC agreed on a compromise under 
which reform of agricultural trade could at least be initiated. Even though the 
influence of the Cairns Group on the final outcome was limited, the coalition 
had undoubtedly succeeded in ensuring that agricultural issues would be 
given serious consideration and that the Round would not be concluded 
without any tangible result for the agricultural exporters it represented. 
 
STRATEGY 
The Group adopted a prudent set of strategies to exploit its strengths 
and minimize its weaknesses. Its proposals were consistently based on serious 
                                                 
405 Ministerial Statement, 6th Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting, Chang Mai, Thailand, 21-23 
November 1989. 
406 Ministerial Statement, 6th Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting, Chang Mai, Thailand, 21-23 
November 1989. 
407 “The Group’s short-term proposals have included the following: 1) a freeze on all new 
access barriers; 2) immediate across-the-board cuts in subsidies by agreed percentages; 3) 
fixed-percentage increases to improve market access; 4) the establishment of targets for 
reducing support and protection over a ten-year period; and 5) a ban on the introduction of 
any new nontariff barriers and trade-distorting subsidies.” Higgott and Cooper (1990): 613. 
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research and pragmatism rather than ideological posturing. 
The heterogeneity of the membership necessitated a highly 
sophisticated approach to consensus-building. The Group represented 
economies which exhibited important differences in size, development and 
trade interests, and had vastly dissimilar agricultural sectors. Nevertheless, 
the Cairns Group successfully managed to use its diversity to enhance its 
influence during the negotiations. The coalition tried to foster an effective 
division of labor among its members, “with each country concentrating on 
what it was most involved with, was best equipped to do, or found the least 
sensitive to domestic political concerns.”408 For instance, ASEAN countries 
actively participated to the elaboration of the section about Special and 
Differential Treatment for LDCs in the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Reform if Agriculture. The fact that its membership included nations from 
four continents accrued to the legitimacy of the Group’s requests.  
The objective divergence in trade policy priorities in other areas such 
as services or intellectual property rights posed a serious threat to the 
coalition’s cohesion; the solution was found in the firm anchoring of the 
Group’s actions to one single issue: the reform of agricultural trade. 
The presence within the coalition of both temperate and tropical 
products exporters also constituted a potential problem because some of those 
commodities were competing for the same markets. On the other hand, these 
difficulties were compensated by a wide membership. The nations 
participating in the Group collectively held very large shares of the global 
trade in agriculture: their choice to negotiate together amplified their 
                                                 
408 Higgott and Cooper (1990): 616. 
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bargaining power, conferring legitimacy and credible force to their 
negotiating positions.409
The Cairns Group consistently tried to mediate between the two 
conflicting positions of the United States and the European Community. The 
coalition saw itself as a bridge-builder and maintained a high degree of 
flexibility during the prolonged negotiations. It has been noted that the major 
contribution of the group was to provide the US and the EC with an 
opportunity for compromise.410 In fact, the coalition had never intended to 
openly confront the big trade powers. As Higgott and Cooper suggested, “the 
fundamental goal of the Cairns Group has remained that of restraining and 
modifying the behavior of larger … actors through the strengthening of order 
in the world economy.”411  
Notwithstanding its attempts to mediate, the coalition’s unity was 
repeatedly challenged by both the US and the EEC. As Tussie noted, “first in 
Montreal [1988] and again in Brussels [1990] the big powers tried to use the 
coalition to overcome their opponent’s resistance to their negotiating stance. 
The US encouraged the Latin American members to walk out of the Brussels 
meeting and the EEC tried to weaken the group making an offer on tropical 
products.”412 However, the coalition managed to stay together and insisted on 
a multilateral solution to the problems of agriculture. A solution that had to be 
                                                 
409 “Except for cereals and oilseeds (where the US enjoyed a dominant position) and dairy 
products (EC dominance), the prominence of the group in aggregate was found in almost all 
agricultural commodity groups.” (Narlikar 2003: 136) Also Higgott and Cooper, (1990): 603, 
table 2. 
410 Narlikar (2003): 141. 
411 Higgott and Cooper (1990): 600. 
412 Tussie, Diana (1993) “Holding the Balance: The Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round.” In 
Tussie, D. and D. Glover. (eds.) (1993) Developing Countries in World Trade. Boulder, Co.: 
Lynne Rieder: 199 “Specifically, the EC proposed to eliminate tariffs on raw materials, to 
reduce duties on semi-processed goods by 35 percent and to cut duties on processed food by 
50 percent. Products included were coffee, cocoa, tea, tropical fruits, spices, cut flowers, 
essential oils, rubber, and wood articles.” 
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based not on exceptions granted by industrial countries, but rooted in rules 
applying to all contracting parties. 
The coalition’s adherence to GATT principles of liberal markets and 
concern for the special needs of less developed countries contributed 
positively to its legitimacy and helped to broaden the appeal of its proposals. 
 
A SUCCESSFUL COALITION? 
However successful the Cairns Group was, it essentially played the 
role of a mediator. As in the case of the Café au Lait, the Group’s demands 
were satisfied only insofar as they were aligned or compatible with the 
American positions. The degree of autonomous success of the coalition 
remains a matter of debate among scholars and observers.413 In fact, the 
Group had to apply a great deal of flexibility during the negotiating process 
and had to gradually reduce the scope of its requests, and the final outcome 
“fell far short of even the [often] revised objectives of the group.”414 
Nevertheless, the Cairns Group managed to grow from an agenda-setting 
alliance into a full-fledged negotiating coalition and survived the challenges 
of the Round to acquire official recognition of its role inside the GATT/WTO. 
 
5) APEC and the EAEG 
THE FOUNDING OF APEC: AN OVERVIEW  
APEC was established in Canberra, Australia, in November 1989. Its 
                                                 
413 For a positive assessment see Higgott and Cooper (1990); R. Paarlberg (1997) does not 
give any credit to the coalition for the reaching of a compromise over agriculture; and 
Narlikar (2003) does appreciate the success of the coalition in keeping together its many 
members, but finds that the group had only a limited influence on the final outcome of the 
negotiations. 
414 Narlikar (2003): 142. 
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founding members were Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South 
Korea, the United States and the ASEAN-6.415 The Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation was the first intergovernmental organization to include in its 
membership nations from around the Pacific Rim, although the ASEAN post-
ministerial conferences had previously introduced a forum for 
intergovernmental consultation.416
The call for the establishment of the new organization was made by 
the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke in January 1989 in Seoul.417 
Speaking to the Korean Business Association, he proposed a meeting at a 
ministerial level to be held before the end of 1989 with the aim of “creating a 
more formal intergovernmental vehicle of regional cooperation.”418
The success of the Australian initiative, after decades of reluctance by 
concerned governments to engage in formal cooperation, was determined by 
the economic and political changes that had taken place inside and outside the 
region during the 1980s. 
 
WHY? ECONOMIC FACTORS  
During the 1980s intra-regional trade had increased substantially: 
intra-Pacific trade (APEC plus China, Taiwan and Hong Kong) constituted 66 
percent of region’s total trade in 1988, up from 57 percent in 1970, and 80 
                                                 
415 China, Taiwan and Hong Kong joined in 1991. 
416 The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) was established in 1980; in 1989, 
PECC had 14 members: the ASEAN-6, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South 
Korea, the United States, China, and Taiwan). Government officials, businessmen and 
academics participated to PECC activities in their private capacity. PECC is an NGO. 
417 This section draws on Ravenhill (2001). 
418 Quoted in Ravenhill (2001): 82. 
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percent of foreign direct investment in APEC countries originated within the 
region.419
The increase in intra-regional trade happened in two distinct phases; 
during the first half of the 1980s the overvaluation of the dollar stimulated 
exports to the US from the East Asian NIEs and Japan. This trend spurred the 
creation of large bilateral trade surpluses between the United States and the 
Northeast Asian countries, triggering a protectionist response by the 
American congress that included the ‘graduation’ of Korea and Taiwan from 
the US GSP list. Mounting protectionist threats and the devaluation of the 
dollar in 1986, and the parallel revaluation of the Northeast Asian currencies, 
prompted a massive wave of FDIs from North to Southeast Asia.420 Firms 
from Japan and the NIEs were relocating their most labor-intense activities to 
the ASEAN countries; the move was motivated by the need to cut costs and 
to secure market access for their products in the US. American companies 
followed their competitors’ example: major electronics producers expanded 
their production facilities in Southeast Asia.  
The consequences of these developments were twofold: by the end of 
the 1980s, ASEAN was a larger export market for Japan than the EC, mainly 
because of the very intense intra-industry trade. However, the increase in 
trade with the United States was so large that the indexes measuring the 
                                                 
419  Low, Linda. (1991) “The East Asia Economic Grouping.” In The Pacific Review. Vol. 4, 
No. 4, 1991:378. 
420 “Japan’s new investment in manufacturing in other Asian countries in the years 1986-
1989 exceeded the cumulative total for the whole of the 1951-85 period. The growth in 
Taiwanese and Korean investment in ASEAN was even more spectacular. At the end of 1987 
the total stock of Taiwanese investment in manufacturing in ASEAN stood at $78 million. In 
the following three years over $850 million was invested. … A similar surge, though at lower 
levels, occurred in outflows from Korea: in 1985 the cumulative investment from Korea 
amounted to only $42; in 1989 alone, new investment from Korea amounted to $132 
million.” Ravenhill (2001): 74. 
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intensity of trade between most East Asian economies and other parts of Asia 
actually showed a decline during the decade.421
The phenomenal increase in trade in the Pacific region was 
accompanied by calls for stronger and more formalized regional cooperation. 
Intergovernmental dialogues and initiatives were considered essential to 
successfully remove structural impediments to trade422 and to provide trade 
information.423
 
WHY? THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
There were sound economic arguments in support of the establishment 
of a regional institution; however, the motivation behind the creation of 
APEC was essentially a pessimistic interpretation of the direction in which 
the Uruguay Round was moving.  
The round had been launched in September 1986: two years of 
painstaking negotiations had produced negligible results and the mid-term 
review in Montreal in December 1988 terminated in failure. Many read in the 
events in Montreal the end of the GATT system, and the emergence of a 
world dominated by the European Union and the North-American bloc. The 
Australian initiative in January 1989 reflected the fears of the trading nations 
of East Asia: tellingly, in the first list of possible members that PM Hawke 
circulated neither Canada nor the United States was included. The East Asian 
countries shared with Australia and New Zealand a strong interest in the 
                                                 
421 Ravenhill (2001): 77. 
422 See Elek, Andrew. (1992). “Pacific Economic Co-operation.” In Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature. Vol. 6 No.1 (May 1992): 3.  
423 See Petri, Peter A. (1993) “The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History.” In 
Frankel J. A. and M. Kahler. (1993) Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in 
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preservation of a rule-based and liberal trading system: regional dialogue and 
consultation during the 1980s had focused on this common goal. Ravenhill 
has noted that “regionalism was valued as much for the perceived potential 
leverage it would give to states in their dealings with outsiders as for any 
immediate economic benefits it might bring in within-region relations.”424
The rise of protectionist pressures in the United States coincided with 
the end of the Cold War; in the Pacific it was feared that strategic 
considerations would have held less influence in Washington and this could 
have meant an increase in American unilateral trade actions against ‘unfair’ 
traders. At the same time, a large number of observers were convinced that 
the establishment of the EU Single Market would translate to limited access 
to the already much protected European markets. 
Therefore, the Australian proposal for increased intergovernmental 
cooperation in the Pacific Rim was accepted, albeit reluctantly by some. 
 
MEMBERSHIP 
The creation of a regional organization had been strongly supported 
by Australia. The government was aware that the country could find itself 
‘isolated’ in a world dominated by trading blocs and it had been extremely 
active since the pre-launch phase of the Uruguay Round and had entered into 
a web of alliances. Australia was a member of the Café au Lait coalition, and 
the main actor behind the Cairns Group; it had tried to revitalize the Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council and collaborated with Japan to found APEC. 
                                                 
424 Ravenhill (2001): 79 Also, “in 1983, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed … 
that the trade ministers of Western Pacific economies should meet annually. The intention 
was to strengthen the participation by these economies in the anticipated new round of 
negotiations” and “PECC sponsored the quest for a ‘Pacific position’ on the multilateral trade 
negotiations.” 
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Australia considered APEC an important instrument to “constrain 
Washington’s resort to unilateralism and to reduce the likelihood that the US 
government would promote a regional bloc in the Americas.”425 The 
government was also keen to promote the concept of an ‘East Asian 
Hemisphere’ to which Australia indisputably belonged.426  
The United States did not show any enthusiasm for the Australian 
proposal; the Bush administration, however, was displeased with the 
exclusion of the United States from the Hawke’s original list. The US adopted 
the Japanese/Australian approach, and announced that they would join APEC 
if the Southeast Asian nations were to participate as well. 
In 1992, the newly elected Clinton administration took a different 
approach to APEC. The United States considered that the organization could 
serve three main foreign policy aims: it could reaffirm the US role in the 
Pacific, offer a platform for opening the East Asian markets, and represent a 
considerable leverage against the European Union in the Uruguay Round.  
The Japanese government had long been interested in establishing a 
regional organization and had actively helped the Australian government to 
bring about the Canberra meeting.427 However, the Japanese saw APEC 
mainly as a dialogue forum, where member nations could discuss and adopt 
measures for trade facilitation and technical cooperation; their position was 
aligned with many other Asian governments. 
In fact, one of Japan’s main concerns was to preserve good relations 
                                                 
425 Ravenhill (2001): 61. 
426 Phrase adopted by Gareth Evans, Minister for foreign Affairs, quoted in Ravenhill 
(2001):115. An intriguingly similar identity issue was behind the full ‘Asianness’ of the 
EAEG of PM Mahathir. 
427 For the disagreements among the Japanese ministries and their implications for Japanese 
diplomacy, see Ravenhill (2001): 98-103. 
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with ASEAN. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was particularly worried that 
APEC might be seen by its ASEAN counterparts as an instrument of Japanese 
economic power. Notably, Japanese diplomats were also concerned by the 
possibility that a conflict might arise between the ASEAN nations and the 
Western members of APEC about the objectives and/or the institutional shape 
of the organization: such an occurrence would have proven extremely 
embarrassing for Japan. There was, though, a clear similarity in trade interests 
between Japan and the ASEAN countries.  
The Southeast Asian governments had long opposed the establishment 
of a formal Pacific regional institution: they believed it would endanger the 
identity and cohesion of ASEAN. There were, however, “powerful market 
forces [drawing] ASEAN economies deeper and deeper into the complex web 
of division of labour fast emerging in the Asia-Pacific region.”428  
The potential benefits that ASEAN countries could expect from 
participating in APEC were manifold. Besides gaining from the additional 
leverage in the ongoing trade negotiations, it had been suggested that ASEAN 
could position itself as the smaller countries inside the European Community 
had, and, consequently, enjoy a disproportionate influence inside APEC.429 
The Southeast Asian nations also had hopes that APEC would be instrumental 
in increasing Northeast Asian investments to their region. Furthermore, 
APEC could constitute an ‘insurance policy’ in case of a collapse of the 
Round: ASEAN would have at least secured a stable and relatively open 
trading system in the Pacific region.  
As such, ASEAN needed to balance its reluctance to join APEC with 
                                                 
428 Tan, Kong Yam, Toh Mun Heng, and Linda Low. (1992) “ASEAN and Pacific Economic 
Co-operation.” In ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1992): 324. 
429 Tan, Toh and Low (1992): 325. 
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the objective reality of its economic interests; as a result, it adopted a 
pragmatic view and decided to participate provided that some guarantees 
were given to its members.  
ASEAN concerns were explicitly addressed in the Chairman’s 
Summary Statement of the Canberra Ministerial Meeting under the title 
“General Principles of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.” The main points 
from the ASEAN point of view were that “cooperation should recognise the 
diversity of the region, including differing social and economic systems and 
current levels of development, …[it] should involve a commitment to open 
dialogue and consensus, and be based on non-formal consultative exchanges 
of views among the members.” Furthermore, APEC should not evolve into a 
trading bloc and, most importantly, “cooperation should complement and 
draw upon, rather than detract from, existing organisations in the region, 
including formal intergovernmental bodies such as ASEAN.”430 An 
additional recognition of the role of ASEAN came from the ‘request’ that the 
ASEAN Secretariat would act, at least until a decision was taken about the 
final institutional form of the new organization, as Secretariat for APEC.431
The Joint Statement declared the Asian-Pacific economies’ support 
the “further opening of the multilateral trading system [through] the 
successful conclusion of the [Uruguay] Round.”432 In fact, most of the Joint 
Statement is devoted to the multilateral round of trade negotiations and its 
implications for Asia-Pacific economies. This has been interpreted to signify 
that, besides the common interest in a positive outcome for the MTN, there 
                                                 
430 Chairman’s Summary Statement, First APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 6-
7 November 1989. 
431 A separate APEC Secretariat was created in 1992. 
432 Joint Statement, First APEC Ministerial Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 6-7 November 
1989. 
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was little else upon which the ministers could agree.433
 
MALAYSIA AND APEC 
Malaysia was the only nation that supported the first Hawke proposal 
for a regional organization from which the United States and Canada were 
excluded. The Malaysian position was that ASEAN, given its limited 
economic and political dimensions, could not have any significant role to play 
inside APEC. According to the Malaysian view, APEC would have posed a 
significant threat to ASEAN‘s identity, and consequently to ASEAN’s 
capacity to represent the interests of its members. There was also the risk of 
APEC being used by its Western members, and in particular the United 
States, to forcibly open East Asian markets. However, similar arguments 
could be used to support ASEAN participation in APEC. The relative size of 
ASEAN would not have allowed its members to stop APEC from happening, 
particularly if other and more powerful nations had decided in its favor. 
Furthermore, ASEAN’s participation could help reduce protectionist 
measures or unilateral actions by the United States.  
Malaysia eventually went along with its ASEAN partners; however, it 
strongly opposed any effort to transform APEC into anything other that a 
consultative forum and repeatedly insisted on the ‘voluntary’ nature of 
possible liberalization measures adopted by the APEC membership. 
The opposition to APEC, however, did not mean that the Malaysian 
government was opposed to regional cooperation. It was a matter of defining 
the concept of ‘region’. It is important to remember that Malaysian officials 
                                                 
433 According to Rudner, the meeting produced “a studiously vague statement of intent.” 
Rudner, Martin. (1995) “APEC: the Challenges for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.” In 
Modern Asian Studies. Vol. 29, No. 2 (1995): 410. Quoted in Ravenhill (2001): 90. 
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were convinced that trade conflicts between the United States and Japan, and 
between the US and the European Community, were the greatest threats to 
regional prosperity. In the words of Noordin Sopiee “in both these trade 
conflicts the ASEAN states are in danger if the combatants collide and they 
are in danger if they collude … and fall to the temptation of conflict 
resolution or appeasement on the basis of short-sighted bilateral book-keeping 
and trade diversion.”434
Strategically, ASEAN would have benefited from siding with one of 
the ‘combatants’; this would have probably increased the cost of a trade war 
and pushed all parties back to the negotiating table. Japan was the natural ally 
for the Southeast Asian nations. The investment flows of the second half of 
the 1980s had led to a real integration of the North and Southeast Asian 
economies: Japan, the NIEs and ASEAN “constituted three tiers of countries 
at different levels of skill, wage rates, and development. The flow of 
investments from the upper to lower tier of countries [acted] as a transmission 
belt in transmitting growth momentum to one tier to the next.”435 Besides 
being increasingly dependent on Northeast Asian FDIs, ASEAN nations had 
come to share quasi-identical trade interests with their Northern counterparts; 
their exports of manufactures were growing exponentially, while their 
revenues from commodity exports were falling.  
In the past, Japan and the NIEs had been able to adapt to US 
protectionist practices and even manipulate them to their own advantage.436 
However, the loopholes in protectionist barriers that had been exploited by 
                                                 
434 Sopiee Noordin. (1987) “ASEAN in the Changed World Economy.” In The Indonesian 
Quarterly. Vol. XV, No. 3 (1987): 383. 
435 Low (1991): 378. 
436 See Yoffie, David B. (1983) Power and Protectionism. New York: Columbia University 
Press.  
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Japan and the NIEs were rapidly closing. Even assuming the ASEAN 
countries would be able to muster the bureaucratic and technical resources 
needed to succeed in the delicate game of bilateral negotiations with the 
United States, there were signs that even the cleverest bargaining tactics were 
producing decreasing returns.437
Japan, the NIEs and ASEAN held, therefore, very similar views about 
what the Uruguay Round should achieve and how the international trading 
system should be organized. 438
When, “on December 7, 1990, US Trade Representative Carla Hills 
appeared before the press in Brussels to announce the collapse of the four-
year long Uruguay Round,”439 the Malaysian government decided it was time 
to take the initiative; on December 10, 1990, at the presence of the Chinese 
President, PM Mahathir proposed the creation of the East Asian Economic 
Grouping. 
 
THE EAEG PROPOSAL 
The EAEG members would have been the ASEAN-6, Japan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and “other countries in the Indo-China region, 
though there was no firm list of countries.”440 However, it was very clear 
which nations were not invited, the United States, Canada and Australia. 
The prime minister explicitly linked the EAEG proposal to the state of 
the international trading system. In a speech in March 1991 he declared that 
                                                 
437 Glover, David. (1993) “Bypassing Barriers: Lessons from the Asian NICs.” in Tussie D. 
and D. Glover (eds.) (1993) Developing Countries in World Trade. Boulder, Co.: Lynne 
Rieder:176. 
438 With the possible exception of agriculture; although, as noted in Chapter 4, Japan, or 
South Korea, could not be accused of disrupting international agricultural trade. 
439 Prestowitz, Tonelson and Jerome (1991): 130. 
440 Low (1991): 375. 
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“the question is what we in this region do to rescue the free trading system of 
the world? … To stop the slide and to preserve free trade the countries of East 
Asia … must … speak with one voice. … A formal grouping [is] intended to 
facilitate consultation and consensus prior to negotiating with Europe or 
America or in multilateral fora such as GATT.”441
The EAEG was meant to be a consultative forum where East Asian 
nations would exchange views and develop common positions on trade and 
economic issues of mutual concern.442 The Malaysian government insisted 
that the grouping would be perfectly consistent with GATT principles and 
was not proposed as a trading bloc. 
The influence of ASEAN would have been preserved and the EAEG 
would have provided its members with greater bargaining power in 
international negotiations. The Malaysian Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim 
observed that “The East Asian group should be able to sit with North America 
or Europe on an equal footing. This would not be possible if we relied on 
APEC because the US and Canada also belong to the North American Free 
Trade Area.”443
The EAEG did not receive a positive response from most of its 
potential members and those excluded were adamantly against it. The 
proposal had two main weaknesses. First, from a strategic point of view, the 
exclusion of the United States was problematic. In 1989, US imports from 
developing countries in East Asia totaled US$94 billion, compared to Japan’s 
                                                 
441 Speech by the Malaysian Prime Minister at the Conference on ‘The ASEAN countries and 
the World Economy: Challenge of Change”, organized by the Centre for Strategic and 
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US$56 billion: from a trade perspective, “economic integration across the 
Pacific [had] been as strong as it [had] within East Asia.”444 Even well-
disposed Southeast Asian observers commented that “if the EAEG proposal 
[was] to be taken further, the exclusion of the United States should [have 
been] reconsidered.”445 The Japanese government reacted very cautiously to 
the initiative and was unwilling to upset the Americans: the United States was 
not only its main trade partner, but also the destination of the largest part of 
Japanese foreign investments.446
The second problem was more tactical in nature: PM Mahathir had not 
consulted his ASEAN partners about the project before announcing it in 
public. Malaysia had broken an unwritten, but fundamental rule of the 
ASEAN Way. As a consequence, unified support for the EAEG was lacking 
and the proposal was the object of “misconceptions and misinterpretations” 
that months of Malaysian diplomatic efforts could only partially dispel.447 
After a period of intense consultation, the EAEG was transformed into the 
East Asian Economic Caucus and it was agreed that it would operate inside 
APEC. 
The effectiveness of APEC as a coalition during the Uruguay Round 
is difficult to ascertain. Although the concerns about the outcome of 
negotiations were central to its founding, APEC’s documents do not contain 
specific proposals on the various issues, but rather generic declarations of 
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intent.448 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation had probably played a role 
more like a blocking coalition than an agenda-setting or negotiating alliance. 
In all likelihood, it gave the American negotiators additional leverage against 
the European Community during the crucial agricultural negotiations. 449
It must also to be noted that both the founding of APEC and the 
EAEG proposal happened at a time of deep crisis of the multilateral 
negotiations; they were symptoms of a growing loss of confidence in the 
GATT system and the EAEG proposal could have communicated to the US 
government a sense of urgency about achieving concrete results at the Round. 
In fact, the US found the proposal for a broad FTA in the Pacific region 
without Washington participation unacceptable. There was a fear that the 
EAEG might lead to the creation of a three regional blocks (Europe, the 
Americas, and East Asia). The Us Administration reacted to this prospective 
calling Mahathir’s proposal “unwise”. Richard Solomon, [then] Assistant 
Secretary of State, warned the ASEAN governments that “GATT-compatible 
regionalism, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, strengthens efforts to 
sustain and expand a global free trade regime. Closed Exclusionary 




The Malaysian government decided to join a number of coalitions 
during the Round with the goal of maximizing the potential benefits from the 
                                                 
448 See, for instance, the APEC Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Singapore, 30 July 1990 
449 See, for instance, Palmujoki, Eero. (2001) Regionalism and Globalism in Southeast Asia. 
New York: Palgrave: 92.  
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negotiations given the limited resources at its disposal.  
Overall, its efforts were successful. The coalitions to which Malaysia 
adhered contributed greatly to the launch of the Round; to the reform of the 
GATT and the establishment the WTO; to a limited, but valuable reform in 
agricultural trade; and to the preservation of Special and Differential 
treatment for developing countries.  
The choice to participate as a coalition (ASEAN) and to coalitions 
(Café au Lait, Cairns Group) helped Malaysia to manage carefully limited 
human and technical resources at a time of “ever-greater external demands on 
national trade policy making."451
During the Round, the demands on bureaucratic and technical 
structures became heavier and more complex. The next chapter will describe 
the institutions involved in Malaysian trade policy-making, their competences 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
MALAYSIA’S TRADE POLICYMAKING SYSTEM 
 
 “While retaining its constitutional authority for external trade policy, the 
Federal Parliament has delegated the administration of trade and trade-
related policy instruments to the Executive branch of Government.”452
WTO, Trade Policy Review – Malaysia 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses a set of questions about government actors in 
trade policymaking in Malaysia.  
The following section focuses on the issue of political control and 
direction of the process of policymaking. The paramount authority of the 
Prime Minister and the degree of control that Dr. Mahathir exerted during his 
tenure are the object of the first section. The role and influence of a few other 
major political players is then briefly assessed. 
The third section examines how the government was organized to 
make trade policy and how the government’s agencies approached the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. It looks at the Malaysian administrative 
machinery. The roles of the lead Ministries and agencies are assessed as well 
as the organizational links between the various policymaking institutions. The 
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section also deals with the changes both in process and organization that have 
taken place during the Uruguay Round years.  
The last section of the chapter is devoted to the inclusion of the 
private sector in the trade policymaking process. As Nau observed, the 
organizational arrangements and priorities for trade policy in each country are 
not static.453 The rising number and intricacy of the issues faced by 
negotiators during the Round meant that the capacity of the bureaucracy was 
stretched. In particular, the need for gathering relevant information was 
central in the choice of involving segments of the private sector in the 
consultation process. 
 
2) POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
OVERVIEW 
Since independence, Malaysian foreign policy has been led by the 
twin priorities of preserving the integrity of the nation and achieving a level 
of national welfare sufficient to overcome the “fundamental divisions within 
Malaysian society”454. National security must be guaranteed, therefore, not 
only against possible external threats, but, and most crucially, against the risk 
of internal ethnic discord. Then Prime Minister Mahathir has remarked that 
“the most desirable society is a stable society and the task of leadership is to 
strive for that … One of the things we often say in Malaysia is that the 
country is doing well if everyone is unhappy. This involves trade-offs and 
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compromise. … we have three different communities in Malaysia. 
Fundamentally, our problem is racial animosity.”455
The objective of securing social stability has been pursued through a 
set of policies aimed at stimulating economic growth and redistributing 
wealth among the different ethnic groups. Successive Malaysian governments 
have relied on export growth to achieve economic and social domestic goals. 
Malaysian officials have repeatedly stressed the importance of 
economic growth for the continued existence of the state, especially during 
the recession that the country experienced in the mid-1980s. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, in October 1987, reminded his American audience that “In 
fact, in Malaysia, our economic ties have priority over purely foreign policy 
issues. The first business of a nation must, after all, be survival. For us, at the 
present time, our survival depends upon our ability to export the fruits of our 
labour.”456 His successor reiterated that “economic issues [had] become part 
and parcel of [Malaysian] foreign policy”457 and the government was 
pursuing a policy of active engagement within the United Nations system, 
from the G-77 to the GATT, to counter rising protectionism and foster trade 
liberalization. 
 
ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER 
Malaysian Prime Ministers have traditionally exerted a strong 
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influence on foreign policy.458 Policy choices reflected “the personality, style 
and attitude of [Malaysia’s] top leaders.”459 Since the ruling coalition 
(Barisan Nasional) has held a large majority in parliament since 
independence, control over foreign policy has remained firmly in the hands of 
the prime minister, and debate on foreign policy has stayed out of 
parliament.460  
Notwithstanding the tradition of executive dominance in this area, 
during Mahathir’s tenure, the Prime Minister has succeeded in further 
extending his power over the definition and implementation of Malaysian 
foreign policy. The higher degree of control by the prime minister over 
foreign policy has been related to the general trend of centralization of power 
by the executive during Mahathir’s years.461
The centralization of decision-making during Mahathir’s premiership 
did not only mean a reduction of bureaucratic influence over the executive. It 
meant literally that the Prime Minister consulted a very few people about 
policy choices. It was a very well known fact that “apart from a very close 
circle of advisers - only few of whom are in the cabinet – Mahathir [kept] on 
his own counsel.”462
The Prime Minister usually did not ask bureaucrats for advice, but 
                                                 
458 See, for example, Pathmanathan M. (1990) “Formulation and Administration of Malaysian 
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relied instead on a small circle of confidents – the so-called ‘kitchen 
cabinet.’463 According to the FEER, at the time the decision to participate to 
the Uruguay Round was taken, the ‘kitchen cabinet’ included the [then] 
Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, and Anwar Ibrahim [then Agriculture 
Minister].464 It is, therefore, plausible to argue that both Daim and Anwar – 
who would succeed Daim at the Ministry of Finance – participated to the 
discussions about which was best strategy for Malaysia to choose at that 
critical juncture. It is also very probable that they shared Mahathir’s belief 
that it was fundamental for the government to do its best to secure a stable, 
multilateral, rule-based trading system. 
The personality and policy preferences of Mahathir have been 
attributed to his personal and political history. The “strong economic bias in 
many of the foreign policy decisions [was] to be expected as [he] has spent 
sometime as the trade minister.”465 Mahathir’ critical attitude towards the 
bureaucracy was explained by the fact that “he was not previously a civil 
servant, whereas his three predecessors came from the ranks of the 
bureaucracy.”466
As Prime Minister Mahathir used his political power in a number of 
policy areas, where he took decisive action to obtain the results he wanted. 
Milne has indicated the privatization policy together with “the “Look East” 
policy, the concept of “Malaysia Inc.” the promotion of heavy industries, 
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population policy and agricultural policy.”467 These are above all domestic 
policies. In foreign policy, Mahathir committed a very significant amount of 
attention and energy to economic issues.  
The Mahathir administration’s main focus was on export promotion 
and reduction of trade barriers, and the presentation of Malaysia as a friendly 
place for foreign investors.468 While export growth was crucial to finance 
development strategies, foreign capital was seen as decisive to achieve rapid 
industrialization, especially after the mid-1980’s crisis. Mahathir himself was 
relentless in advocating international trade reform, a decrease in protection in 
industrialized countries’ markets.  
In a paper presented at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian 
Business Council in 1991, the Prime Minister declared that “in international 
relations, the emphasis should be less on politics and ideology but more on 
economic imperatives.”469
 
EVOLUTION OF MAHATHIR’S FOREIGN POLICY 
As soon as he became Prime Minister in July 1981, Mahathir 
announced the direction in which he would take the country’s foreign policy; 
the main priority was to strengthen the Malaysian role and influence inside 
ASEAN, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Commonwealth - the order reflecting the ascribed 
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relevance of each organization to Malaysia’s national interests.470
Although the lines along which Mahathir acted as prime motor of the 
country’s foreign policy were clearly set since the beginning of his tenure as 
Prime Minister, scholars have usually divided the premiership into two 
distinct periods.471 In the first, from 1981 to 1988, Mahathir sought mainly to 
consolidate his power base both at the national level and within UMNO. The 
main thrust of his foreign policy was directed at “breaking what he saw as a 
subservient economic relationship with the old colonial master, Britain 
[while] developing … his ‘Look East’ policy.”472 The gist of the ‘Look East’ 
policy was not only to attract more political attention and direct investment 
from Japan, but also to start forging stronger economic and political 
cooperation among East Asian countries.473
In the second phase of his premiership, strong economic growth 
facilitated Mahathir’s quest for a more visible Malaysian role in international 
diplomacy. The instrument of choice in this endeavor was ASEAN, although 
other initiatives, such the establishment of the Group of 15 and an enhanced 
participation to the activities of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
were also testimony of the newly found confidence of Malaysia as a player in 
international relations. 
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PERMANENCE OF PRIORITIES 
However ambitious Mahathir’s foreign policy vision, it was rooted in 
the solid perception that sustained economic growth was indispensable to 
achieve his domestic and foreign goals. In March 1986, the Deputy Foreign 
Minister, in his address at a seminar on US-ASEAN relations, observed that 
“In the Asian political culture, respect, if not legitimacy of governments, is 
clearly closely linked to their ability to ensure improvement in the livelihood 
of the people. … Under these circumstances [sharp falls in commodity prices, 
rising protectionism in developed countries, failures in international and 
commodity arrangements], a host of economic problems … have brought 
about pressures that could well threaten the stability of governments and 
nations.”474 The Prime Minister himself in April 1986, at a conference of 
Japanese investors, remarked that “The world must trade. No country can live 
in isolation no matter how rich and self-sufficient” and that his country, 
although facing a severe economic crisis, was not “asking for aid. All we are 
asking for is fair trade.”475
Since the early 1980s, the world economy had deteriorated and risks 
of political instability in developing countries, like Malaysia, were amplified 
by “high interest rates, growing inflation, rising unemployment, mounting 
protectionism, tumbling commodity prices and a tight squeeze in financial 
flows.”476
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Mahathir had often remarked that commodity-producing countries 
were at a disadvantage in the international economy; he firmly wanted to turn 
Malaysia from an agricultural country into an industrial state.477 Mahathir 
also believed that Malaysia’s domestic market was too small to support an 
industrial development effort solely on an import-substitution strategy. He 
noted that “Import substitution industries are good … but their scope must 
necessarily be limited. If we want to grow we have to export our industrial 
products on the same scale as we export our agricultural exports.”478
Mahathir though that Malaysia could develop a modern industrial 
structure if it embraced an export-oriented strategy. The export-oriented 
industrialization drive was strongly associated with foreign investments. 
Mahathir had been Minister for Trade and Industry from 1978 to 1981.∗ 
During those years, he had consistently promoted Malaysia as a destination of 
choice for FDIs. In 1979, he explained that the country needed foreign 
capitals to modernize its industries and foreign investments in the 
manufacturing sector were necessary to create job opportunities for a growing 
population. Finally, foreign multinationals were expected to transfer some 
skills and technology to Malaysia. 479
Mahathir’s vision for the economic development of Malaysia clashed 
with the policies that industrialized countries were adopting to contain the 
effects of the global recession. He lamented that “protectionism is rife. 
…Leaders of the developed countries piously [called] for more free trade, but 
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at the same time they [devised] new restrictions – including quotas, tariffs, 
high interest rates … in order to stifle imports into their countries.”480
Malaysia’s economic development depended on the ability of its 
government to secure access for its goods to the markets of industrialized 
nations. An unpredictable, and therefore riskier, international trading system 
would also have considerably reduced foreign investments.  
In 1983, Mahathir acknowledged that “the North-South dialogue, 
UNCTAD and the other conferences … [had] been futile.”481 It was, 
therefore, apparent that developing countries needed a different approach to 
deal with the industrialized nations: in order to contain the spread of 
protectionism it was crucial to be able to universally apply the same 
economic rules that the rich nations used to impose on poorer countries.  
The Prime minister feared that the protectionist wave caused by the 
recession would swallow the opportunities for Malaysia’s economic 
development. Developing countries seeking to industrialize needed to trade 
and needed a multilateral rule-based system to guarantee that global trade 
would be based on fair terms. Fair trade meant that the same rules should 
apply to strong and weak alike, and could not be changed according to the 
whims of the “free-traders of convenience.”482 Mahathir noted that “the big 
powers … formed their own economic clubs … to which the developing 
countries were allowed to appeal from time to time.”483 Developing nations 
                                                 
480 Speech of the Prime Minister at the Banquet Hosted by his Excellency President Chun 
Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea. Seoul, 9 August 1983. Foreign-Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 
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483 Speech of the Prime Minister at the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
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should therefore build up their own resilience.484 Resilience and credibility as 
partners were necessary to enter serious negotiations to secure a rule-based 
international trading system. A GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations 
represented then a real opportunity. 
 
OTHER RELEVANT POLITICAL ACTORS  
The Minister of Finance and the Minister of International Trade and 
Industry are by far the most influential members of the Cabinet, other than the 
Prime Minister himself. 
As previously mentioned, Daim and Anwar were included by 
Mahathir in the small circle of people which he consulted regularly about 
policy choices. Both of them served as Ministers of Finance during the 
Round. 
The Ministers of International Trade and Industry were very 
influential actors in the Malaysian political landscape.485 Razaleigh was 
Minister during the pre-negotiation phase of the UR round; although, as I 
noted in Chapter 1, it is plausible that he supported Malaysia’s participation 
in the negotiations, his contribution to the debate must have been limited 
because he was a major political opponent of Mahathir. Rafidah, on the other 
hand, was a Mahathir loyalist and earned a reputation for technical and 
negotiating skills, but she was not one of the ‘confidents’ of the Prime 
Minister. 
                                                 
484 Speech of the Prime Minister at the 7th Conference of Heads of State/Government of Non-
Aligned Countries. New Delhi, 8 March 1983. Foreign Affairs-Malaysia. Vol. 16 No.2 
(June): 1-9. 
485 Crouch, Harold. (1996) Government and Society in Malaysia. Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press: 38. According to Crouch, the Minister of Trade and Industry had ‘a central 
role in patronage.’ 
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Daim Zainuddin was the Minister of Finance from 1984 to February 
1991. He was in office during the preliminary discussions about the 
opportunities that a new Round of multilateral trade negotiations would offer 
to Malaysia, and during most of the Round itself. The Economic Reports 
published by the Ministry during his tenure contained detailed appraisals of 
the negotiations and the reasons why Malaysia was participating. Daim 
played an important role in the formulation and implementation of the 
privatization policy and “was responsible for the restructuring of the 
Malaysian economy” in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the mid-
1980s. 486 As Mahathir’s personal economic advisor, he undoubtedly yielded 
considerable weight in the Cabinet. 
In 1991, Anwar Ibrahim became finance minister. Daim’s successor 
was decidedly more a politician than a businessman: in 1993, he was elected 
deputy president of UMNO and shortly after was appointed deputy prime 
minister. Anwar’s reputation was one of pragmatism. As finance minister, 
Anwar has been involved in negotiations over an ASEAN Free Trade Area 
and in APEC official meetings.487 When he took office as Minister of 
Finance, the Round was experiencing very serious difficulties. In the 
Foreword of the first Economic Report published under his tenure, Anwar 
stated that “the Malaysia’s proposal for the establishment of the GATT-
compatible East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which is now an ASEAN 
undertaking, should be viewed as a positive response to global economic 
changes and the emergence of the Pacific Rim as the most dynamic economic 
                                                 
486 Camroux David (1994): 427. 
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 222
region.”488 The Minister obviously was contemplating the possibility of a 
prolonged stalemate in the Round, and assessing the alternatives. Malaysia, at 
that point, could not contribute in any significant way to the multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva; it was, however, possible to build regional 
agreements to protect the country’s trading interests. 
In September 1986, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Razaleigh 
Hamzah attended the meeting of the GATT at Punta del Este. Razaleigh 
would soon challenge Mahathir for the premiership, and therefore would 
loose his Cabinet post in favor of a Mahathir loyalist, Rafidah Aziz. Her 
tenure covered all the Round years and the difficult period of the initial 
implementation of the agreements. Rafidah participated in the discussions of 
the Cairns Group and in the other economic regional fora. She was convinced 
of the necessity for Malaysia of a successful conclusion to the negotiations. In 
1991, speaking in Singapore, she told her audience that “First and foremost is 
the need to maintain an open, multilateral trading system. Malaysia … needs 
an open trading system to survive. In order to achieve that openness, the UR 
has to succeed to ensure that the GATT which is the cornerstone of such 
system will be strengthened.”489 As Minister of International Trade and 
Industry, she participated personally to the actual negotiations; 
representatives of other countries do remember her as a exceptionally ‘hands-
on’ minister and a very tough negotiator.490
                                                 
488 Ministry of Finance, Malaysia (1991), Economic Report, Foreword by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
489 Speech by the Hon. Dato’ Seri Rafidah Aziz, Minister of International Trade and Industry, 
Malaysia at the Eight General Meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 
Singapore, 20 May 1991. Reprinted in ASEAN Economic Bulletin. Vol. 8. No. 1 (July 1991): 
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490 Personal interview with a former Canadian official. October 2008. 
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Rafidah was also aware of the need for a better cooperation between 
the public and the private sector and MITI was at the forefront of the 
administration’s efforts to create a “meaningful and healthy public-private 
partnership.”491
 
3) THE FORMAL STRUCTURE  
At the time the Uruguay Round was launched, and for the seven years 
of negotiations that ensued, trade policymaking in Malaysia was considerably 
centralized: the executive branch of the Government had a firm hold on 
economic policymaking on the whole, including trade issues. During the 
Round, however, the influence of the private sector and advisory think tanks 
became more significant, especially as far as information gathering was 
concerned. The mounting demand for specialized information and 
consultation brought about some institutional and administrative changes in 
the process of trade policymaking.  
This section examines the ‘formal’ system through which decisions 
were taken and policies implemented. 
Officially, it is the Cabinet of Ministers of the Malaysian Federation, 
headed by the Prime Minister that “formulates trade and investment policy 
objectives and measures, initiates legislation and exercise executive 
functions.”492 However, the Cabinet is not the locus where major political 
decisions are made, but rather a “forum for the settling of administrative 
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matters.”493 Although the Cabinet’s approval of policy measures is an 
indispensable step in the implementation of such measures, its role is merely 
formal: “[Cabinet’s] decisions [are] really endorsement functions.”494 As 
already stated, actual discussions and decisions about policy choices are taken 
routinely by the Prime Minister and a restricted group of senior ministers.495
The policies approved by the Cabinet have to be implemented by 
various Ministries, agencies and statutory bodies that are involved in trade 
policy matters. 
 
THE PRIME MINISTER 
The Prime Minister has traditionally enjoyed a position of 
preeminence in the Cabinet; however, Dr. Mahathir has successfully enlarged 
the powers of his Office and restricted the role of other political actors in the 
decision-making process.496 The Prime Minister’s Department controls the 
Malaysian bureaucracy. It has functions both of policy planning and 
monitoring; and it manages the personnel. 
Under the Malaysian constitution, the Prime minister holds the most 
preeminent office. The Prime Ministers of Malaysia have so far “been able to 
establish considerable personal political authority; have held the important 
positions of President of UMNO and Chairman of the Barisan Nasional; have 
                                                 
493 Harding, Andrew. (1996) Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia. The Hague 
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enjoyed the support, not just of a majority, but of at least two-thirds of the 
members of the Derwan Rakyat [House of Representatives].”497
It is important to note that many of the powers enjoyed by the 
Malaysian Prime Minister are not clearly stated in the constitution “because 
they are political and conventional in their nature rather than legal.”498 The 
Prime Minister is the head of the executive, he presides over policy choices 
and he decides about the composition of his government. As Harding 
indicates “ministers other than the Prime Minister hold office at the pleasure 
of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong [the King] {article 43(5) of the Malaysian 
Constitution}. This means in effect that they can be dismissed at anytime on 
the advice of the Prime Minister.”499 A Malaysian Prime Minister has the 
authority to set the Cabinet’s agenda, determine which proposals should be 
introduced to the parliament and decide when to hold elections. The only 
credible menace to his position can be brought from within the UMNO. The 
Prime Minister, as remarked earlier, is the President of UMNO and a 
contender could challenge the incumbent in a party election. 
A strong premiership is an established tradition in Malaysian politics. 
In fact, it is “unusual for any new policy to emerge without the commitment 
of the Prime Minister.”500 Nevertheless, Dr. Mahathir has been able to further 
consolidate the authority of the Premier and to enlarge the controls on the 
various levers of power. Zakaria commented that “a lot of foreign policy 
initiatives have derived since 1981 from the Prime Minister himself – 
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indicating that the locus of foreign policy decision making [was] effectively 
in the hands of the political chief executive.”501
Prime Minister Mahathir led his administration through the Prime 
Minister’s Department. Ho contended that “policy formulation in Malaysia 
[was] a highly bureaucratic act emanating primarily from the Prime 
Minister’s Department.”502 During Mahathir’s administration, the functions 
assigned to the Prime Minister’s Department have increased because of the 
determination of the Prime Minister himself to control more strictly the 
planning and the implementing of policies.503
The PM’s Department, and above all the Economic Planning Unit, has 
a considerable influence on the policy–making and implementation processes. 
The EPU serves as Secretariat for many important committees.504 The 
Cabinet has the final authority to change or reject their proposals, and the 
coordinating committees are the locus where the practicalities of policy 
proposals are discussed and choices are made.505  
Under the Mahathir administration, the bureaucratic influence has 
been limited mainly to the Prime Minister’s Department. Prime Minister 
Mahathir could well rely on a restricted group of senior officials for the 
elaboration of policy proposals. However, he had to use the existent 
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THE BUREAUCRACY 
The Malaysian public sector506 comprises “the federal government, 
thirteen state governments, four municipalities (namely Penang, Ipoh, Kuala 
Lumpur, and Malacca), non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs), public 
financial institutions such the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and the 
Bumiputra Investment Foundation, plus other government companies. … 
Sixty-five government departments serve twenty-five ministries.”507
The bureaucracy is composed of central and operating agencies. The 
central agencies are the most influential, “because they control the operating 
and development budgets, and personnel matters of the operating 
agencies.”508 The Public Sector Department (PSD), the EPU, the Malaysia 
Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), 
and the Treasury are among the central agencies. 
In 1990 the public sector employed more than 700,000 persons. The 
Administrative and Diplomatic Service had 2960 officers.509 The officers 
from the Administrative and Diplomatic Service hold the most important 
positions in the bureaucracy.510
                                                 
506 “In Malaysian official documents and references, the term “bureaucracy” is never used. 
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The Prime Minister’s Department is “the chief government ministry at 
the federal level. … In 1990/91 it had forty-eight divisions/unit/branches 
under its jurisdiction.”511
The Department devotes a large part of its resources to the “planning 
formulation, coordination, and implementation of economic policies” and 
therefore its most prominent agencies are the EPU, MAMPU and the Public 
Service Department. 512 Camroux has observed that the increase in resources 
and expertise in the PMD, and especially the Economic Planning Unit, has 
correspondently decreased the Prime Minister’s dependence on the Finance 
Ministry.513
The top bureaucrat is the Chief Secretary to the Government; this is a 
politically designated post and the Chief Secretary is also Secretary to the 
Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service. The Chief Secretary “is responsible 
for ensuring the implementation of the decisions of the Cabinet” and he is the 
chairman of high-ranking permanent committees. 514 It is important to note 
that this very important post is always “held by a Malay.”515 The civil service 
has in fact been “a bastion of Malay power.”516 This characteristic helps in 
explaining another peculiarity of the Malaysian bureaucracy: “the 
interconnection and close ties between leading Malay politicians and 
bureaucrats.”517 As Crouch observed the civil-service elite always enjoyed 
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close links with UMNO; this special relationship has continued also under 
Prime Minister Mahathir, notwithstanding his wish to make the bureaucratic 
system more efficient and business-friendly. 518
The Malaysian political establishment undoubtedly trusts the loyalty 
of the civil service. In exchange, the bureaucratic elite enjoy status and are 
offered career opportunities in public corporations, in the private sector and in 
politics.519
 
THE LEAD MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES 
The lead agency on trade policy is the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI)520. The Ministry of Finance determines the level of 
import and export tariffs, and manages a range of incentives. Other ministries 
that participate in trade policy making and implementation are the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Primary Industries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bank 
Negara (the central bank of Malaysia) advises on financial services 
negotiations. The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) is a 
statutory body that assists MITI in matters relating to “the promotion and 
coordination of Malaysia’s industrial development and investment 
promotion.”521 The Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister’s 
Department holds considerable influence on trade policy making. 
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The Ministry of International Trade and Industry “bears major 
responsibility for the planning and implementation of the nation’s foreign 
trade and industrial policies to accelerate economic growth.”522 The Ministry 
has therefore to devise, propose and implement industrial development 
strategies and international trade policies. A major function of the MITI is to 
promote foreign and domestic investments in Malaysia in accordance with the 
policy directions indicated by the Industrial Master Plan. A second important 
objective of the Ministry is “to promote and coordinate Malaysia’s export of 
manufacturing products and services by strengthening bilateral, 
multilateral523 and regional trade relations and cooperation.”524 
Consequently, the Ministry is in charge of both industrial (and technological) 
development and trade. The Ministry is composed of two main sections, one 
that deals with industrial development concerns, and another responsible for 
international trade matters. 
International trade issues are managed by the Bilateral Trade Division, 
the ASEAN Economic Cooperation Division, the Trade Support Division525 
and the Multilateral Trade Relations Division. Before the Uruguay Round, the 
Division had to monitor international trade developments under the GATT in 
order to protect Malaysia’s interests in relation to issues such as market 
access or unfair trade practices.  
                                                 
522 WTO (1993): 34. 
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The Division was directly involved in the negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round; the Malaysian mission to GATT (and now WTO) was 
staffed by MITI officials and it was separated from the Malaysian mission to 
the United Nations in Geneva. During the negotiations, there were four 
officials from MITI in Geneva; when specialized expertise was required, as it 
was the case for the negotiations on tropical products and financial services, 
the administration would send additional personnel from the relevant agencies 
and ministries.526
Although during the Uruguay Round, as Sally has noted, active 
participation to the negotiations was limited to a small number of MITI 
officials operating in Geneva and Kuala Lumpur, it was because of the 
experience of the first years of active participation in the GATT process that a 
number of mechanisms for enlarged consultation within and without the 
government bureaucracy were created.527 As the next section will illustrate, 
when the Uruguay Round ended, the mission was receiving “more input from 
other parts of the government on non-border regulatory issues; and 
consultation with business [had] been stepped up.”528
With the successful conclusion of the Round, the Division’s main 
functions became to “analyse and evaluate policy development under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), … emerging multilateral trade issues such 
as multilateral investment rules, trade and environment, trade and competition 
policy, trade and labour standards.”529
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The Multilateral Trade Relations Division has also to perform the 
activities related to anti-dumping and countervailing investigations. The 
Division furthermore represents Malaysia in a number of multilateral fora, 
including UNCTAD and APEC.530
In addition, MITI is involved in the planning of policies towards 
foreign investment: the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA), a statutory body placed under the umbrella of MITI, has the task of 
implementing the investment policies applying to all manufacturing activities. 
MIDA “as one-stop investment approval agency for all … domestic and 
foreign-owned investments in the manufacturing sector” has to process all the 
applications related to FDI, which will subsequently go to MITI for the final 
authorization. 531 In this respect, MIDA manages a wide range of incentives. 
It can also propose “to grant tariff protection to what are considered to be 
“deserving industries;”532 however, the final decision on these matters is a 
preserve of the Ministry of Finance. In addition, MIDA supervises the non-
financial services sectors. 
During the first half of the 1990s when the Uruguay Round 
negotiations were still under way, MITI went through two important 
restructuring exercises. At the end of 1990, the Ministry was split and the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs was created. The new 
Ministry was to act with the objective of “facilitating an orderly and healthy 
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development of domestic trade … and for protecting the interests of 
consumers, businessmen and manufacturers.”533 The Ministry of Domestic 
Trade and Consumer Affairs was also given the task to devise and execute the 
policies for the protection of intellectual property rights. 
A second major restructuring effort was directed at the Ministry’s 
export promotion activities. In June 1993, the Malaysian External Trade 
Corporation (MATRADE) was launched by the Prime Minister. The new 
agency was charged with the promotion, development and facilitation of 
Malaysia’s external trade in existing and new markets.534 The author of the 
MITI’s 1993 Annual Report stressed how the “pace and magnitude of … 
changes in the composition and direction of the export trade … required a 
well organised institution to be set up to ensure that policies and programmes 
are translated into effective action at the micro-economic and business 
community level.”535
The founding of MATRADE allowed MITI to restructure its system 
of Trade Commissions around the world. It was decided that MITI would 
maintain its focus on trade policy proper, and therefore retain its offices in the 
ASEAN capitals and in a few other important cities, including Geneva.536 
MATRADE would have to represent Malaysia’s trade interests in all the other 
existing trade commissions and concentrate on export promotion.537
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The restructuring of MITI was only indirectly related to the Uruguay 
Round negotiations; however, the complexity of the issues, and the awareness 
that the implementation (and the monitoring) of the eventual agreements 
would not be less difficult, made reforms appear more urgent. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry moreover started the 
publication of an annual report. The first “International Trade and Industry 
Report” was published in 1993. In the Foreword, the Minister Dato’ Seri 
Rafidah Aziz observed that the “publication [was] a response to the need felt 
by both the public and private sectors over the years for a comprehensive 
report on the country’s trade and industry policies and performance.”538 
Although the Ministry of Finance and Bank Negara had published annual 
reports on the Malaysian economy for many years, Rafidah believed that a 
comprehensive report by the MITI had long been overdue since “the trade 
and industry sector … is the most important sector in the economy.”539
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) proposes monetary and fiscal 
policies, and prepares and implements the budget. The MOF regulates the 
banking and insurance sectors, as well as the security industry and capital 
markets. The Ministry “makes the final decisions on taxes, including tariffs 
and various tax and non-tax incentives for investment.”540 For example, while 
applications for manufacturing licenses under the Industrial Coordination Act 
1975 and incentives provided under the Promotion of Investment Act 1986 
are examined by MIDA, MITI and the Ministry of Finance have the last word 
and MOF can in principle reject the granting of tax incentives.  
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The Treasury, various departments and four statutory bodies (Bank 
Negara, The Employees Provident Fund, the Securities Commission and the 
Inland Revenue Board) fall under the Ministry. The Royal Customs and 
Excise Department administers and collects indirect taxes, including customs 
duties (both import and export).541 Two divisions, the Economic and 
International Division and the Finance Division are involved in issues 
pertaining to the international economy and international trade matters.  
The Economic and International Division includes a Section dedicated 
to trade in services. The Finance Division proposes the Ministry’s position in 
APEC, ASEAN and WTO negotiations. Division’s officials also take part in 
consultations with the World Bank, IMF and WTO and represent the Ministry 
in APEC, ASEAN and WTO related meeting and negotiations. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is naturally in charge of the conduct 
of Malaysia’s foreign relations. Its main responsibility is to “pursue, maintain 
and enhance friendly ties with other nations …[In addition] The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs plays an important role in promoting the political and 
economic interests of the country.”542 The Ministry has a very limited 
involvement in trade policy-making. Its participation in the Uruguay Round 
has been minimal. Nonetheless, given the growing relevance of economic and 
international trade issues in Malaysia’s foreign policy, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has undergone significant restructuring. Interestingly, the 
reforms took place during the years of the Round. First, the most important 
section of the Ministry, the Political Division has had its title changed into 
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Department of Political and Economic Relations. Second, a new International 
Organizations and Multilateral Economics Department was created.  
As Zakaria has observed about Wisma Putra, as the Ministry is 
popularly known, “it is apparent … that equal emphasis is paid to political 
and economic issues and that bilateral relations are as important as 
multilateral ones in the contemporary world.”543
 
THE ECONOMIC PLANNING UNIT, PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT 
The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) is the central planning agency of 
the Malaysian government. Its main task is to propose economic policies and 
strategies for the development of the country.  
The Economic Planning Unit is constituted by two main divisions: the 
Macro Planning Division and the Sectoral Planning Division. The EPU is 
expected to “prepare the planning framework in order to expedite economic 
growth through the effective use of internal and external resources.”544 The 
agency is in charge of the privatization policy, which it “plans, coordinates 
and monitors.”545 The EPU also monitors investments, domestic and foreign, 
to ensure that the principles of the New Economic Policy are respected by the 
private sector. 546
The EPU is responsible for the formulation of the five-year 
development plans, and the preparation of the mid-term reviews. It has 
therefore to propose the development budget and it assists the Ministry of 
Finance in the preparation of the annual budget. Other tasks range from “to 
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plan and co-ordinate technical assistance from foreign countries and 
international organizations and to manage the Malaysian Technical 
Cooperation Program” to “advise the Government regarding economic 
ties547” 
The Agency, most importantly, allocates funds to the ministries, 
departments or projects and it is “the central staff agency of the government 
for planning national economic development. It functions as the secretariat to 
the National Planning Committee (NPC), the National Development 
Committee (NDPC), the Foreign Investment and the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Privatization.”548  
The EPU is involved in the formulation of all economic policy 
proposals to the Government and it unquestionably has the resources to 
influence outcomes. It is undeniably “the most important planning agency in 
the whole bureaucratic structure.”549 It is the agency that is closest to the 
Prime Minister, and its role is political as well as technical. 
 
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION AND 
OTHER RELEVANT COMMITTEES 
The Ministries and the other agencies described in the previous 
section coordinate their stance in policy-making through interministerial 
committees. Until 1987, two Committees had a significant influence on trade 
                                                 
547 WTO (1993): 35, Table II.1. 
548 Ho Khai Leong (1992), “Dynamics of Policy-Making in Malaysia: the Formulation of 
the New Economic Policy and the National Development Policy.” in Asian Journal of Public 
Administration. Vol. 14 No. 2 (December 1992): 216.  
549 Ho Khai Leong (1999) “Bureaucratic Accountability in Malaysia: Control Mechanisms 
and Critical Concerns” in Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the Asia 
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policy choices: the Coordinating Committee on Trade and Investment Policy 
and the Foreign Investment Committee. 
The Coordinating Committee on Trade and Investment Policy was 
expected to propose Malaysia’s trade policy stance and strategies, specifically 
in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, GATT, UNCTAD, 
the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and ESCAP; the Committee 
would also have “to examine all matters relating to bilateral trade agreements 
and Joint Trade and Economic Committees; to examine proposals on regional 
cooperation and propose appropriate trade policies and action; and to examine 
proposals for bilateral and multilateral investment guarantee agreements and 
other related policies on foreign investment.”550 It was chaired by the 
Secretary-General of the MITI; the participating agencies were the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Primary Industry, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Economic Planning Unit, Bank Negara and MIDA. The 
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs joined in after its creation 
at the end of 1990.  
In July 1987, however, a new committee was launched by the Minister 
of trade and Industry: the National Committee on Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, with the aim of ensuring “greater participation by Malaysia in 
the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade.”551 The new Committee had to 
counsel the Government on matters related to the ongoing negotiations in 
Geneva. In practice, it took over many of the functions that were previously 
performed by the Coordinating Committee on Trade and Investment 
                                                 
550 WTO (1993): 33. 
551 Ministry of Finance. (25 October 1987) Economic Report 1987/1988: 150.  
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Policy552, and since the completion of the Round, it has advised the 
Government about “its obligations under, and on implementation of, the 
WTO Agreements.”553
The National Committee on Multilateral Trade Negotiations is 
organized in a series of subcommittees, which, by and large, follow the logic 
of the negotiating groups in Geneva.554 Therefore, there is a Sub-Committee 
on Tropical Products and Resource-Based Products, chaired by a 
representative from the Ministry of Primary Industries; a Sub-Committee on 
Agriculture (Chairman: Ministry of Agriculture); a Sub-committee on 
Services (Chairman: Ministry of Finance); a Sub-Committee on Institutional 
Issues, Tariff, Non-Tariff Measures (Chairman: Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry). This sub-committee presides over two working groups, 
the Working Group on subsidies and the Working Group on Institutional 
Issues, Tariff, Non-Tariff Measures, both chaired by MITI officials. There are 
also a Sub-Committee on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(Chairman: Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs) and a Sub-
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures (Chairman: MIDA). 
The Foreign Investment Committee is another important high-level 
interministerial committee. Its main responsibility is to “regulate the 
acquisition of assets of 15% or more of the voting power in Malaysian 
companies, control and take-over of companies by foreign interests, and 
mergers and other acquisitions … whether by Malaysian or foreign 
                                                 
552 “The Coordinating Committee on Trade and Investment Policy has not met since 1993” 
WTO (1996):22.  
553 WTO (1996): 22. 
554 This section draws on WTO. (1993): 40, Chart II.2. 
 240
interests.”555 The Committee’s competence does not include matters covered 
by the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, or the Banking and Financial Act, 
and it examines cases were significant assets are exchanged.556 The Director-
General of the Economic Planning Unit is the Committee’s Chairman. The 
other members are “the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Finance, the 
Governor of the Central Bank, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, the Chairman of the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority,” and a few other very senior figures from the 
bureaucracy. 557
During the Round, the interministerial committees would link to their 
peers at the regional level. In particular, the ASEAN Senior Trade Officials 
(ASTO) group allowed for meaningful exchange of information and 
coordination, while in Geneva the ASEAN Geneva Committee would 
“formulate and coordinate ASEAN’s position on issues of common 
interests.”558
 
4) BRINGING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
During the Uruguay Round years, the government put in place a 
number of mechanisms for consultation with the administration and the 
business community. By the end of the Round, “a large number of 
committees and consultation procedures [facilitated] close links between the 
public and the private sector.”559 The government also sought to include 
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academics and scholars in the process of policy-making, and encouraged the 
institution of centers for policy studies. 
This section will first examine the most prominent mechanisms of 
consultation set up by the Mahathir administration: the Consultative 
Committees and the Malaysian Business Council. A short description of the 
activities of the two most important Malaysian think tanks will follow. 
 
THE MALAYSIA INCORPORATED POLICY 
In 1983, Mahathir launched the Malaysia Incorporated Policy with the 
aim of developing a constructive rapport with the private sector. In an address 
at the UMNO general Assembly in 1993, the Prime Minister affirmed that the 
government had “introduced many changes to the administrative system. If 
previously we cooperated less with the private sector, today we consider the 
public and the private sector as a team that works together to develop the 
country.”560
The policy had mixed results; the business community had 
reservations about the real intentions of the government at a time when the 
Prime Minister was fully engaged in his heavy industry program. The concept 
was revived in 1991 when the Government issued a Development 
Administration Circular (No.9 of 1991) titled “Guide on the Implementation 
of Malaysia Incorporated Policy.” The circular explained that “The Malaysian 
Incorporated Policy stresses the importance of co-operation between the 
public and private sectors in order to ensure rapid economic growth and 
national development. The success of the private sector leading to its 
                                                 
560 Quoted in Ahmad Sarji. (1994) The Civil Service of Malaysia: A Paradigm Shift. 
Government of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: 763. 
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expansion and increased profits will provide more revenue to the nation 
through the collection of government taxes. It is therefore crucial that the 
public sector ensures the success of the private sector.”561 The document 
supplied the Malaysian bureaucracy with an outline for the building of a 
process of consultation between the two sectors, with a special emphasis on 
trade and industry. 
The Chief Secretary, in a speech delivered in February 1991, told his 
audience that “from a study by MAMPU on the operationalization of the 
Malaysia Incorporated Policy, the following points emerge: (i) there is a need 
to increase the flow of information in both directions: for example, the private 
sector has lamented on the fact that there is a dearth of guidebooks or 
manuals which explain the procedures, rules or regulations, particularly on 
the issue of permits and licenses; on the other hand, the civil service has also 
found it wanting when it requests for some basic information such as 
production output, cost of production, utilization of raw materials, 
employment data …;(ii) there is a general reticence from the private sector to 
submit specific views and suggestions on the streamlining of rules, 
regulations and procedures, even when these views are solicited.”562
According to the Chief Secretary, the public sector had instituted the 
structural mechanisms needed to facilitate the process of collaboration and 
consultation. Specifically, Consultative Panels had been set up at Ministries, 
Federal Departments, state and district levels. In a paper presented at the 
Malaysia Regional Programme and Ministerial Dialogue on the 30th 
                                                 
561 Development Administration Circular (No.9 of 1991), Prime Minister’s Department. 
Quoted in Common, (2003): 176. 
562 Ahmad Sarji (1992): 285. 
 243
September 1991,563 Ahmad Sarji declared that the Panels’ function was to 
allow for a well-organized exchange of views between the business 
community and the bureaucracy. The discussions would aim at a fuller 
understanding of the problems that the private sector encountered in its 
dealings with the various departments. The Government was also expecting 
that the panels would contribute valuable advice regarding economic policies 
and would offer recommendations on how to improve the implementation of 
such policies. 
The Government had asked all agencies at the federal level to institute 
the Consultative Panels, and required that there should be a minimum of two 
meetings every year plus an Annual Dialogue Session. The Panels had to be 
served by a Secretariat to assist the participants in the preparation of the 
meetings. 
Most notably, the Circular declared that the discussions should 
“include strategic considerations for economic development, information 
generation and information sharing.”564 In particular, the Government 
expected inputs in areas such as “acquisition and dissemination of 
information on global markets, international competitors and product and 
service competitiveness.”565 It was then hoped that this would lead to “joint 
efforts to penetrate new markets, formulate marketing strategies, and 
infrastructure for establishing the Malaysian presence in foreign markets.”566
In 1993, a new high level committee was established to further 
improve the communication between the government bureaucracy and the 
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private sector. The Malaysia Incorporated Officials’ Committee, chaired by 
the Chief Secretary to the Government, met for the first time on August 10, 
1993. Its membership included high ranking officials from the public sectors 
and important business representatives, plus chief editors from the main 
Malaysian newspapers.567 The Committee was expected to “identify and 
discuss issues and problems related to government services that have an 
impact on the Malaysia Incorporated Policy.”568 The Committee would also 
work as a channel trough which feedback from the Chambers of Commerce 
would be submitted to the interested public agencies.569 It is interesting to 
note that, during the first meeting, among various issues, the members talked 
about how to improve Malaysian trade relations with China and other 
important trading partners. 
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In 1994, the Chief Secretary declared that the consultative panels had 
“contributed significantly in facilitating the free flow of information and 
…assisted in establishing closer rapport” between the civil service and the 
business community.570 He also noted that the Malaysian International 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) and the Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) were routinely giving valuable feedback to 
the government on many issues. 
In fact, the government had been disappointed by the initial reaction 
of the private sector at the Malaysia Incorporated Policy. The lack of interest 
shown by the business community during the initial years of the policy had 
convinced the government that more had to be done to involve the private 
sector in the economic policy debate. The improvements in the organization 
of the consultative panels had at last solicited a better response by industrial 
and business associations. The Chief Secretary could announce in 1993 that 
“the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) 
had participated in more than 40 consultative panels at the federal and state 
levels. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) had been 
involved in at least 62 consultative panels, committees and working teams at 
the federal and state levels. The National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of Malaysia had also actively participated in various consultative panels and 
committees.”571 The government was also particularly satisfied because the 
participating officials from those organizations were mostly the chairmen or 
very senior executives. 
                                                 
570 Speech delivered at a talk organized by the American-Malaysian Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM), delivered February 7, 1994 in Kuala Lumpur. Reprinted in Ahmad Sarji. 
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Among the Ministries, the most active in fostering the private sector 
collaboration was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
MITI is involved in a large number of dialogue initiatives, both at the 
Federal and the state level. At the local level, MITI holds regional dialogues 
in cooperation with the FMM; MITI set up also state level Industrial 
Coordination Committees, jointly chaired by the Ministry and the state 
authorities.  
The Annual Trade and Industry Dialogue, however, is the most 
important event hosted by the Ministry in its effort to improve the 
collaboration between the public and the private sector. The dialogues started 
in 1974 as informal meetings between ministry officials and representatives 
of the business community. When, in 1983, the Malaysia Incorporated Policy 
was introduced, the meeting grew to become a more formal and significant 
event. The Annual Dialogue is chaired by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry; senior officials from other ministries, departments and agencies 
dealing with matters linked to trade and industry are asked to be “present to 
report and respond to the issues raised” by the representatives of the private 
sector.572 It is interesting to note that the dialogue is organized as an open 
forum, that is to say “any representative group related to the manufacturing 
industry can register with MITI to be included.”573 In most of the other 
public-private sector meetings it is the government that selects the industries 
and their representatives. 
Participation by the private sector increased substantially during the 
Uruguay Round years. The Ministry commented that the dialogues were 
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attracting widespread and growing attention “from the various chambers of 
commerce and industry representing broad sectors of industry, such as 
electrical and electronic, chemical, textiles and apparel, automotive, palm oil, 
food, iron and steel, wood, rubber, shipping and non-metallic minerals.”574 In 
the 1990s, the service industries, such as banks, have started to participate to 
the Annual Dialogue.  
The Dialogue has been used as an opportunity by the private sector to 
air its concerns about international trade issues, including those relating to the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and agreements.  
 
AN EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATION: THE MALAYSIAN 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (MICCI) 
MICCI is one of the five members of the National Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Malaysia (NCCIM). The others are the Malay, Chinese and 
Indian Chambers and the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers. The 
Chamber represents the interests of the foreign investors.  
Since the second half of the 1980s, the opportunities for the Chamber’s 
members to participate in public-private sector discussions and to make their 
concerns heard increased substantially. The MICCI wished to establish and 
maintain a close rapport with the government; the government, on the other 
hand, during and immediately after the recession, was very keen to consult 
and encourage foreign investors. For example, in 1991, a dialogue session 
was arranged exclusively for MICCI’s members by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry. 
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The MICCI was regularly invited by the Government to express its views 
and table proposals on numerous issues. Since the mid-1980s, the Chamber, - 
in its own capacity or as a member of NCCIM - was involved in a growing 
number of public-private sector consultative bodies.  
The MICCI, as coordinator for the Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
Committee, prepared the NCCIM memorandum for the annual pre-budget 
dialogue with the Minister of Finance. The Chamber consistently used this 
opportunity to “emphasize views pertinent to the foreign investor.”575 It did 
also routinely participate in the Annual Dialogue with the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, and it was a member of the MIDA Board, the Export Promotion 
Council, and the Ministry of Finance Consultative Panel. 
The MICCI tabled in 1987 a “proposal for a clause by clause revision” of 
labor laws with the declared aim of “improving productivity and international 
competitiveness” and the Chamber cooperated regularly with the Malaysian 
Employers’ Federation on labor issues. 576
In 1988, the Chamber was invited by the Chairmanship of the 
National Economic Consultative Council (NECC) to submit its views for a 
post-NEP economic policy. 
The Chamber established a tradition of informal monthly meetings with 
important government officials and prominent political personalities. As 
MICCI’s President stressed in 1989, those close-door meetings “have proved 
to be most useful, both for the Chamber and we believe also to the 
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authorities.”577 That year, the distinguished guest list included Prime Minister 
Mahathir.  
MICCI’s concerns focused chiefly on investment rules, tax and non-tax 
incentives, and labor laws. Members were also interested in easing the rules 
regulating the employment of expatriates, infrastructure development and to 
engage in an exchange of information on topics related to the industrial 
sector, such as, for instance, environmental regulations. 
During the recession of the mid-1980s, the Chamber openly advocated a 
liberalization of the Industrial Coordination Act and supported the 
introduction of additional fiscal incentives destined to manufacturing 
investments. 
Very critical of the ICA – considered “one of the main stumbling blocks 
towards the expansion and diversification of manufacturing activities”578 – it 
welcomed the new guidelines for foreign equity participation introduced in 
July 1985, and the amendments to the Industrial Coordination Act approved 
in December 1985.  
The Chamber also welcomed the establishment of the Export Promotion 
Council as an additional forum where to lobby government officials on behalf 
of the international investors. In fact, in his annual statement in 1986, the 
Chamber’s President expresses satisfaction for the “increasing awareness by 
the Government on the importance of consultation with the private sector.”579
In September 1986, Prime Minister Mahathir revealed the government’s 
intention to introduce new incentives destined to foreign investors. MICCI 
praised the government for the adoption of these measures and expressed 
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great satisfaction over the “frank and open discussions and consultations 
between the public and private sector” that had accompanied the process of 
economic liberalization in Malaysia.580
The “close rapport” with the Malaysian administration improved with the 
end of the recession and the beginning of a sustained economic expansion 
from 1987. The Malaysian economy grew strongly in 1988, and that year saw 
a recovery in private investment; MICCI attributed this sign of renewed 
confidence to the changes in industrial policy introduced since 1985. The 
Government had “to be commended on the attractive range of fiscal and non-
fiscal incentives offered to investors” and on the efforts undertaken to 
streamline administrative procedures. 581 The Chamber expressed satisfaction 
at the establishment of the Coordination Center on Investment (COI) at 
MIDA that would serve as one-stop center for investors applying for 
manufacturing licenses.582
According to the Chamber, prudent and supportive policies implemented 
by the government had favored the strong economic growth registered at the 
beginning of the 1990s. MICCI’s members were convinced that “in 
cognizance of the need for foreign investment and its positive impact on the 
economy,” it was necessary that the trend of liberalization and deregulation of 
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THE MALAYSIAN BUSINESS COUNCIL (MBC) 
The Malaysian Business Council was inaugurated by Prime 
Minister Mahathir in January 1991. Its aim was to assist the development 
at the highest level of meaningful consultation between the government, 
the bureaucracy and corporate leaders.  
The Council is chaired by the Prime Minister; it is expected to 
examine domestic and international economic and business developments, 
discuss and develop practical options and strategies, provide feedback on 
policy issues, foster the cooperation between the private and public sector by 
removing possible obstacles and misunderstandings, and generate consensus 
on the national economic strategies.584  
The Malaysian Business Council has established ten Working 
Committees on different subjects; the Secretariat to the Council and the 
Working Committees is provided by the Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS). 
The Working Committee on International Trade, Industry and 
Investments is chaired by the Minister of International Trade and Industry. It 
has twenty members in representation of the public and the private sector. 
The Committee deals with questions ranging from labor issues, human 




During the 1980s, new research institutions were founded in Malaysia. 
                                                 
584 WTO (1998): 24. 
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These policy-oriented think tanks were asked to participate in the formulation 
of policy proposals. The most well-known of these institutions are the 
Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) and the Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies (ISIS); they are non-profit institutions, 
established under the Companies Act. They receive funding from the 
Government, the private sector and they carry out consultancy activities. 
According to Gomez and Jomo, both the think tanks “are conspicuous 
for their advisory role to the government.”585 Their establishment has been 
linked to the Prime Minister’s wish to reduce the role of the bureaucracy in 
policy-making.586
MIER and ISIS are directed by foreign-educated scholars and 
academics, and have at their disposal large and professional staffs. The two 
research institutions enjoy an established reputation as reliable and competent 
sources of information.  
 
The Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
The Institute’s role is to carry out “objective and independent policy 
research in the areas of defense, security and foreign affairs, national and 
international economic affairs, policies for nation building, and science, 
technology and industry.”587 ISIS is considered the most influential 
international relations research institute in the country.588 A large part of this 
influence was due to its founder and former director, Dr. Noordin Sopiee. In 
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1994, Noordin Sopiee was “chairman of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC), director-general of the Malaysian Pacific Basin Economic 
Council (PBEC) Committee, Chairman of the East Asia Centre for Economic 
Cooperation, the Malaysian representative on the Eminent Persons Group of 
the APEC, the Malaysia representative on the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Steering Committee and convenor 
of the Commission for a New Asia.”589
While opinions vary as to his ability to influence the Prime Minister, 
Dr. Noordin Sopiee was credited with having played an important role in the 
development of the Vision 2020 plan, and the East Asia Economic Group 
proposal, two initiatives where Mahathir invested considerable political 
capital. 590
As mentioned earlier, ISIS serves as secretariat fro the Malaysian 
Business Council and its Working Committees; the institute is also very 
active in promoting and hosting seminars and conferences and its 
representatives regularly attend regional meetings. 
 
The Malaysian Institute of Economic Research  
The institute was founded in 1985 and has a strong academic 
orientation. MIER is dedicated to “monitor and analyse the developments of 
the Malaysian economy, business environment and international economic 
trends and to undertake research projects commissioned by government 
agencies, corporate bodies, businesses, and international and donor agencies. 
To meet these objectives, MIER focuses on the following fields: 
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macroeconomic trends and forecasting, policy studies, industry studies and 
area studies.”591 The Institute at first proposed by the Prime Minister’s 
Economic Panel and then supported by the Council on Malaysian Invisible 
Trade (COMIT). It has been noted that MIER “serves as a bridge between the 
government, private sector and universities and it is a focal point for 
economic and financial research in Malaysia.”592  
Professor Mohamed Ariff, MIER’s Executive Director, has written 
extensively on international trade issues in general and the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in particular. Professor Ariff was a strong advocate for 
Malaysia’s participation in the Round. He firmly believed that the country 
could greatly benefit from a more stable, competitive and liberal international 
trading system. He was also convinced that domestic reforms, especially in 
the field of industrial investment incentives, were necessary and overdue. 
Therefore, the Uruguay Round negotiations presented a great opportunity to 
win domestic resistance to change.  
 
5) CONCLUSION 
The process of policy-making in Malaysia is highly centralized. The 
powers that the Constitution attributes to the Prime Minister have led to a 
tradition of strong Premierships. The pre-eminence of the Prime Minister is 
accentuated by the fact that he is also the president of UMNO.  
The Prime Minister has at his disposal a very large and well resourced 
Prime Ministers’ Department. The Department, and within it, its most 
important agencies, is the real locus of policy formulation and 
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implementation. Policy proposal are then brought to the Cabinet for final 
approval. In Malaysia there is a firm tradition “regarding secrecy and 
confidentiality in intra-cabinet and intra-bureaucratic decision-making 
processes” and it has been alleged that final decisions are routinely taken by a 
few very influential political players. 593
Over the last two decades, Malaysian policy makers had to face 
economic issues of increasing complexity. In addition, the decision to 
welcome foreign investments on a massive scale has entailed the need for 
consultation and cooperation both with the foreign investors and with the 
local private sector that was supposed to service them.  
The government responded with the creation of a system for 
organized consultation and collaboration between the public and the private 
sector. The Malaysian Business Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the 
most prominent, while all the Ministries have established Consultative 
Committees and Annual Business Dialogues.  
The inclusion of the private sector in economic, and therefore trade, 
policy-making has represented a significant change in the country’s political 
tradition. Although the inclusion is mostly at the information gathering level, 
it has had an impact on the business community perception of the public 
sector. In fact, a study by Weder on the role of government in East Asia, 
found that “Malaysia’s business community awarded high marks to the level 
of cooperation with the government.594 The rating on the credibility of the 
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announcements is one of the highest in the entire sample… and so is the 
rating on participation … and trust in government. … Local entrepreneurs … 
generally trust the authorities to enforce property rights. Foreign experts gave 

















                                                                                                                              
you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in rules, laws, or policies which 
materially affect your business?]; Credibility of announcements [Do you expect the 
government to stick to announced major policies?]; Information [The process of developing 
new rules or policies is usually such that affected business are informed]; Participation [In the 
case of important changes in laws and policies affecting my business operation the 
government takes into account concerns voiced either by me or by my business association]; 
No retroactive changes [Do you fear retroactive changes of regulations that are important for 
your business operations?]; Trust in government [“All in all, for doing business I perceive the 
state as …”. Possible responses were on a scale from 1 (government is an opponent0 to 6 
(government is a helpful agent)]. In Weder (1999): 28. 





 “The signing ceremony has already been running for two hours, and 
has another two hours to go, as well over 100 national delegations take their 
turn to sign the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.” Marrakesh, Morocco, 12 April 1994 596
 
1) MALAYSIA AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 
The Uruguay Round had started in the midst of a recession and had 
proceeded in very unsettled economic times. It was only towards the end of 
the negotiations that the international environment began to improve.  
The difficulty of the times was one of the main reasons why Malaysia, 
decided to actively participate in the GATT round. In 1986, those developing 
countries that had already started to adopt a (relatively) more liberal approach 
to trade policy and/or an export-oriented industrialization model saw clearly 
that the critical factor in their economic success – or failure – was access to 
industrialized nations’ markets. 
Malaysia, and its ASEAN partners, grabbed the opportunity that the 
revaluation of the yen presented them with to embrace a regional division of 
labor that in few years would have greatly transformed their economies and 
their industrial structure. If the means to become a developed nation had to 
come from export revenues and FDIs, it was necessary to strengthen the rules 
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of the global trading system, containing protectionist practices and supporting 
the export interests in the developed world in the launching of a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
In order to participate effectively in technically complex and 
politically sensitive negotiations, a small open developing economy like 
Malaysia had to build up its “own resilience.”597 It was necessary to create a 
network of alliances with like-minded nations and to strengthen domestic 
institutions that would have to manage the negotiation and the 
implementation of the eventual agreement. 
This research has shown that Malaysia’s government adopted a 
combination of international and domestic strategies to maximize the nation’s 
leverage at the negotiating table.  
Small states need to find allies in order to enhance their chances of 
influencing the outcomes of international negotiations. Malaysia strongly 
supported intra-ASEAN cooperation during the Uruguay Round. The 
Southeast Asian grouping exploited its significant experience on the 
international stage and its reputation to credit itself as a reliable partner. 
ASEAN nations decided to accept the challenge of a MTN round against the 
wishes of the very influential leaders of the G-77, and ASEAN managed to 
keep a united front when confronted with thorny and sensitive issues such as 
trade in services. It has to be noted that Malaysia was not inclined to open its 
service sector to foreign companies. Although the GATS did not cause any 
major change of policy for the sector, this outcome could not have been taken 
for granted in 1986. Clearly, Malaysia’s priorities were the launch of a new 
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round and ASEAN unity during the negotiations and the government 
accepted the risk of a less favorable result. 
The consistency of ASEAN negotiating positions and the 
cohesiveness of the group, made the Southeast Asian nations important 
members of influential agenda-setting coalitions, such as the Café au Lait and 
the Cairns Group. And ASEAN membership of APEC made it a more 
credible negotiating tool against the reluctance of the EC to reform 
agricultural trade. 
Malaysia could not determine the outcome of the negotiations on any 
issue. However, it could promote the principles of multilateralism, 
cooperating with other like-minded nations to limit the power of the bigger 
players and influence the tone of the negotiations.598  
The system of alliances that Malaysia was able to enter and exploit 
allowed the government to limit the concessions that the Round inevitably 
would require. Malaysia would side with developed countries, like Australia, 
on agriculture, or with Japan, on antidumping, but would go back to 
developing country block on Special and Differential Treatment.  
During the round, every negotiator tried to secure for his country 
significant concessions in exchange for limited offers. Malaysia’s own 
concessions were relevant and did demonstrate the real commitment the 
country had to promote a more liberal trading environment. However, the 
changes in behind-the-border policies and regulations that had to be 
introduced because of the UR agreement were relatively limited.599 The 
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government had already started the reform of the national IP regime and the 
service sector was basically left a domestic domain. No article of the 
agreement challenged the provisions of the NEP. The biggest concession was 
the phasing-out of the very controversial compulsory local-content policy for 
the automotive sector – that by the way, remained the most protected of the 
industrial sectors. 
As examined in Chapter 6, Malaysia did introduce a series of 
bureaucratic and administrative reforms to respond more promptly to the 
events and the demands of the global trading environment. Nevertheless, the 
involvement of the private sector in policy-making was largely confined to 
information gathering. Although many public-private sector fora were created 
during the Uruguay Round, trade policy-making formulation remained 
fundamentally a top-down affair. 
This research has shown that the government of Malaysia adopted 
effective strategies to achieve its negotiating goals. After the negotiations, 
there was considerable debate over the benefits – and the costs – that the 
implementation of the agreement would have brought to the contracting 
parties. While Malaysia was generally considered among the countries that 
would benefit the most from the new regime, some Malaysian observers 
criticized the outcome as too onerous for the nation. Next section summarizes 
the debate and presents an overview of the new issues that some 
industrialized countries, in particular the United States, wished to include in 




2) AFTER THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Towards the conclusion of the Uruguay Round many studies 
attempted to estimate the economic impact of the agreements.600While results 
varied and subsequent studies indicated smaller gains, the models shared one 
common characteristic: Asia was set to gain more than other regions. World 
Bank and OECD studies suggested that developing Asia would benefit the 
most from the increase in trade in manufactured goods, while Latin America 
would benefit less and Africa virtually nothing; according to a memorandum 
from the World Bank, “gains [were to] be most immediate in Southeast and 
East Asia.601” 
There were other economic reasons that made Asian negotiators 
confident that their countries had fought the right battle when they supported 
the launch of the round and endured eight long years of laborious 
negotiations. First, Asia’s share of world trade was rapidly expanding as were 
foreign investments. Any increase in world trade would have necessarily 
benefited the fastest growing trading nations. Second, China and India were 
emerging as economic powers and their growth was bound to bring new 
opportunities for trade growth, especially since India had started to liberalize 
its economy and China was negotiating its accession to the newly created 
WTO. Third, East and Southeast Asian developing nations were the largest 
exporters of manufactures in the developing world. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
round had achieved significant reductions in tariffs applied on many 
manufactures, including electronics, and had integrated, albeit at a slow pace, 
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trade in textile and clothing in the GATT framework. Therefore, Southeast 
and East Asian exporters were set to benefit from the tariff cuts. 
Malaysia was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. The 
International Trade and Industry Report of 1993 stated that the “successful 
conclusion of the Round will help to maintain and … improve market access 
for Malaysian exports of agricultural commodities and manufactured goods” 
and “improved trading rules … will provide protection for smaller trading 
nations like Malaysia.”602
The government acknowledged that there were also obligations that 
the country had to fulfill such as reforming its incentive and subsidies 
systems and problems with the implementation of many agreements, 
especially those on services, property rights and investments. However, since 
“international trade [would] remain the anchor of [Malaysia’s] future 
economic expansion,” the government was adamant that the country had a 
strong and prime interest in the preservation and the strengthening of a rule-
based multilateral trading system.603
The conclusion of the Round was not universally met with 
enthusiasm. Many criticisms were addressed to the fact that the negotiations 
had failed to fully integrate agricultural trade in the GATT framework, the 
time table for the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement was very back 
loaded, and that developing countries had accepted to sign the very onerous 
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agreements on services, TRIPs and TRIMs while industrial countries had 
failed to offer significant compensation.604
As for Malaysia, some commentators pointed out that the country was 
already extremely dependent on trade and investment flows, and, therefore, 
“further liberalizing trade [would] make [the country’s] economic growth 
even more vulnerable to external instability.”605 According to the critics, the 
TRIPs and TRIMs provisions would not encourage the transfer of technology 
to Malaysia; instead they would “retard the development of local industry and 
technology.” 606 And the new agreement on services would only worsen the 
service account deficit. Others would also rightly note that the costs for 
implementation would not be negligible and that developing countries had 
been given little time to fulfill their new obligations. 
However, both the Malaysian government and its critics shared some 
serious concerns about the future agenda for negotiations at the WTO. During 
the final years of the round, some industrialized countries attempted to start 
talks on new issues such as labor standards and environmental protection. The 
potential linkage of non-trade objectives to trade policies was immediately 
confronted with strong opposition by developing countries’ governments. The 
basic objection was that trade policy is seldom the best remedy for non-trade 
problems. Furthermore, there is the possibility of policy capture; “support for 
such trade policy interventions may come from those not directly interested in 
the non-trade policy objective at issue. … Because it is impossible to separate 
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policy capture from the appropriate use of trade policy tools, the bias must be 
weighted towards nonintervention in most cases.”607
The Malaysian government was well aware of the growing trend to 
use “unilateral trade policy instruments to support environmental 
objectives.”608And there was also a growing tendency to bring environmental 
dispute at the multilateral level. There had been proposals for trade bans on 
tropical lumber to reduce the risk of rain forest destruction and the number of 
environmental-related disputes in GATT was rising.609 Developing countries 
were opposed to any GATT involvement in this issue. There was a risk that 
industrial countries would use threats of sanctions in non environmental 
policy areas to enforce environmental policy commitments. It is interesting to 
note that “this possible threat of cross-retaliation onto trade in goods triggered 
by non-fulfillment of environmental norm and standards almost exactly 
parallels the debate on intellectual property enforcement in the Uruguay 
Round.”610
In 1994, few weeks before the Ministerial Meeting in Marrakesh, the 
United States, supported by some other industrialized countries tried to 
include workers’ rights on the agenda of the WTO work program. The 
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proposal was met with fierce opposition by the representatives of the 
developing and newly industrializing nations. Their governments argued that 
relatively lower labor costs constituted the principal, if not the only, 
comparative advantage their economies could rely on. Any linkage of 
multilaterally agreed labor standards with trade would undermine developing 
countries’ competitiveness.611
These concerns, the complexities and the inevitable shortcoming of 
the Uruguay Round agreements were expressed by Prime Minister Mahathir 
in March, 1994 when he declared that although the multilateral trade 
negotiations had come to a conclusion, he “happened to think that those who 
believe in trade liberalism will continue to have a fight on their hands against 
the forces of protectionism.”612
In the following years, the government of Malaysia became 
progressively more concerned that the WTO work program did not reflect the 
country’s interests. An examination of Malaysian development policies and 
the WTO work program at the end of the 1990s could certainly help in 
understanding why Malaysia left the ranks of the ‘friends of the Negotiations’ 
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